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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF BID-ASK SPREADS
ON RETURN COMPUTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL ANOMALIES
SEPTEMBER 1988
DAVID P. ECHEVARRIA, B.A., CHAPMAN COLLEGE
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA
Ph,D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Ben Branch

A substantial body of literature on security market anomalies has
emerged since the general acceptance of the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis.

Two major areas are observed in this literature.

The

first examines information effects on security price behavior.

This

literature analyzes the price adjustment lags in response to new
information.

The second investigates empirical anomalies; size

effects, weekend effects, and January effects.

Studies in both areas

have largely depended on an analysis of returns computed from closing
prices.
This study examines the impact of alternative specifications of
the return generating process in testing previous findings of empirical
anomalies.

Specifically, the study assesses the usefulness of returns

generated in a manner consistent with the use of "market” and "limit"
orders by public traders.

Accordingly, returns measured ask-to-bid and

bid-to-ask are utilized to test the persistence of the empirical
anomalies.

The empirical results support the hypothesis that the

misspecification of the return generating process in previous market

vi

studies is in part the cause of anomalous findings of market
inefficiencies.
This study also examines whether more efficient estimates of
relative risk (beta) can be estimated when returns are measured using
alternative price structures (i.e., means of closing bid-ask prices)
for market index construction.

These alternative return models are

expected to produce more efficient estimates of beta.

The empirical

results demonstrate that small increases in beta estimation efficiency
can be achieved when the mean of the closing bid-ask price quotes are
used in the place of closing prices.
Empirical evidence is presented which sheds further light on the
nature of the negative serial correlations observed in discrete price
series.

The evidence supports the hypothesis that market behavior is

substantially predictable in the very short term.

The ability to

forecast the direction of the next day's return is, however, of
negligible economic value due to costs and institutional restraints.

• •
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
1.1

The Valuation Problem
The central problem in finance is the valuation of financial

assets.

The inputs into the analytical framework for valuation are

the size of anticipated returns, the dates those returns are to be
received, and the risk undertaken to obtain those returns.

The last

input, risk, is the most difficult variable to measure and incorporate
into the valuation process.

The simplest definition of risk is the

variance of the income stream of a financial asset over time.

The

greater the variation in anticipated income streams, the greater the
risk.

The level of risk is critically important as it helps to fix

the level of the required or expected rate of return.
A significant advance in asset valuation was the development of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).

The CAPM decomposes risk into

two categories; systematic risk and nonsystematic risk.

Systematic

risk is that portion of total security return fluctuations (including
dividends) resulting from the co-movement of individual security
prices with the market.

Nonsystematic risk is the residual after

subtracting the systematic portion.

It is largely that portion of

total security return fluctuations (including dividends) resulting
from news about a particular issuer.

Security prices move with the

broader market in response to changes in important economic forces
(macro economic variables) or change in response to new information
regarding the company’s prospects (micro economic variables).

The

effects of nonsystematic risk can be minimized by combining different
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securities into a portfolio.

Thus, within the framework of the CAPM,

only systematic sources of risk are priced.
The CAPM assumes that investors are risk averse.
less risk to more for a given level of return.

They prefer

The normative

imperatives of the CAPM suggests that investors will hold a meanvariance efficient (well diversified) portfolio (the market portfolio)
in combination with a risk free asset.

The proportions of the market

portfolio and risk free asset are determined by the risk preferences
of each investor.

An investor unwilling to undertake risk will hold a

larger proportion of his (her) wealth in the risk free asset.

The

CAPM also states that the trade-off between (beta) risk and return is
linear.

1.2

Market Efficiency
An important association in the CAPM framework is the

relationship between information and prices.

In efficient markets,

observed prices accurately reflect all publicly available and
historical information.

This is the theoretical content of the

Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).

The CAPM explicitly assumes that

markets are efficient; observed prices are true prices.

At the center

of efficient market dynamics is the question of whether observed
prices accurately reflect all the information necessary to allocate
capital efficiently among competing uses.

Thus tests are performed to

ascertain if observed prices incorporate all information contained in
past prices (weak form efficiency), if all publicly available
information is incorporated in observed prices (semi-strong form
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efficiency), and if observed prices accurately anticipate inside
information (strong form efficiency).

1.2.1 Weak Form Efficiency
Early research in security markets revealed the presence of
serial dependencies in returns generated using daily closing prices,
and regularities in the variation of intraday prices.

The

independence of successive returns is at the heart of efficient
markets theory.

Returns are assumed to follow a random walk.

The

random walk model, a restrictive form of the EMH, assumes that
successive returns are independently and identically distributed over
time.

The existence of positive or negative correlations implied the

possibility of potentially exploitable patterns in sequential returns;
the correlations could be used to earn (abnormal) risk-adjusted
profits.

Alexander (1961), and Fama and Blume (1966) examined the

presence and magnitude of serial price dependencies and concluded that
the small magnitudes of the serial dependencies precluded
opportunities for earning abnormal profits after transaction costs.
The transaction costs specified in these studies consisted of
brokerage fees and did not specifically include liquidity costs.
1.2.2 Semi-Strong Form Efficiency
The incorporation of new public information in security prices is
at the heart of the semi-strong form of the EMH.

Testing of the semi¬

strong form EMH is facilitated with the use of event studies.

These

studies examine the speed with which security prices adjust to new
information.

In an efficient market, prices rapidly adjust to new

information; no opportunities should exist for earning abnormal
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profits by acting on new information.

The market model and returns

generated from closing prices are utilized to test for semi-strong
form market efficiency.

Early security market research generally

supported the semi-strong form of the EMH (Cf. Ball and Brown [1968],
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [1969]).

More recent studies, however,

have identified abnormal profit opportunities existing beyond an
information event when the information is unexpected.

Ball (1978)

reviewed fifteen separate event studies reporting excess returns
persisting beyond the unexpected information event.

The inconsistency

of semi-strong form market efficiency research results have generally
been attributed to misspecifications of the two parameter model used
to describe equilibrium in the stock market.
1.2.3 Strong Form Efficiency
The EMH holds that security prices fully reflect not only public
information but also properly anticipate inside information.

Most

studies examine the ability of professional portfolio managers to
outperform the market averages.

The most frequent research result is

that professionals are unable to outperform the market averages on a
consistent basis.

The important exceptions to these general studies

are the profits obtained by corporate insiders and stock exchange
specialists.

Studies by Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976), and Nunn,

Madden, and Gambola (1983) indicate that insiders are able to
outperform the market averages on a consistent basis.

1.3

Market Microstructure and Trading Behavior
In perfect and efficient markets, each asset trades at one price

at a given point in time.

Also, the price at which a trade is
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consummated is assumed to be equal to the true or intrinsic value of
the asset.

Efficient markets are also liquid:

Financial assets may

be readily bought and sold at their intrinsic values.

An implicit

assumption of the asset pricing models pertains to the nature of
liquidity.

Liquidity obtains when buyers are ready to transact with

sellers at a price equal to the intrinsic value of the asset being
traded; if a seller cannot find a buyer, the market is not (perfectly)
liquid.

The asset pricing models generally assume that buy and sell

orders for the same security occur simultaneously through time; both
orders reach the point of transaction at the same time (Cf. Garman
[1976]).

In the language of real markets, orders are "crossed."

This

should not be interpreted to mean that all orders are crossed, but
that the average transaction price is equivalent to the intrinsic
value of the security.

If markets are illiquid, transaction values

might have to differ substantially from intrinsic values to facilitate
desired trades.

Illiquidity implies an undesirable cost.

The

existence of liquidity can only be sustained with synchronous
(continuous) trading and a sufficient number of market participants.
Real security markets are characterized by nonsynchronous buying
and selling; matching buy and sell orders do not arrive at the trading
point at the same time.

The nonsynchronous nature of trading requires

the establishment of liquidity services in order to provide the
essence of a continuous market (Cf. Demsetz [1968], Smidt [1971]).
Liquidity services are especially important for traders in stocks
characterized by low daily volumes of shares traded.

Thus a buyer

(seller) may not always have a seller (buyer) to balance the
transaction.

Accordingly, institutional (i.e., stock exchange)
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arrangements are made for the provision of liquidity services.
Liquidity (or immediacy) services are provided by specialists on the
floor of the NYSE or by market maker-dealers in the over-the-counter
(OTC) market.

The cost of liquidity services are the mark-ups or

mark-downs buyers or sellers incur when trades are consummated.

In

such trading, the specialist represents the other half of the trade.
The costs of immediacy services provided by the specialist are
important because they affect the cost of capital for firms in
accordance with the level of prices and daily trading volume.
Moreover, the prices at which immediacy transactions occur may not be
equilibrium prices.
The prices utilized to generate returns in the asset pricing
models are usually the last trade (closing) prices of a security.

The

implicit assumption of this particular return generating process is
that the closing price is the price which would be obtained in buying
or selling the asset at that particular point in time.

The formal

structure of the CAPM does not directly address the operating dynamics
of the market at the micro-structure level.
is cast in terms of perfect capital markets;

The asset pricing theory
no transaction costs and

taxes, buyers and sellers are price takers in a competitive market,
and all economic players have equal and costless access to
information.

General treatment of these assumptions suggest that they

may be relaxed without impairing the [theoretical] results.
markets are imperfect.

Real

Transactions costs and taxes are nonzero.

players do not have equal and costless access to price relevant
information.

Also, the general equilibrium CAPM has nothing to say

about the possibility of trading opportunities.

Finally, and most

All
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importantly, buyers and sellers are not atomistic price takers
exchanging assets at intrinsic values.

The nonsynchronous nature of

trading in real markets impose additional burdens on public traders;
they frequently transact with the market maker/ specialist at prices
favorable to the latter (Cf., Bagehot [1971]).
The empirical examination the CAPM treats the closing price as an
equivalent of intrinsic value.

Also, this closing price is implicitly

assumed to be the (market clearing) price which would prevail in
trading activity.

Thus any deviations of actual (trading) prices from

the intrinsic price structure would necessarily result in measurement
errors or biases in computed returns.

The probability is high that

returns computed from observed (closing) prices are inconsistent with
the assumptions of the CAPM.

We note, however, that the CAPM is a

general equilibrium model which is not affected by the type of return
utilized; thus any reasonably constructed return could be used to test
the two-parameter asset price model.
An important part of the assumption content of the asset pricing
theory holds that equilibrium prices are (by definition) market
clearing prices.

Observed transaction prices may be viewed as being

market clearing prices but such prices are not necessarily equilibrium
prices.

Thus the possibility exists that some of the observed closing

prices are inconsistent with intrinsic values.

The implication of

this potential inconsistency is that it casts doubt on the suitability
of returns computed from observed closing prices when those returns
are used in the [equilibrium] asset pricing model.

If returns

computed from closing prices are not equilibrium returns, then the
asset pricing models may not be correctly pricing real or financial
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assets.

The incorrect pricing of assets would result in the

misallocation of capital.

1.4

Market Anomalies
A considerable number of security market researchers have

attempted to explain the behavior of its participants by studying the
behavior of prices in the context of an asset pricing theory.

The

theoretical components of that framework are efficient markets theory
and the capital asset pricing model.

Efficient market theory suggests

that observed prices are equal to intrinsic values.

This result

obtains from the informational efficiency said to characterize the
market for investment assets.

The capital asset pricing model

outlines the method for utilizing observed returns together with
variance and covariance structures to price securities.
A substantial body of literature on security market anomalies has
evolved since the general acceptance of the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis (EMH).
distinct areas.

This literature may be dichotomized into two
The first examines information effects on security

price behavior (event studies).

This literature analyzes price

adjustment lags in response to new information.

The second examines a

different set of empirical anomalies; size effects, weekend effects,
and January or turn-of-the-year effects.

These empirical anomalies

demonstrate price and return behavior inconsistent with that suggested
by efficient markets theory and the capital asset pricing model.
i

Weekend and January effects reflect systematic regularities in stock
returns inconsistent with the EMH.

Size effects result in returns

incompatible with those predicted by the capital asset pricing model.
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Most of these studies utilized returns computed from closing prices.
The possibility that returns computed from closing prices differ
significantly from equilibrium returns may underlie findings of market
anomalies when [joint] tests are made of market efficiency and the
specification of the CAPM.

1.5

Research Objectives
Two observations may be made at this point.

First, the case

against the EMH as a realistic theory explaining the behavior of
prices appears to be substantial.

One possible explanation is that

the capital asset pricing model is inadequate or misspecified.
Another possibility is that the return generating process is
misspecified yielding incorrect estimates of risk and return.

Of the

three forms of the EMH, only the weak form stands relatively
unchallenged.

The semi-strong form has been repeatedly challenged in

the event study literature, although without a completely unqualified
result.

Research on abnormal returns accruing to traders with inside

information is widely regarded as negating the strong form EMH.
The second observation concerns the specification of the return
generating process.

Virtually all empirical security market research

has been based upon returns computed from closing prices.

While

readily available on the major data tapes, such returns may not
accurately reflect what a real world trader would earn.

As the last

reported transaction, the "close” may take place at the closing bid
(highest unexercised offer to buy), closing ask (lowest unexercised
offer to sell) or somewhere within or even outside the end-of-day bidask range.

Indeed, stocks can "close" (last trade) at any time during
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the day.

Thus closing prices may bear relatively little relation to

the market situation at the end of the day.

Also, closing prices may

not adequately reflect prices obtainable by traders.

Results reported

by Branch and Echevarria (1986) suggest a significant bias is
introduced into returns when those returns are generated using closing
prices.

These biases are the result of a misspecification of the

return generating process.
The general objectives of the current study are:
1.

to determine the effects of biases introduced by the
use of closing prices to compute returns.

2.

to examine the effects of alternative specifications
of the return generating process on market anomalies.

3.

to examine the effects of alternative specifications
of the return generating process on measures of risk
and return.

The alternative specifications of the return generating process are
useful in determining the effects of specialist/market maker spreads
on obtainable returns and the implicit effects on the cost of capital.

1.6

The Theoretical Model
In economic theory, the equilibrium price is the price which

equilibrates the supply of commodities with the demand for those
commodities.

In the basic Walrasian model, equilibrium is assumed to

be attained through a process of tatonnement with recontracting.

No

trades are consummated until buyers and sellers agree on the
equilibrium set of prices for commodities to be exchanged.

In theory,

equilibrium prices and quantities for all commodities are
simultaneously determined.

Moreover, in equilibrium, neither excess

demand nor excess commodities exist.

The incidence of production and
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consumption are identical in time.

This theoretical structure has

been extended to the market for financial assets (claims on future
sums of money).

The essence of the theory is the suggestion that

markets move from one point of equilibrium to the next without
intervening activity.
In general equilibrium, the equilibrium price is also termed the
market clearing price.

The critical assumption in this general scheme

is the instantaneous determination of equilibrium prices and
quantities.

If we vacate or relax this price adjustment assumption,

then we cannot maintain that market clearing prices are necessarily
equilibrium prices.

Transaction prices can be deemed to be transitory

market clearing prices as markets move from one equilibrium point to
the next.

All asset pricing theories assume that market clearing

prices are equilibrium prices.

This relationship results from

instantaneous price adjustments in response to new information in a
perfect and efficient market.

Moreover, these relationships form the

theoretical content of the efficient markets hypothesis.
The realities in the securities marketplace require alternative
arrangements when time preferences do not coincide.

This adjustment

takes the form of third parties who stand ready to buy into their
inventories the output of producers and to sell from those inventories
to consumers.

The implicit fees charged by these third parties (mark¬

ups or mark-downs) are the compensation for the risk undertaken in
providing all economic players flexibility from having to coincide
perfectly their production and consumption decisions.

As a

consequence, the prices received or paid are affected by the magnitude
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of the fees charged.

The magnitudes of the fees are in turn

determined by the perceived levels of risk.
Observed security prices (closing prices) are explicitly assumed
to be market clearing prices.

Also, the structure of the [security]

valuation theories assume that these values are equilibrium prices
readily obtainable in markets which are continuously trading or are
characterized by synchronous trading.

When markets do not trade on a

continuous or synchronous basis, arrangements are made similar to
those existing in commodity markets.

Third parties, specialists,

stand ready to transact, for a fee, with traders desiring immediate
execution of their orders.
received or paid.

The result is a change in the prices

These prices are market clearing prices in the

context of individual trades, but these prices are not necessarily
equilibrium prices.

Also, the returns computed from these prices are

not necessarily the equilibrium returns envisioned in the asset
pricing theory.

The fees charged by the specialists affect the level

of transaction prices and the returns realized or expected.

Further,

these fees affect the realized rates of return and, by implication,
the cost of capital.

Any valuation model would be misspecified if it

did not include a provision for the effects of the fees charged by
providers of liquidity.
The essence of the models to be defined in the current study stem
from the assumption that markets do not equilibrate instantaneously.
Instead, market transactions are viewed as the process by which
markets seek to establish equilibrium values under general conditions
of uncertainty.

The levels of uncertainty are not only affected by

investor perceptions about the true state of nature, but also by the
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specialist.

In this sense, market activity appears as a series of

transactions at prices simply viewed as transitory market clearing
prices.

This view is supported by the observation that many

transactions are completed at prices different from the theoretically
defined equilibrium price.

1.7 Methodology and Sample
One method for investigating the nature of market efficiency and
the asset pricing models is to examine the implications of alternative
assumptions about the form of the return generating process.

The form

of the existing return generating models are constructed in a
normative sense; they assume informational efficiency in a perfect
market, general equilibrium in the commodity markets and an extension
of that equilibrium to the capital markets.

Consequently, closing

prices are assumed to be identical with equilibrium prices.

Also,

returns computed from these closing prices are assumed to be
equilibrium returns.

Alternative specifications of the return

generating process would be driven by a positive view of market
behavior; an imperfect market which strives to be informationally
efficient.

The set of prices used will reflect the prices most likely

to be obtained by a public trader.

Accordingly, we will not assume

that observed transaction prices are equilibrium prices.

This inquiry

will treat observed prices as transitory market clearing prices.

The

imperfections of the market for financial assets are held to be
captured in the bid and ask spreads which reflect the discontinuous
nature of trading activity.

14

The general focus of this research is the examination of the
effects on computed returns when those returns are measured for
positions that are bought and sold with market orders.
returns most likely to be earned by public traders.

These are the

For comparative

purposes, this analysis will also examine the results of using prices
from a limit order strategy to compute returns.

Both sets of returns

will be compared to returns measured in the traditional manner.

The

degree to which biases are induced in returns computed using closing
prices will be measured as the difference between the returns measured
close-to-close and returns measured ask-to-bid (assuming a market
order to buy and sell).

Close-to-close returns will also be compared

with returns measured bid-to-ask (assuming execution of a limit
order).
The current study will examine the effects of alternative return
generating models on previous findings of empirical anomalies.

We

will determine if mis-specifications of the return generating process
are the cause of the size effects, January effects, and weekend
effects.

The inquiry will utilize and compare all three methods

examined by Roll (1983) for computing mean returns; buy and hold,
rebalanced, and arithmetic average portfolio returns using close-toclose, ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask price information.

This comparison

will provide additional insight into the effects of measurement bias
introduced by the use of close-to-close returns in size effect
studies.
One issue related to market efficiency studies is the
autocovariance properties of observed prices.

Accordingly,

we

utilize the data sample to examine next day behavior of prices and
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returns when today’s closing price distribution is known.
Specifically, we are interested in the relation between today's close
and tomorrow's return.

This work builds on earlier studies by

Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966) reporting the presence of serial
dependencies in intraday price movements.

The presence of

autocorrelation in sequential price series is a statistically
troublesome phenomena.

Herein we examine the phenomena to determine

if any additional characteristics of the regularities exist beyond
those previously reported.
The availability of a sample containing the closing bid and ask
price quotes in addition to closing prices will permit comparisons of
the DJIA constructed in the usual manner and one constructed with
closing ask quotes, bid quotes, or the average of the two.

These

indexes will then be compared to the traditional index and the
differences will be noted.

The reconstructed indexes will then be

used as a proxy for the market portfolio and betas will be estimated
for various portfolios and individual securities.

The primary purpose

of these estimates will be to determine whether more efficient
estimates of relative volatility are possible using indexes
constructed under alternative methods.

This inquiry does not

reexamine the market efficiency issue.

What is germane in this

particular study is how alternative measures of price might influence
the construction of an index (ie., the DJIA).

Also, if alternative

constructs are possible, they may allow for better tests of market
efficiency regarding efficient betas or a stronger relationship
between risk and return
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The current investigation utilizes two data samples.

The first

sample includes 42 days of closing, bid, and ask price quotes for 1134
NYSE issues for initial testing of the research hypotheses.
sample is referred to as the ’’test sample one.”

This

A second sample

includes 43 days of closing, bid, and ask price quotes for 1205 NYSE
issues.

This second sample is referred to as the ’’test sample two.”

The two samples cover a bear (December 1981 - January 1982) and a bull
(December 1982 - January 1983) move in the market.

The two samples

may help to make somewhat stronger generalizations than would a single
two month sample.
The two samples combined, however, are still smaller than most
samples typically used in market studies.
to support the results of this study.

Two arguments can be made

First, the current samples are

the largest ever used in examining market microstructure behavior and
trading effects.

Second, the strength of statistical tests suggests

that an extremely large sample is not necessary to ascertain the
general characteristics of the population.

This is particularly true

if the behavioral characteristics of two sub-samples can be
demonstrated to be similar.

The strength of this study derives at

least in part from that demonstration.

1.8

Research Implications
This investigation is expected to provide several useful insights

into the behavior of security markets and the problems engendered by
attempting to demonstrate normative abstractions too far removed from
empirical realities.

First, this investigation should provide useful

data on the extent of biases induced in returns when those returns are
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computed solely with the use of closing prices.

Second, this study

will provide an alternative analysis of the nature of empirical
anomalies.

In particular, this study will demonstrate how results

vary when alternative specifications of the return generating process
are utilized to define price structures and measure returns.

The use

of alternative price structures result from the imperfections of the
market.
This investigation will also provide additional information
regarding the nature of serial price correlation in observed prices.
The degree to which regularities exist will bring into question the
putative randomness of security prices.

The nature of the results

will permit certain characterizations to be reformulated about the
efficiency by which capital is allocated and its costs determined.
Finally, the most important implication of this study concerns the
manner in which security market research has been conducted.

This

implication is particularly germane in the area of market efficiency
and asset pricing.
This study will offer results which are likely to be critical of
efficient market theory.

The intent of this research is to emphasize

differences in the results achieved in this study and those of prior
studies.

We seek to increase our understanding of the limitations to

what we think we know about security market behavior.

Accordingly,

the results reported herein are seen as important contributions to our
knowledge of the operations of security markets.
A significant amount of work still remains to be done in
reviewing tests of the efficient markets hypothesis as a unified
theory explaining the behavior of security prices.

The nonrandom
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behavior of security prices and the potential for biases in returns
measured from closing prices suggest that alternatives be considered.
While the articulation a of new asset pricing paradigm is not
suggested, the use of alternative return measures to confirm or deny
the strength of market efficiency theory and the asset pricing models
is suggested.

Returns should be generated in a manner which most

closely reflects the actual operation of the market.

Thus realistic

testing of these anomalies should assume the use of market orders (the
only type that assures a trade).

1.9

Outline of the Study
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter II

reviews the relevant body of literature relating to spreads,
specialist behavior, and empirical anomalies.

Chapter III presents

the principal hypotheses to be examined and the form of the test
procedures.

Chapter IV describes the research methodology and

sample data set.

the

Chapter V contains a detail description of the

characteristics of the data set and the initial set of empirical
results.

Chapter VI contains the empirical results of the market

anomaly tests.

Conclusions and implications of the study are

contained in chapter VII

CHAPTER

2

LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Transaction Costs on the NYSE
In imperfect markets, securities may trade at more than one

price.

As described in chapter I, stocks may trade at the bid, ask,

or inside the bid-ask spread.

Bid and ask prices are necessary

because of the nonsynchronous nature of trading activity in real
markets.

Bid-ask spreads are transaction costs incurred when services

are provided which free transactors from the requirement for a
matching order on the other side of the transaction: One essence of
perfect markets is costless, synchronous trading.

Given the

structural arrangements of imperfect security markets, security
transactions are subject to two sources of transaction costs;
brokerage fees and bid-ask spreads.

Brokerage fees were previously

set by general agreement among member firms of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE).

Since May 1, 1975 fees have been largely set by

competitive forces.

These fees are based on share price and number of

shares traded; the higher the price of the stock and the greater the
number if shares traded, the greater the brokerage fee.

The relative

(%) cost of transacting, however, per dollar exchanged is lower for
higher priced stocks and larger size trades.
The relevant characteristic of brokerage fees is that they do not
consider the riskiness of any particular security or its level of
trading activity.

Thus securities appear "equal" when brokerage fees

are considered; two securities trading at the same price would incur
the same brokerage fee from the same broker.
extend to the structure of bid-ask spreads.

This "equality" does not
Bid-ask spreads (the
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difference between the highest unexercised offer to buy and the lowest
unexercised offer to sell) are observed to be substantially less
homogeneous than brokerage fees due to the sensitivity of bid-ask
spreads to price levels, trading volume, and specialist perceived
levels of risk.

This study does not address the impact of brokerage
/

fees on realized returns.
effects of bid-ask spreads.

The primary focus of this research is the
Accordingly, this study will assume a

uniform schedule of brokerage fees for a single round lot (100 shares)
at intervals similar to the price stratified deciles utilized in this
study.

However, when spreads are analyzed with a price stratified

sample, certain general relationships between price and bid-ask
spreads are apparent.

Figure 2.1

(p. 21) demonstrates the nature of

these relationships for test sample one (TS1).
Stocks in TS1 (1134 issues covering 42 days of trading) are
classified by price into deciles and decile averages calculated for
share price, percentage bid-ask spread and dollar spread.

The

logarithm (log) of the average percentage spread (left-side y-axis) is
plotted against the log of the average share price per decile (xaxis).

The log of the average dollar spread (right-side y-axis) is

also plotted against the average share price.

The graph clearly shows

that the percentage spread declines as stock prices get larger.
Moreover, the relationship appears to be a log-linear function.

The

somewhat obvious exception is the percentage spread for the lowest
price decile.

As demonstrated in figure 2.1, the relative spread for

the lowest price decile departs from the strict linearity of the other
deciles.

This departure may be related to previously reported

findings of abnormal returns accruing to low price stocks, the stocks
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Figure 2.1 Bid-Ask Spread versus Average Share Price by Decile.
Results are graphed for test sample one.

of small firms, and firms with low market values of equity.

Figure

2.1 also shows that the proportional increases in dollar spreads are
also log-linear in terms of increases in price per share.
Demsetz (1968) observed that;

...A security’s price must also affect the spread quoted for
quick exchange. Spread per share will tend to increase in
proportion to an increase in the price per share so as to
equalize the cost of transacting per dollar exchanged.
Otherwise, those who submit limit orders will find it
profitable to narrow spreads on those securities for which
dollar spread per dollar exchanged is larger,
(p. 45)

Demsetz also suggested that the lack of strict proportionality in
brokerage commissions could result in the attenuation of the ’’strict
proportionality” (p. 45)

in specialist imposed transaction costs.

Furthermore, the bid-ask spread for any individual security is
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sensitive to the volume of trading activity in that security and this
sensitivity affects realized returns in a manner distinctly different
from brokerage fees.
In as much as securities tend to trade noncontinuously,
institutional arrangements are required in order to provide liquidity
or immediacy services for traders demanding immediate execution of
their orders.

Demsetz (1968) described the bid-ask spread as "...the

markup that is paid for predictable immediacy of exchange in organized
markets." (p. 36)

The specialist function on the floor of the NYSE

provides liquidity services by imposing a dual price structure.

The

specialist stands ready to buy (sell) at the quoted bid (ask) price
from (to) those traders desiring immediate execution of their sell
(buy) orders.

If markets are efficient, the bid-ask spread should

straddle the true price.

In effect, the trader who demands an

immediate execution pays a "penalty" equal to one-half of the spread.
This penalty increases the cost basis on a buy and reduces the
proceeds on a sale.
spread.

A "round trip" incurs the full amount of the

An important characteristic of the bid-ask spread is that it

varies according to the several aspects of the market for each
security.

Hence stocks trading at the same price but with different

daily volumes or price volatilities are subject to different spreads.
The cost of [equity] capital for a firm reflects the rate of
return required by investors who buy and hold the firm's [equity]
securities.

The total rate of return experienced by investors is

affected by the level of transaction costs.

Demsetz (1968) suggested

that a portion of the difference in "...borrowing costs between large
and small firms can be attributed to differences in the cost of trans-
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acting rather than to imperfections in the capital market” (p. 34).
The importance of Demsetz' study resides in its suggestion of a
relationship between transaction costs and the cost of capital.
The buying and selling of a firm’s securities does not by itself
change the cost of the firm's capital.

This change is brought about

by changes in the rates of returns investors desire to achieve.
dynamics of this suggestion are fairly simple.

The

Investors will attempt

to pass on to other investors any costs incurred which reduce
achievable rates of return.

The effective result is an increase in

the gross required rate of return achieved by adjusting the price at
which they wish to sell or buy.

This grossing up of the investors

required rate of return results in an effective increase in the cost
of capital for the firm.

The amount by which investors gross up the

required rate of return is directly a function of the magnitude of the
transaction costs incurred at the brokerage level and on the floor of
the stock exchange.

Since brokerage fees are essentially fixed by

competitive forces, bid-ask spreads imposed by the market maker/
specialist function are important determinants of the price adjust¬
ments made by investors.

This suggests that the return experienced by

an investor/trader must consider the effects of transaction costs.
Thus any model of the return generating process, given the
imperfections of ’’real world” markets, would have to reflect the
effects of transaction costs (i.e., bid-ask spread) on measured
returns.

Also, these transaction costs would be expected to influence

the allocation of capital in a market where firms are competing for
investment capital.

Thus a rational argument can be made that

investors will adjust their required rates of return based on expected
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transaction costs.

This is a typical situation in real estate where

sellers will mark-up the asking price of their property by an amount
equal to the expected brokerage fee.

In the case of securities, the

portion of transaction costs represented by bid-ask spreads would be
expected to influence the return required by investors.

Similarly,

the return experienced by an investor would be influenced by the
magnitude of the bid-ask spread.

We might also argue that the

existence of the limit order book may result from investors adjusting
their buy/sell prices to compensate for the effects of transaction
costs on realized or expected returns.

The magnitude of those effects

is a function of several market related variables.
More recently. Roll (1984), Glosten and Harris (1985), Harris
(1986b), and Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988) have attempted to
measure the magnitude of the bid-ask spread actually paid (the
effective spread) by uninformed traders.

The important commonality in

their research has been the attempt to measure the magnitude of the
effective spread by utilizing closing prices.

Moreover, their

research is motivated by a recognition of the important effects that
bid-ask spreads have on investor behavior.

Constantinedes (1986)

suggests that these proportional transactions costs (i.e., bid-ask
spreads) create ”no transactions regions.”

Specifically, investors

will make no adjustments to their portfolios when asset prices lie
within the no transaction region.

Roll (1984) suggested the use of

the serial covariance properties of observed prices to estimate
effective bid-ask spreads in order to avoid the costly process of
collecting actual bid-ask spread data in machine readable form.

An

important objective for any empirical study utilizing actual bid-ask
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spread data would be to examine the accuracy of bid-ask spread
magnitudes measured utilizing transaction prices.

2.2

Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread
Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972) and others have investigated the

determinants of the bid-ask spread.

Demsetz (1968) observed an

inverse relationship between the cost of transacting and trading
activity.

As the number of trades (volume) increased, the bid-ask

spread tended to become smaller.

Demsetz also observed that as stock

prices increase, the relative cost of transacting also tends to become
smaller; the percentage spread declines as price increases.

The

effective result is an increase in the cost of [equity] capital (and
by implication the required rate of return) for small firms (those
with low price stocks or small market values of equity) or firms with
narrow trading volumes.

Implicit in Demsetz' observations is a

relationship between bid-ask spreads, stock price, trading volume, and
observed returns.

Tinic (1971) suggested that Demsetz’ (1968) study

examined too few variables.

Tinic included as determinants of the

bid-ask spread certain aspects of the specialists' portfolio inventory
position, market structural characteristics, and the economics of the
specialist's function.

The Tinic model included eight variables (six

statistically significant) explaining 84 percent of the variation in
bid-ask spreads.

Branch and Freed (1977) constructed an equally

effective model of bid-ask spread determinants using volume,
competition, volatility, and stock price.
An important issue in this study relates to the more complete
specification of the returns generating process.

Demsetz (1968)
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established a clear relationship between bid-ask spreads and the cost
of capital and by implication the required rates of return.

The

important determinants of the bid-ask spread have been identified as
price, volume, volatility, and the degree of competition.

Clearly,

models purporting to represent the returns generating process would be
misspecified if they did not consider either the bid-ask spread or its
determinants.

Beaver (1981) has suggested that much of the existing

empirical research has been conducted in the absence of a formal model
of the returns generating process.

The addition of a spread variable

to the return generating process would capture an important element
missing in the CAPM.

Alternatively, the return generating process

could be respecified to include the effects of nonsynchronous trading
at the microstructure level by measuring returns across the bid-ask
spread.

2.3

Specification of the Return Generating Process
Many researchers have observed weak relationships between beta

(as a relative measure of risk) and return [ie., Sharpe (1965),
Lintner (1965)].

Schwert (1983) has suggested that the statistical

evidence supporting a positive relationship between (beta) risk and
average returns is surprisingly weak.

The basic model used to test

this relationship is described by equation (2.1).

R-^ = a-£ + B-^Rm + e-[
Where:

(2.1)

B-^ = beta, a measure of systematic (market) risk
RjL = the average return for security i
ai» ei = a constant and random error term, respectively
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The inability of the (linear) capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
to reflect actual market experience more efficiently may be tied to
the manner in which returns and risk have often been measured.

Thus

the recurrent observation of a misspecified model or incorrectly
measured risk attributes may be the result of reliance on returns
measured close-to-close.

This reliance may be due in large measure to

the availability of closing price data in computer readable form.
The effects of the bid-ask spread on the cost of capital and by
implication, required rates of return have been established in studies
by Demsetz (1968), Smidt (1971), and Tinic (1972).

These studies

indirectly suggest an alternative method for measuring returns.
Assuming for the moment that the cost of capital is affected by the
cost of transacting, any model of the returns generating process would
be misspecified if it did not include a cost of trading variable.
Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest that "...transaction costs are a
missing factor in the single period, two-parameter CAPM.” (p. 58).
Accordingly, the costs of transferring existing equity should also
affect the required rates of return.

Thus, we argue that by measuring

returns across the bid-ask spread we may capture an important aspect
of transaction costs.
returns be measured?

The obvious question is how should those
Most trading activity on the floor of the NYSE

is accomplished via the use of "market'’ orders.
are the only type that assures a trade.

Moreover, such orders

Thus, any realistic testing

of trading strategies or returns measurement should assume the use of
market orders.

Market orders, if not "crossed" with other market

orders on the floor of the exchange, are taken to the relevant post to
be executed at the quoted ask price for buy orders, and bid price for
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sell orders.

Computing returns would require the use of an asking

price on the buy side and a bid price on the sell side.
Some market orders are "crossed" with other market orders,
usually at a price within the bid-ask spread.

Such matching requires

that orders arrive at the relevant "post" at very nearly the same
time.

Given a random occurrence of crossed trades within the bid-ask

spread, the average price of these crossed trades should approximate
the mean of the bid and ask price quotes.

Returns measured using the

mean of the bid and ask price quotes would approximate returns
computed from "true" prices as defined by Blume and Stambaugh (1983)
and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).

The likelihood of crossed-trades

occurring on the buy and sell transactions for any given trader is
probably low except for securities with relatively large spreads or
low volumes.

Thus a case may be made for measuring returns using the

means of the bid and ask price quotes.

Most studies using closing

price quotes to compute returns implicitly assume the equivalence of
the mean closing price quotes and the mean of the bid and ask price
quotes.
Returns could also be measured assuming the use of "limit"
orders.

Limit orders specify a particular execution price, usually

outside the current bid-ask price quotes or equal to either the
specialist's bid-price for a limit-buy order or the ask-price for a
limit-sell order.

If these orders cannot be executed reasonably

quickly, they are left with the specialist who enters them in the
limit-order book.

These orders will eventually be executed at the

specified price (assuming that is possible).

Thus a "best" case

return would be measured by buying at the bid and selling at the ask.
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This is the return typically earned by the specialist.

A public

trader is unlikely, however, to earn this return on a regular basis.
Nearly three-quarters of all trades utilize market orders.
Moreover, the specialist participates in two out of every three
trades.

Thus returns computed from ask-to-bid prices are much more

likely to reflect what might actually be earned than returns based on
close-to-close prices.

Computing returns ask-to-bid (buying at the

ask and selling at the bid) embodies a "worst case" assumption.

Such

an assumption is, however, probably the most realistic for most public
(ie., non-exchange member) traders.

Computing returns from close-to-

close prices, in contrast, introduces a bias of potentially
significant but thus far largely unknown dimensions.

This study,

however, examines the magnitude of this bias.

2.4

Empirical Anomalies
The current study bears on all security market studies that have

used close-to-close returns.

Much of the empirical research on market

behavior has been motivated by tests of market efficiency which use
the CAPM to establish risk adjusted returns as a benchmark.

This

study is, however, particularly motivated by the recent interest in
the size, low-priced, and year-end effects as well as the weekend
effect.

The literature on market anomalies is fairly recent in

origin.

The seminal papers were written by Banz (1981) and Reinganum

(1981) on size effects and by French (1981) and Gibbons and Hess
(1982) on weekend effects.

These researchers were generally testing

the explanatory power of the CAPM when they discovered the results
reported in the following sections.

The literature in this area is
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substantial and growing.
exhaustive.

The following review is not intended to be

The remainder of this chapter will review the most

germane research reported in the academic literature.
2.4.1 Size/Low Price Effects
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) are frequently cited as the
motivators of subsequent research activity on size effects.

Size

effects address the incidence of excess risk adjusted rates of return
accruing to the stocks of small firms over time.

The rates of return

experienced are in excess of those predicted by most asset pricing
models.

Also, size effects are most pronounced in studies utilizing

daily returns data.

Several potential explanations have been offered

for these anomalies including the possible misspecification of the
CAPM.

Roll (1981) has suggested that nonsynchronous trading may

explain the size effect anomalies associated with the stocks of small
firms or firms with small market values of equity.

Alternatively,

Roll (1983) suggested that what appear to be excess (positive) returns
for small capitalization stocks may have two potential causes: first,
the mis-estimation of returns; second, the underestimation of risk,
particularly under conditions of nonsynchronous trading.

Lakonishok

and Smidt (1984) found that stocks in the lowest market value of
equity (MVE) decile only traded on average 75 percent of their sample
days.

This finding is typical of turn-of-the-year trading patterns.

Branch and Echevarria (1986) have reported a significant bias in
returns when those returns are measured using closing prices.

Thus an

indication of nonsynchronous trading, underestimation of risk, and
overestimated returns may explain the apparent abnormal excess returns
of small MVE.
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Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest that the small MVE effect can
also be viewed as a low price effect (LPE).

Using monthly holding

period returns and per share price as the stratification variable they
found results similar to Reinganum (1982).
reported in other research.

The same results have been

Both methods utilize stock prices or

market values computed from stock prices as the classification
variable.

Stoll and Whaley (1983) echo other researchers' concerns

that the effect could be due to price or other statistical biases.
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) have suggested that the "bid-ask
effect" explains part of the size effect.

That is, a portion of the

effect is due to an estimation bias in computed returns for individual
securities.

The bid-ask effect imparts an upward bias in average

returns computed from closing prices.
is largest in stocks with low MVE.

Moreover, the bias' magnitude

The upward bias in computed

returns results from the oscillation of closing (last) transaction
prices between quoted bid and ask prices.

Unfortunately, they do not

offer an explanation for why the bid-ask effect imparts an upward bias
in computed returns.

Blume and Stambaugh also suggest that the bid-

ask effect bias is strongest in rebalanced portfolios and is
substantially less significant in buy and hold portfolios.

This

reduction in bias for buy and hold portfolios results from a
"diversification effect" not present in rebalanced portfolios.
creates some confusion.

This

Rebalancing means maintaining an equal dollar

amount invested in each asset held in a portfolio by "rebalancing" at
the end of each period.

Accordingly, stocks which have gone up in

price must have some portion sold so as to maintain a fixed dollar
value invested; stocks which have gone down in price must have
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additional shares purchased in order to maintain the same proportions
(equal weights).

This rebalancing behavior does not present a problem

in a perfect market; i.e., no transactions costs.

The effects of

rebalancing can be accomplished (de facto) by simply computing the
daily return of the portfolio as the cross-sectional daily average
return of all securities in the portfolio and then utilizing these
daily portfolio returns to compute the geometric holding period
return.

The result appears as a rebalancing to equal weights.

The

lack of a ’’diversification effect” is unlikely to result in a bias or
bid-ask effect.

A portfolio composed of randomly selected securities

which are bought and held does not necessarily obtain better
diversification effects than a series of randomly formed portfolios
over the same time frame.
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) characterize the magnitude of the
estimation bias in terms of return differentials between buy-and-hold
portfolios and rebalanced portfolios.

They demonstrate that the bias

in calculated returns is most noticeable in "rebalanced” portfolios.
Blume and Stambaugh show that the size effect reported by Reinganum
(1981) is reduced by one-half when buy-and-hold portfolio returns are
calculated.

This reduction in the magnitude of the size effect is

attributed to the attenuation of the bid-ask effect via use of buyand-hold portfolios.
Roll (1983) has shown that the method used for computing mean
portfolio returns in size effect studies lead to different results.
The method used to compute mean returns is partly responsible for
anomalous excess returns accruing to small firms or firms with small
market values.

These results stem from the autocovariance properties

33

of portfolio returns.

Specifically, if positive serial dependence is

present in portfolio returns, arithmetic average returns (AR) will be
larger than returns for buy-and-hold (BH) or rebalanced (RB)
portfolios.

Thus any size effects will be larger if a simple AR

return is used in contrast to BH or RB returns.

Also, for short-term

holding periods (ie., daily or weekly) use of arithmetic average
returns or rebalancing strategies will overstate returns compared to
buy-and-hold.
The Mbid-ask effect", in the Blume and Stambaugh (1983) study,
results in a mis-estimation of the "true" prices (and by implication
true returns) when the average of observed prices is computed.

They

define the true price as the average of the closing bid and ask price
quotes.

This definition differs from the true price as defined by

Glosten and Milgrom (1985).

The latter define the "true" price as the

price which would prevail under conditions of symmetric information.
The two definitions evolve from complementary views of the market
microstructure.

The Blume and Stambaugh (1983) view implicitly

recognizes the imperfection of real markets; stocks trade at values
other than their theoretical intrinsic values.

The mean of these

observed transaction prices should, however, be equal to the intrinsic
value.

The intrinsic value is the result of an informationally

efficient market and is termed the "true" value by Glosten and Milgrom
(1985).

An underlying drift in the daily mean of the closing bid and

ask price spread over a period of time is a potential source of error
or bias.

This is readily observable in a bull or bear market.

A

tendency of last trade prices to occur on the ask-side (bull market)
or the bid-side (bear market) could result in a difference between the

34

mean of observed closing prices and the mean of the closing bid and
ask prices.
Intuitively, if transactions occur symmetrically at the bid and
ask levels and randomly within or outside the bid-ask spread, the mean
of all transaction prices in any security should equal the true price.
The bias resulting from oscillations of quoted closing prices which
differentiate the mean of the closing price quotes from the mean of
the closing bid and ask prices suggest some degree of measurement
error or inefficiency.

Moreover, the bias could be greater if the

price series were experiencing a drift.

The magnitude of the drift

would be the difference between the mean closing price and the mean of
the closing bid and ask price quotes divided by the number of
observations.

The presence of any drift in values, up or down, would

be reflected in the distribution of transactions at the bid, ask,
inside or outside the bid-ask spread at the close of trading.

Thus an

upward or downward bias might be found in computed average returns
which are subject to an underlying drift moment.

If the "bid-ask”

effect bias is partly responsible for the size effect, then the bias
should be relatively large for low price stocks and stocks with low
trading volumes.

This result is due to the magnitude of the relative

spread which tends to be higher for those stocks.

Blume and Stambaugh

(1983), however, offer limited empirical evidence for their
hypothesized bid-ask effect.

Their sample consisted of one day's

closing bid and ask price quotes for 332 stocks on the NYSE with bid
prices less than $8.00.

Thus their results may only be valid for a

static cross-section of stocks and may not reflect the dynamic
behavior of this bias over a longer period of time.

Also, the Blume
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and Stambaugh study does not examine any other effects due to volume
differences, price volatility, or the magnitude of the bias as stock
prices get larger.

These additional variables would be useful in any

study examining the determinants of the bias.
2.4.2 January Effects
The sample of December and January bid-ask spreads facilitates
review of the January effect research.

The January effect is the

apparent tendency of stocks which experienced year-end lows in
December or large declines in the preceding year to experience
positive returns in January.

Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Branch and

Freed (1977), Dyl (1977), Keim (1983).

More recently Branch and Chang

(1985), and a host of others observe seasonal effects in stock
returns.

Keim (1983), studying the size effect, observed that 50% of

the abnormal excess (positive) returns ascribed to the size effect
occur in the month of January; 26% occurs in the first week in January
and 11% the first day.

As a consequence, the January effect and the

size effect may exhibit some degree of inter-relationship.
effects may be acting together.

The two

Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983),

using monthly returns data report that the January effect is unstable,
but still positive.

Keim (1986) observes that the magnitude of the

size effect differs across days of the week and months of the year.
Accordingly, the magnitudes of the effects may be influenced by
whether the year ends or starts on a Monday or a Friday.

Keim (1986)

also observes that the inclusion of dividends imparts a strong upward
bias if a sufficient number of companies in the sample are paying
dividends.

Few companies in the lowest price decile of this study

paid dividends either during the 42-day test sample one or the 43-day
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confirmation sample.

However, all returns will include dividend

yields.
2.4.3 Weekend Effects
Cross (1973), French (1980), and Gibbons and Hess (1981) have
reported the apparent tendency of stocks to experience negative
returns on Mondays.

This behavior is inconsistent with the weak form

of the efficient market hypothesis.

One potential explanation for the

weekend effect may be the systematic occurrence of ex-dividend dates
on Mondays.

These studies did not control for the incidence of ex-

dividend dates.

Thus any study of a weekend effect would need to

control for ex-dividend effects.

The French (1980) study reporting a

weekend effect used a data sample for Standard & Poor’s Industrials
stocks that did not include dividends.

Thus, the presence of a

substantial negative return on Mondays would be expected in the
absence of correcting the return computation algorithm for ex¬
dividend-day price adjustments.

French observes that his results may

’’...simply reflect a systematic pattern in ’ex-dividend' dates."

More

recently Philips-Patrick and Schneeweis (1987) find that ex-dividend
price effects distort weekend effect findings and offer an essentially
theoretical proof.

2.5

Microstructure Price Behavior and Autocorrelation
An important concern of security market researchers is the extent

to which serial price correlations affect the results of empirical
studies.

The general theoretical assumption is that prices are

randomly drawn from a known distribution.

The theoretically expected

results are independently distributed returns.

An important and
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unresolved question is how returns are related to where stocks close
in relation to the bid-ask spread.

Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966)

reported the presence of serial dependencies in intraday price
movements.

The presence of autocorrelation in sequential price series

is a statistically troublesome phenomenon.
About twenty years ago Niederhofer and Osborne found a tendency
for intraday transaction prices to move up and down (between the bid
and ask price quotes) thereby producing an apparent degree of negative
serial autocorrelation in successive price changes.

An earlier study

by Niederhofer (1965) reported the apparent clustering of limit order
prices at whole dollar values.

The important result is the negative

autocovariance property of intraday sequential transaction price
series.

This property reflects the manner in which stock trades occur

when markets are discontinuous.

An important explanation for this

behavior is the activity of the specialist.

In markets characterized

by discontinuous trading, the specialist alternatively buys and sells
from his (her) own account or holds orders left by other brokers until
a matching order arrives at the trading post.

The result appears as a

series of up and down movements of transaction prices.

The

assumptional structure of the asset pricing models holds that these
oscillations are random.

The first order negative covariance

properties would indicate that successive prices are not randomly
drawn as specified in the theory.

2.6

Market Indexes and Stock Performance
A substantial body of literature has addressed the problems of the

capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and market efficiency.

Roll (1977)
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observed that the choice of index will influence any results obtained
when the CAPM is used to measure market efficiency.

Roll also

suggested that the market portfolio should contain all assets.
Statistical sampling techniques allow for the use of very small
samples in order to ascertain the characteristics of the population.
In like manner, an index may be constructed using a small set of
securities which captures the character and trend of the stock market.
The DJIA has been selected for this purpose.
Closing prices (last trade of the day) are used to compute price
changes of securities that are reported in the newspapers and
elsewhere.

These same closing prices are also used to compute the

values of market indexes and the change in those values.

The last

trade of the day for a particular issue is, however, a rather
imperfect index of the market for that stock at day's end.

The last

trade could have taken place any time during the day (including the
opening).

Moreover the bid and ask levels could have moved

appreciably by the end of the day.

Without a transaction, however,

the reported close will not reflect this movement.

Most of those who

follow the market primarily focus on the closing or last trade prices
to determine what is happening to the market index and individual
security prices.

Also, most measures of stock price volatility ( such

as betas and nonmarket risk measures) utilize prices and price changes
based on the close.

CHAPTER

3

HYPOTHESES
3.1

Research Questions
The basic questions discussed in this chapter are:

Question la:

How much measurement error is induced in the
estimate of the true price when closing
transaction prices are utilized rather than
closing bid and ask price quotations ?

Question lb:

What is the magnitude of measurement error in
computed holding period returns when closing
prices are used rather than expected closing
prices estimated from closing bid and ask
prices ?

Question 2a:

To what extent is the evidence of the size
effect anomalies the result of misspecification
of the return generating process ?

Question 2b:

To what extent is the evidence of weekend
effects the results of misspecifications of
the return generating process and other market
regularities ?

Question 2c:

To what extent can we identify potential causes
of the January effect and can size effects be
separated from the January effect ?

Question

How efficient are market estimates of relative
risk (beta) when alternative price structures
are utilized to estimate beta ?

3:

This chapter begins with the development of the rationale
underlying the construction of alternative price and return measurement
models to be utilized in testing the persistence of the several
anomalies reviewed in the literature.

The assumptions regarding the

nature of observed prices will also be tested to determine the extent
of their viability as estimates of true prices.

The specification for

each of the three return generating process models is based on the
assumed transaction price level.

The models may indicate that some

portion of the reported anomalies result from the misspecification of
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the price and return measurement models used in almost all security
market research.

The key to much of the following discussion is the

manner in which the asset pricing models have been constructed and how
biases and measurement errors may have resulted in findings
inconsistent with market efficiency.

3.2

Observed Prices as True Prices
Demsetz (1968), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), and Glosten and

Milgrom (1985) have addressed the notion of the "true" price.

The true

price represents the intrinsic value of the underlying firm’s expected
income streams on a per share basis.

Demsetz characterized the true

price as the price which would prevail in a perfect market.
recently,

Blume and Stambaugh

and

Glosten and Milgrom

More

have defined

the true price as the simple average of the closing bid and ask price
quotes in an efficient market.

Most market studies assume that the

closing price is an equivalent of the true price construct.

If a

significant and systematic difference exists between the observed price
and the true price, then some or all of the reported anomalies may be
the result of measurement errors induced by the use of closing prices.
Blume and Stambaugh suggest that a difference between true and observed
prices does exist and results from a "bid-ask effect."

The magnitude

of the error can be readily obtained as the difference between the
closing price and the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes.
The following discussion draws heavily from Blume and Stambaugh
(1983) and forms the development rationale for the test hypothesis.
Let

represent the true (expected closing) price and pt represent the

observed (average closing) price.

For purposes of this study, and in
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order to maintain consistency with prior studies, Pt is defined in
equation (3.1) as the mean of the closing bid (PB) and ask (PA) price
quotes;

(3.1)

Pt = < PB,t + PA,t > / 2

Errors in estimating security returns arise when Pt and pt are not
equal.

Accordingly, the closing price is modeled by Blume and

Stambaugh in equation (3.2) as;

(3.2)
Solving for 6^ t;

(3.3)

The term

defines the [percentage] factor by which the observed

closing price (p-j^) differs from the expected closing price (Pj_ t).
Blume and Stambaugh assume that Pi,t is equal either to the closing bid
or the closing ask price.

Since many, perhaps most, stocks have bid-

ask spreads sufficiently large to permit a close between the bid and
the ask, we estimate the empirical value of 6j_ t as e-j. t.

We will then

compare Blume and Stambaughs E(6) to the empirically estimated E(e).
Accordingly, we model e^

ei,t

“ [Pi,t /

We will test to see if

pi,tJ

" 1

E{e-j^t} is nonzero.

(3.4)

Blume and Stambaugh (1983)

assumed 6-^ ^ to be independently distributed across t and independent
of Pj^t f°r all t.
covariance of (e^

We do not make the same assumption about the
e^ t+j).
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Results reported by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) did not address the
magnitude of this error.

This omission may be due to the limited

amount of data available to them.

Their study was based on one day’s

data for closing bid and ask price quotes.

The current test examines

42 days of data for 1134 companies in the test sample and 43 days of
data for 1205 companies in the verification sample.

A second problem

with the Blume and Stambaugh suggestions is that they do not consider
the effects of an underlying drift in the true price as market
estimates of intrinsic values change over time.

At question is the

identity of the mean observed closing price and the mean of the closing
bid and ask prices.

The effects of any underlying drift in the true

price will be reflected in slightly higher variance estimates for both
price series.

This underlying drift is not expected to have an adverse

impact on the statistical tests.

Hypothesis 1—True versus Observed Prices

Hypothesis 1:

The mean of the observed closing price is equal
to the mean of the closing bid-ask price quotes.
Specifically, the E{ej)t} = 0.

This test has two parts.

In the first part we will test the

parameter estimates for all stocks in each of the research samples.

In

the second part we test the parameter estimates for each priceclassified decile.

The two sets of tests are necessary.

An objective

of this phase of the study is to ascertain the magnitude of the bias
across different price ranges.

Failure to reject the null hypothesis

will imply that the two measures are the same.

Failure to accept the
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null hypothesis will have more important implications for empirical
anomalies and market efficiency.

3.3

Observed Returns as True Returns
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) suggest that the "bid-ask effect"

results in upwardly biased estimates of security returns.

The bias

results when closing prices, instead of "true" prices, are utilized to
compute [daily] returns.

Blume and Stambaugh estimate the

"...potential magnitude of the bid-ask bias" (p390) using equation
(3.5);

o2(6) =

E {(PA - PB) / (PA + PB)}2

(3.5)

The Blume and Stambaugh suggestion that equation (3.5) defines the
magnitude of the bid-ask bias requires amplification and correction.
Equation (3.5) is really a point estimate of the [maximum] variance of
the difference between the expected (true) closing price and the
observed closing price.

The numerator

(pa-Pb) as e(lual to the bid-ask

spread; the denominator (Pa+pb^ is etlual to two times the true price.
Equation (3.4) may be re-written as;

o2(6) =
where:

( 0 / P )2

(3.6)

0 = one-half the bid-ask spread
P = the true price computed as (PA+PB)/2

In effect, o2(6) is a conditional estimate of s2(e); the variance of
the error term described by equation (3.4).

Moreover, equation (3.5)

explicitly assumes that stocks will close at the bid (PB) or the ask
(PA) price.

This assumption is reasonable for stocks trading with a
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spread of 1/8 point.
price decile.

This is the case for most stocks in the lowest

Blume and Stambaugh estimate the average value of o2(6)

as .051% (based on one day’s data for 332 NYSE-listed stocks).
study will test the generality of that result.

This

We note that the

magnitude of the bid-ask bias in returns estimated by equation (3.5) is
conditioned on an assumption of a zero drift in the underlying price
trends.

We will show that the Blume and Stambaugh estimate of the bid-

ask bias in returns is incorrect when security prices are subject to
drift.
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) also fail to test the significance of
the difference between returns computed using closing prices and
returns computed using the mean of the closing bid and ask quotes.
Recall that in an efficient market, the bid and ask quotes should
straddle the true price.

Accordingly, we model two return series; a

true series and an observed series.

The difference between the two

series represents the magnitude of the bias resulting from the bid-ask
effect.

The true return (R^ t) for anY security i for period t is

modeled;

(Dj. t = dividend)

} - 1

(3.7)

ri,t “ < < Pi,t + Di,t > / Pi,t-1 > - 1

(3.8)

Ri,t =

{

(

pi,t + Di,t

)

/

pi,t-l

and the observed return (rj^t) is modeled;

and the error process is modeled;
i, t

*-

rn t
Ri, t - ri,

(3.9)

If the bid-ask effect is not a factor in return measurements, we expect
that E($i j-) = 0.

Any significant differences between the two computed
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return series implies a degree of return measurement inefficiency.
This inefficiency may be the cause of a portion of the return
estimation problems observed in tests of the asset pricing models.
Also, this inefficiency may underlie the explanations for research
results demonstrating anomalies in security returns.

Hypothesis 2—True Returns versus Observed Returns
Hypothesis 2:

The mean of the observed returns for individual
securities is equal to the mean of the estimated
true return.
Specifically, E($) = 0.

Blume and Stambaugh (1983) suggest that E(r-j^t) > E(R^ t).

This

test will explore whether this assertion is true and more importantly
if the difference is significant.

The results of this test, as in the

previous test, will have important implications for the assumptional
structures of the asset pricing models.

3.4

The Size Effect
The size effects reported by Banz (1981),

Reinganum (1981), and

Keim (1983) may be statistical artifacts of the method used to
calculate returns.

Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) have

suggested that size effect findings are influenced by the methods used
to measure mean portfolio returns.

Blume and Stambaugh ascribe the

magnitude of the findings to "bid-ask effects" which are more
pronounced in rebalanced portfolios.

Roll suggests that the method

used to compute mean returns contributes to size effect findings.

Both

agree that the affects are minimized, but still present, in buy/hold
portfolios.

Size effects may also be the result of a misspecification

of the return generating process.

An important difference between this
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study and prior studies is that the current study utilizes stock price
as the stratification variable instead of the market value of equity.
Stoll and Whaley (1983) have suggested that the size effect and the low
price effect are substantially the same.

Accordingly, we examine the

character of the size effect by utilizing the prices rather than market
value of equity.

Clearly low price and low market capitalization are

not identical; one is no more than an imperfect proxy of the other.
Accordingly, We expect some loss of generality as a result of this
modification.
In an efficient market, the observed closing price is assumed to
be an identity with the expected closing (true) price.

We have

suggested earlier in this chapter the possibility that the two may be
different.

Even if the two are not significantly different, a problem

remains stemming from the implicit assumption that the observed closing
price is in all instances obtainable by a public trader.
is tied to the measurement of returns.

The problem

If the expected closing price

is identical to the price obtainable by a public trader, then the
return generating process would be modeled as;

Ri,t = t

<Pi,t + Dt) / Pi,t-1

3 " 1

(3.10)

Note that equation (3.10) assumes a substantive identity between the
true and observed prices ( Pj^t * Pi,t
equivalent to implying that Pi}t

This assumption is not

a £ood representation of an

obtainable price for a public trader using a market order.

Earlier, we

reviewed the problems and costs incurred when markets do not
continuously trade.

The result is an additional cost for immediacy

services (the bid-ask spread).

This cost is equal to one half of the
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bid-ask spread for a buy or sell order; we defined 0 to equal one half
of the spread.

Assuming that the most prevalent order used for trading

securities is the market order, the return process should be modeled;

*i,t = t

<Pi#t“*>

+ Di,t> / <Pi,t-l+0)

1 - 1

0.11)

Note that by the normal operation of the market, a market order trader
buys at the ask and sells at the bid.
and

Accordingly, bid^ t =

t - 0

aski>t = Pi,t-1 + <*•

ri,t = [(bidi,t + Di^t^ / as^i,t-l 1 “3

(3.12)

The returns computed using equation (3.12) are to be compared to
returns computed using equation (3.10).

Two sets of returns will be

computed; December and January for each price stratified decile .

Keim

(1983) reports a significant difference between January returns and
returns for other months of the year between firms in the smallest and
largest market value of equity deciles.

Similarly, we will compare

average December and January returns in testing the persistence of low
price effects.

The low price effect will also be tested using returns

generated bid-to-ask (simulating a limit order execution).

Hypothesis 3—Effects of Alternative Specifications of the
Return Generating Process on Findings of Low Price Effects.
Hypothesis 3:

The low price effect is a statistical artifact
of the return generating model used to compute
returns.

Tests of the low price effect under alternative specifications of
the return generating process underscore the importance of the biases
found in returns generated from closing price quotes.

The fundamental
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question is; are the assumptions made about the return generating
process adequately specified when they rely on closing prices?

We have

earlier described the manner in which returns are most likely to be
earned; ie., ask-to-bid with a market order, and less probably bid-toask with a limit-order.
be the ask-to-bid model.

The most important return process model must
The results of this study should help

increase our understanding of the extent to which biases in estimated
returns underlie the causes of observed empirical regularities.
One additional set of comparisons will be made.

Roll (1983)

demonstrates that the method used to compute mean portfolio returns in
size effect studies determines to a significant degree the magnitude of
the size effect.

Accordingly, this study will compute and compare

returns utilizing the three methodologies outlined by Roll; Arithmetic
returns (AR), Buy and Hold returns (BH) and Rebalanced returns 'RB).
The three mean portfolio return measurements are modeled in equations
(3.13), (3.14), and (3.15).

Where:

RAR = l/HT-I li Zt Ri>t]*

(3.13)

rBH - 1/S-Ii-l H Ri,t 1

(3.14)

RrB = *t I 1/N-Ij Ri,t )

(3.15)

S = the number of securities in the portfolio
t = the total number of periodic returns in the sample
i = a product of T-periodic returns

Equations (3.13) and (3.14) specify two alternative methods for
computing mean equally-weighted portfolio returns.

Equation r 3.13) is

a simple periodic (i.e., daily) average return computed across N
securities for t periods.

This periodic average is then raised to the
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Tth power to compute the total portfolio return for t periods.
Equation (3.14) demonstrates the actual investment results achieved
when equal dollar amounts are invested in N securities and held for t
periods.

Equation (3.15) is the return an investor would earn if equal

dollar amounts were invested in N securities and maintained by
rebalancing at the end of each period, t = 1,...,T.

Research use of

equation (3.15) implicitly ignores the transactions costs which would
be incurred as a result of periodic rebalancing of the amounts invested
in each security held.
Twelve different estimates of portfolio returns are possible.
Discrete returns may be computed with equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.12),
and a variation of (3.12) reflecting the use of a limit order and
portfolio returns computed with equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15); 4
x 3 = 12.

Roll shows that (AR) returns are greater than (BH) in the

presence of positive serial correlations in portfolio returns.

Roll

also shows that (RB) returns are also larger than (BH) returns.

These

results obtain from the behavior of the error process in computed
returns.

3.5

The Weekend Effect
The weekend effect has been documented in studies by Cross (1973),

French (1980), and Gibbons and Hess (1981).

In each study returns

generated from closing prices have been utilized.

These studies have

generally lacked adequate controls for potential biases in FridayMonday returns caused by any tendency for large numbers of stocks to go
ex-dividend on Mondays compared to other days of the week.

Also, these

studies have not examined the effects across different levels of price
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and under alternative specifications of a return generating process.
The use of closing prices to estimate returns are known to involve
significant estimation biases.

These biases may underlie findings of

weekend effects in stock returns.
This study will reexamine the weekend effect utilizing two
separate methodologies.

First, Friday-to-Monday and Monday-to-Tuesday

returns will be estimated using equations (3.10) and (3.12).
Differences between Friday-Monday and Monday-Tuesday returns will be
tested for significance.

Second, the effects will be examined for each

price stratified decile.

Dichotomization of the sample permits more

discrete information to be established on the nature of the effect.
Weekend effects may also be the result of a misspecification of the
return generating process.

Alternatively, the weekend effect may not

be uniform across different stock price ranges.

Finally, the weekend

effect may be the result of mis-estimations of true prices and returns
by observed prices and returns.

Hypothesis 4—Causes and Explanations of the Weekend Effect
Hypothesis 4a:

The weekend effect is a statistical artifact of
the return generating process used to compute
returns.

Hypothesis 4b:

The weekend effect is uniform across all
securities regardless of price range or dividend
payment artifacts.

Examination of these two hypotheses will permit a more structured
and complete study of the weekend effect in stock returns.

Earlier

studies reporting weekend effects have generally failed to examine all
the available information fully and have as a result been unable to
explain adequately the probable causes of the anomaly.
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3.6

The January Effect
Several studies have noted the apparent tendency of stocks

experiencing depressed prices in December to experience substantial
gains in January.

These findings may have been confounded by size

effects or other possible anomalies.

Substantial disagreement

permeates the various papers on the subject.

The current study is

principally engaged in examining the biases induced in returns when
those returns are measured using closing prices rather than bid and ask
price structures.

The nature of the data samples, however, permits a

partial examination of this effect.

Accordingly, the first (lowest)

and tenth (highest) price deciles are subdivided into quintiles.
Stocks are assigned into each quintile on the basis of December
returns.

Stocks with the poorest December performance are assigned to

quintile one, those with the best December performance to quintile
five.

These quintiles are then utilized to contrast December and

January returns.

Some research has reported that stocks experiencing

large declines in December experience large gains in January.

Other

research has shown that stocks with large positive returns in December
experience additional gains in the new year.

Also, price and volume

data may be examined to test the strength of the January effect.

No

testable hypotheses are offered due to the limitation imposed by the
time period of the data samples.

This particular area, however, offers

a fertile ground for additional research with an expanded data set.

3.7

Alternative Price Specification Effects on Indexes
A final area of interest in this study is the construction of a

market index using prices other than the closing price reported in the
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financial press and on the data tapes.

Of particular interest are the

magnitudes of any differences noted between alternative index
construction methods and measures of risk (beta).

The use of closing

prices may result in a more volatile index and/or more volatile
estimates of risk when the market model, equation (3.16), is utilized.
The interest in this particular area stems from the frequent
identification of a misspecified asset pricing model or problems
arising from mis-estimation of returns and variances.

This particular

part of the study may not lend itself to meaningful statistical testing
due to the limited time-frame of the sample and the problems attendant
to getting good estimates of beta.

The results to be described in this

study should be treated accordingly.

Also, no part of this inquiry is

meant to imply an interest in forecasting returns.

Our principal

objective is to determine whether more efficient estimates of beta may
be attained by utilizing alternative price structures.
The current study will examine the effect of using the mean of the
closing bid and ask price quotes
beta (using the market model).

to generate returns and estimates of
A recurrent observation in the

literature on size effects is that these effects are to some degree the
result of misestimations of risk

and/or over-estimations of return.

Elimination of potential sources of estimation error should improve the
efficiency of beta estimates.
equations (3.7) and (3.8).

Returns will be generated using

Betas will be estimated using the market

model as defined by equation (3.16);

Rit ~ ai + &i_Rmt + eit

(3.16)
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Betas estimated by using returns computed with equation (3.7) will be
compared to betas estimated with returns computed with equation (3.8).
We would expect that the latter would be more efficient than the
former.
Hypothesis 5—Efficiency of Beta Estimates
Hypothesis 5:

Estimates of betas are sensitive to errors
induced by misestimations of true prices
in computing returns.

An additional set of betas may be estimated using the returns
estimated from equation (3.12) for all securities in the sample.

This

study recognizes that these estimates as well as the estimates using
equations (3.7) and (3.8) are deficient in that they only cover a very
limited time sample.

These estimates are made for purposes of

determining if increases in risk estimation and pricing efficiency are
possible when alternative price constructs are used in estimating
returns.

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, a substantial

portion of the deficiencies of the asset pricing models, the CAPM in
particular, may be the result of numerous small sources of errors in
estimating security returns.

The reduction of these sources of error

may be achieved via corrections in the specifications of the price and
return generating models.

CHAPTER

4

METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This chapter begins with an outline of the research design.
Special emphasis is placed on discussing the significance of the test
procedures for the research hypotheses.
follows.

A description of the samples

A discussion of measurement procedures and statistical

analysis completes the work of the chapter.

4.1

Research Design
The hypotheses to be tested in this study call for two basic

research designs.

Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 require the computation of

means and variances.

Hypothesis 5 requires the regression of

individual security returns against a proxy for the market portfolio
using alternative price and return generating process specifications.
The form of the tests are rather simple.

The implications of those

tests are another matter.
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1 and 2
These hypotheses address important questions raised in security
market research regarding the equivalence of observed prices and
returns and the estimates of true prices and returns constructed from
closing bid and ask price quotations.

In an efficient market the bid

and ask price quotes should straddle the true price.

Any significant

deviation of closing prices from the mean of the closing bid and ask
prices becomes important in light of the operation and sensitivity of
the asset pricing models.

The problems in the use of the asset pricing

models to test market efficiency are well documented.

At issue in this

section of the study is the magnitude of the errors in the price
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assumptions and whether those errors are systematic.

Accordingly, we

test to see if errors are significantly different from zero, or if two
sample means are the same or significantly different.

The test of

hypothesis 1 will indicate whether the mean of an observed series of
closing prices is equal to the mean of the closing bid and ask quotes.
The Milgrom, et al, price theory holds that the expected closing price
should be approximately equal to the true price.

The expected closing

price is assumed to be the average of observed closing prices over some
unspecified time period for any randomly selected security.

Any

significant differences could result in potential errors in measuring
returns.

The validation of that finding is made by testing the returns

generated from the observed price series against returns computed
utilizing the closing bid and ask prices.

The test of hypothesis 2 is

designed to indicate whether the observed returns are equal to the true
returns.

Both tests are used to determine the extent of measurement

errors in the variables used to test market efficiency and the asset
pricing models.

The problem of measurement errors is non-trivial even

in samples as large as those typically used in security market
research.
4.1.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4
Hypotheses 3 and 4 address specific anomalies reported in the
literature.

Hypothesis 3 examines the persistence of the size effect

when alternative specifications of the return generating process are
utilized.

The market value of equity is generally used to study the

small firm or size effect.

A study by Stoll and Whaley (1983)

confirmed findings by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) reporting the
inverse relationship between market value of equity and risk-adjusted
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returns.

Stoll and Whaley also demonstrate that price per share

exhibits the same characteristic.

Accordingly, price per share is

utilized to examine the dynamics of the size effect.
series are generated for December and January.
other researchers

{i.e., Keim (1983)}

Separate return

Results reported by

indicate that the returns of

these two months are significantly different.

Accordingly, we test the

data sample using the same return generating model specification in
order to verify that the anomaly is present.

The same data set is then

tested with returns measured in different ways to determine whether or
not the anomalies persist and if they do exist, whether the effects are
attenuated or magnified.
The size effect anomaly will be tested in a manner similar to
Reinganum (1981).

The sample will be divided into deciles using price

as the classification variable.

Testing of the sample will be made to

ascertain the strength of the difference between December and January
returns using close-to-close prices.

One important difference between

this and prior studies is the size of the data sample.
have typically used 15 to 20 or more years of data.

Prior studies

The current study

has two months of data in the test sample and an additional two months
in the verification sample.

The enormity of effort required to collect

just one month of closing bid-ask quotes in computer-usable form
restricted our sample size.

The implications of any results found

using this data sample are accordingly limited.

This study will be

able to examine returns in the month of January relative to December
returns.

Keim (1983) has reported that a substantial portion of the

size effect (excess returns for small capitalization stocks) occurs in
January and the bulk of it in the first week in January.

The current
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data sample allows these findings to be confirmed.

The size effect may

then be tested using the alternative return measures from chapter III.
The size effect will be tested primarily for the differences between
the average daily returns when different methods are utilized to
compute portfolio average returns.

Specifically, Roll (1983) suggested

that the manner in which returns are measured explain part of the
effect.

Roll discusses three methods for measuring portfolio returns;

averaged returns (AR), buy-hold returns (BH) and rebalanced returns
(RB).

Given the observed presence of negative autocovariance in

individual security returns and positive covariance in portfolio
returns, testing for the size effect will utilize the BH method as the
primary test vehicle.

Roll (1983) and others have reported this method

yields the smallest, but still significant, size effect.
deciles become the buy-hold portfolios.

The price

December returns will be

compared to January returns using the three return calculation methods
discussed in chapter III.

Student-t tests will be used to test if the

differences are statistically significant.
Hypothesis 4 addresses the weekend effect anomaly in much the same
manner as hypothesis 3.

The weekend effect is important as it forms a

major violation of the random walk hypothesis.

Systematic negative

returns accruing on Mondays in contrast to other days of the week are
potentially troublesome, particularly for studies using monthly or
weekly data.

The prevalence of Monday observations in the data set

would tend to bias downward the estimated returns.

Also, variance

estimates might be upwardly biased unless corrective measures are
taken.

The results could appear as excess risk adjusted returns.

The

test procedures for the weekend effect require three separate phases.
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First, the returns are tested for dividend effects.

A systematic

pattern of ex-dividend dates falling on Mondays could result in the
observed negative returns .
not universal.
others.

A second possibility is that the effect is

It may be stronger in some price categories and not in

In the second phase, we gauge the strength of the anomaly

across price stratified data.
deciles and not in others.

The effect may be significant in some

As a consequence, a few securities may be

able to influence overall results.

Alternatively, the effect may be

the artifact of the means used to measure returns.

In phase three we

test the returns generating model specification hypothesis.

The

weekend effect may be an artifact of the method used to measure
returns.

An important thread throughout the current study is the

importance of this specification.

The strength of previously reported

anomalies will be substantially attenuated when the return generating
process is respecified.
The weekend effect will be tested by examining the difference
between the average of returns generated Friday-to-Monday (or Thursdayto-Monday for the holiday weekends) and average Monday-to-Tuesday
returns using equations (3.7),(3.8), and (3.12) in chapter III to
compute each daily return.

Statistical tests of the difference between

the two sets of average returns will confirm the presence of a weekend
effect in the sample data.

The data sample will then be subdivided

into dividend and non-dividend paying stocks to test further the nature
of the anomaly.

If the weekend effects anomaly is sensitive to the

presence of ex-dividend day effects, then weekend returns should not
differ significantly from weekday returns when dividend paying stocks
are excluded.

The weekend anomaly may also be an artifact of the
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manner in which returns are measured;
ex-dividend day effects.
possible.

in addition to or exclusive of

One additional examination of the data is

If ex-dividend day frequency distributions are non-random,

then we should observe a non-random pattern in daily price effects.
The tests in this section are strongly related to the first set of
tests described in section 4.1.1.

The common objective of the first

four hypotheses is to gauge the behavior of anomalies and errors when
alternative specifications of price structures are imposed and when
alternative specifications of the return generating process are
utilized.

A third anomaly, the January effect, is also examined

The January effect refers to the apparent tendency of stock prices
depressed in December to experience substantial gains in January.
These effects may be compounded by low price effects.

Stocks which

have reached lows are very likely to fall in the lower price deciles.
Any stock experiencing a low in December may experience a substantially
positive move in December.

Moreover, the magnitude of the January

"recovery" may be a function of the price level.

An appropriate test

would be to subdivide securities within each decile on the basis of
December performance.

Stocks in the first and tenth price deciles are

rank-ordered on the basis of December returns into quintiles.

January

returns are compared to December returns by quintile to examine the
extent of the January effect and to determine if the January effect is
sensitive to price level.

Also, stocks which have not reached year end

lows in December are equally likely to experience substantial gains in
January.

Since the two effects may be difficult to separate, this

study will examine the distribution of December returns against January
returns.

Accordingly, two sets of returns (December vs January) for
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the lowest and highest price deciles will be examined using mean
quintile return differentials.

The differentials will be tested to see

if they are significantly different from zero.

The resulting analysis

should permit some generalizations to be made about the January effect.
4.1.3 Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 brings the process of this study to an interim
conclusion.

The results to be presented in the following chapter will

raise several questions about the methodologies used in constructing
the asset pricing models and in the relevancy of the assumptional
structures which support them.

In Hypothesis 5 we test to see if more

efficient estimates of relative (beta) risk are possible when
measurement errors in the variables are minimized.

Accordingly, we

estimate beta utilizing the simple market model and two different price
series.

The first price series is the usual closing price series.

This series is used to compute returns for individual securities and
the proxy for the market portfolio.
used to construct

the market index.

All securities in the sample are
The second price series is

constructed by calculating the means of the closing bid and ask quotes.
In effect, the second price series enables us to estimate the true
return.

We assume that such a return is capable of being estimated

using empirical data.

The assumption is non-trivial.

If the notion of

an efficient market is to be verified empirically, then this series
should yield improved estimates of beta.

If this series does not

improve the efficiency of the model, then other constructs might be
required in order to improve or respecify the current asset pricing
models.
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4.2

The Research Sample
The research data sample is divided into two sub-samples. The

first test sample (TS1) includes market data for 1134 stocks traded on
the NYSE over the period from December 1, 1981 through January 29, 1982
(42 days).
1982

The second test sample (TS2) covers the period December 1,

through

1205 stocks.

January 31,1983 (43 days),

and contains market data for

TS1 includes daily open, high, low, closing, bid, and ask

price quotes, and trading volume;
closing price data.

TS2 consists of bid, ask, and

Open, high, low, close, and volume data were

extracted from the daily range tape prepared by Fitch for the NYSE.
Closing bid and ask price quotes for each day in the data sample were
provided by Fitch’s ’’Stock Quotations on the New York Stock Exchange".
TS1 information on ex-dividend dates and dividend amounts were manually
inputted from Standard and Poor's Dividend Record (1982).

TS2

information on ex-dividend dates and distributions were extracted fiom
the CRSP daily master tape (1987).

The resulting data samples

represent a substantial increase in the amount of bid and ask price
data from that used in prior studies.
preferred stocks,

or warrants.

The data samples contain no

Also, the return computation

algorithms have been modified to allow for the ex-day effects of stock
dividends or stock splits during the two-month time frame covered by
the samples.
observations.

A check has been made on the extent of missing
For TS1, out of 47,292 transaction line items, 348 were

missing data on the range tape (.74%).
are missing data in TS2.

A smaller percentage of issues

Issues missing three or more successive days

of closing, bid, or ask price data were excluded from the samples.
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Finally, the data samples have been checked for the presence of
foreign securities trading via American Depository Receipts (ADRs).
These securities were deleted from the sample to remove any currency
translation effects which might affect parameter estimates.

The

resulting data samples has been exhaustively checked to assure a
reasonably high degree of accuracy.

This included spot checking of

closing prices and ex-dividend dates reported in the Wall Street
Journal for randomly selected days and stocks.

The resulting data

sample should permit accurate estimation of "true" returns and
variances in a manner consistent with that suggested by Blume and
Stambaugh (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and the extensive
literature on the EMH.

4.3

Measurement of Variables
The methods used to measure portfolio returns in testing low price

effects follow Roll (1983).
measured AR, BH, and RB.

Accordingly, mean portfolio returns are

The January effect is tested using geometric

returns computed for each security, then averaged cross-sectionally by
quintile for the months of December and January.

January returns

assume that stocks were purchased on December 31st.

This is in accord

with the general convention adopted in this investigation;

re¬

balancing to equal weights are assumed to occur on December 31st and
are motivated by tax-related reasons.

This differs from the usual

practice of cross-sectional averaging of daily returns for the period
under observation.

The latter practice yields substantial distortions

in the magnitude of reported anomalies.

The general method in this

investigation is to calculate geometric returns for individual
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securities and measure variances as the difference between the mean
geometric return and the discrete period returns.

This practice yields

more appropriate estimates of the contribution of individual securities
to portfolio variance.

Elsewhere, individual daily returns are

computed, summed, and averaged cross-sectionally by decile and for the
overall sample.

We expect no loss of generality from

using this

method.
As noted in the introduction and literature review, almost all
prior studies on bid-ask spreads and their determinants were based on
small samples of bid-ask data.

Some samples were cross-sectionally

large but none were time series large.

No sample reported in the

literature was deemed large enough to permit a reasonable subdivision
into quartiles, quintiles, or deciles.

The current study provides a

total of 85 days of closing bid and ask price data for over two
thousand securities.
movements.

The data sample covers two pronounced market

The resulting contrast will enable us to make better

descriptions of market behavior in the case of spreads, returns, and
measurement errors.

4.4

The Degree of Bias in Computed Returns
We suggested earlier that biases are introduced when returns are

measured using closing prices.

A more realistic measurement of returns

would assume the use of "market” orders (the only type that assures a
trade).

Most market orders to sell are executed at the bid while most

market orders to buy are executed at the ask.

Accordingly, returns

should be measured from yesterday’s ask for a buy to today's bid for a
sell.

Buying at the bid (in effect competing with the specialist) and
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selling at the ask is also possible.

Returns based on such trades

would assume the use of attractively placed "limit” orders for both the
buy and the sell.

This discussion suggests three alternative return

measurement methods: Close-to-close, ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask.

This

investigation will study returns measured ask-to-bid (Rab) and bid-toask (Rba) in addition to close-to-close (Rcc) returns.

The magnitude

of return measurement biases for the data samples will be reported in
chapter V in summary form.

Mean daily returns variances are also

examined to determine relative volatilities.
Average daily returns will be computed utilizing closing prices
and compared to average daily returns computed from the mean of the
closing bid and ask price quotes for each data sample.

Additionally,

each sample will be stratified by price and average returns computed
for each decile.

Three sets of returns will be computed: AR, BH, and

RB following Roll (1983).

The December 1, 1981 closing price will be

utilized as the stratification variable.

Any biases due the "bid-ask"

effect will be demonstrated by a significant difference between returns
measured close-to-close (CC) and returns measured with the daily means
of the closing bid and ask price quotes (MAB).

Thus, six sets of

returns are computed and corresponding sets, three for each sub-sample,
tested for the statistical significance of the differences (CC-MAB) for
each of the Roll (1983) portfolio return measurement models.

4.5

Testing Empirical Anomalies
The limited time horizon of the data samples utilized in this

study requires that the samples be tested for the presence of
previously reported anomalies.

The presence of these anomalies when
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returns are measured in the traditional way (close-to-close) will serve
to underscore the validity of any different results obtained when the
alternative return generating specifications are used.

Accordingly,

the data samples will be divided into deciles using closing prices on
December 1st as the stratification variable.

Statistical testing of

the data samples should reveal the presence of significant weekend and
low price effects previously reported by French (1980) and Stoll and
Whaley (1983), respectively.
The price-stratified samples will be utilized to measure mean
December and January returns for buy-hold portfolios.

Student-t tests

for the difference between January and December mean daily returns
should indicate if January returns are significantly less negative or
more positive compared to December for the low price decile.

Also,

these results may be influenced by the presence of a January effect.
Statistical tests for the significance of the difference between
two means will be conducted to verify the presence of the weekend
effect in the data sample.

The t-statistic for all stocks in each

sample is expected to indicate a significant weekend effect.

The

results of these tests may be affected by the time period covered by
the data samples.

The weekend effect examined during a period at the

turn-of-the-year may be different from the weekend effect examined at
other times of the year.

The first day of January has been reported by

Keim (1983) and others to contain the largest proportion of the size
affect.

Both data samples in this study commence the new year on a

Monday.

Therefore, testing will be conducted with the new years’

returns included and excluded from the samples.
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Friday-Monday returns have been reported to be significantly
(more) negative than Monday-Tuesday returns.

The same test will be

repeated for each of the price-stratified deciles.

These tests should

provide additional insights into the nature of the weekend returns
anomaly.

Also, the price stratified deciles will be dichotomized on

the basis of stocks declaring dividends during the sample time frame
and those which did not declare dividends.

The strong presence of a

weekend effect when prices are corrected for dividends indicates the
effect is not an artifact of a systematic trend for large numbers of
stocks to go ex-dividend on Mondays.

This result will be strengthened

if non-ex-dividend stocks also experience negative weekend returns in
contrast to (positive) weekday returns.
The tests will be repeated using returns measured ask-to-bid and
bid-to-ask

to test for persistence of the effect.

If the effects are

still present we can tentatively conclude that the empirical anomalies
are not statistical artifacts resulting from the manner in which
returns are measured.

Alternatively, if the effects are not present

when returns are measured using alternative specifications of the
return generating process, we may tentatively conclude that the
empirical anomalies are artifacts of the manner in which returns have
been traditionally measured.

CHAPTER

5

RESULTS I
5.1

Sample Summary Statistics
A meaningful evaluation of the empirical results to be reported in

chapter VI requires an understanding of the biases induced in returns
when those returns are computed solely with closing prices.

The key to

that knowledge is an understanding of the behavior of prices, bid-ask
spreads, trading volumes, and trading activity at the microstructure
level.

The chapter begins with an examination of the distributions and

changes in the magnitude of the relevant variables.
statistics are reported first.
for the verification sample.
potential explanations.

The test sample

The same information is then reported
Differences are noted along with

The expected result is an increase in our

understanding of market microstructure behavior and new insight on the
nature of empirical anomalies in the research literature.
The hypotheses to be examined in this study are first tested using
test sample one (TS1).

These results are then compared to a second

sample, test sample two (TS2).

The data are analyzed under two general

schemes; collectively, and stratified by price (closing price on
December 1,

1981 or December 1,

1982).

Securities are assigned to ten

equal-weighted portfolios and daily cross-sectional average returns
calculated for each price-stratified portfolio.

These portfolios were

maintained for all subsequent calculations, in effect creating buy-andhold portfolios.
Figure 5.1.A displays the trend of the daily cross-sectional
average price for TS1.

(Chart Note:

F = Friday, T = Thursday)

Percent Spread
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Figure 5.1.A. Closing Bid, Asked, and Last Trade Prices.
Daily crosssectional averages for 1134 NYSE issues in test sample one for period
December 1, 1981 through January 29, 1982.

Figure 5.I.B. Closing Bid, Asked, and Last Trade Prices.
Daily crosssectional averages for 1205 NYSE issues in test sample one for period
December 1, 1982 through January 31, 1982.
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Prices in TS1 declined slowly throughout December (1981).

The rate of

decline accelerated the first seven trading days in January (1982).
Figure 5.1.B (p. 68) displays the average price trends in TS2.

The

broad market finished approximately where it started for the month of
December; the January market finished noticeably higher.
Table 5.1.A (p. 70) presents summary data for each decile in TS1.
January prices were typically lower in all deciles compared to December
reflecting the general bear trend of the market during this time frame.
Relative (percentage) spreads were larger in January for all deciles:
The increase in January relative spreads reflects lower prices and a
general decline in share volume.

The behavior of the average relative

spread for TS1 is plotted in figure 5.1.A.

These results are in

conformance with the behavior of spreads reported by Demsetz, et al.
Column (4) contains the average daily value of the absolute (dollar)
spread for all stocks in each decile;
stock prices get larger.

absolute spreads increase as

Demsetz (1968) suggested that the absolute

spread increases with share price in order to maintain constant
proportionality between the cost of transacting and total transaction
dollar value.

Column (5) contains the average relative spread:

Relative spreads are largest for the lowest-priced stocks and exhibit a
monotone decline by decile as prices get larger.

These results accord

with those reported by Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1971), and others
researching microstructure behavior.

Moreover, the results indicate

that the general characteristics of test sample one are similar to
those reported by other researchers using different (and smaller)
samples of bid-ask price data and different time frames.

Accordingly,

we conclude that TS1 is typical of securities traded on the NYSE.
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Table 5.1.A: Average Daily Closing Prices & Spreads
Test Sample One Summary Data by Deciles

(1)
Dec Close
1
4.978
2
9.940
3
13.226
4
16.076
5
18.934
6
22.672
7
26.069
8
30.198
9
36.686
10
53.405

DEC!EMBER
(2)
(3)
Bid
Ask
4.910
5.082
9.857
10.061
13.123
13.357
15.969
16.216
18.818
19.077
22.546 22.825
25.936
26.225
30.061
30.356
36.540 36.844
53.248 53.572

(1)
Dec Close
1
4.898
2
9.741
3
12.857
4
15.656
5
18.311
6 21.486
7
24.803
8
28.807
9 34.024
10
50.441

JAN U A R Y
(2)
(3)
Bid
Ask
4.815
4.990
9.643
9.852
12.744
12.984
15.542
15.789
18.186
18.449
21.354 21.634
24.666
24.957
28.671
28.957
33.879 34.177
50.287
50.601

19 8 1
(4)
(5)
$Sprd
%Sprd
0.172
4.002
0.204
2.081
0.234
1.781
0.247
1.546
0.260
1.372
0.278
1.235
0.288
1.111
0.295
0.982
0.303
0.831
0.323
0.615
19 8 2
(4)
$Sprd
0.175
0.210
0.241
0.247
0.263
0.281
0.290
0.286
0.297
0.314

(5)
%Sprd
4.159
2.204
1.891
1.596
1.440
1.317
1.178
1.004
0.882
0.639

(6)
N
105
113
112
106
121
114
100
121
114
128

(6)
N
105
113
112
106
121
114
100
121
114
128

Note: %Sprd = (ask-bid)/((ask+bid)/2) * 100

Table 5.1.B (p. 71) displays the summary data for each decile in
TS2.

In TS2, prices are typically higher in January compared to

December.

Percentage spreads are typically smaller in January; a

result of slightly higher prices.

December and January absolute

spreads are insignificantly different.

General comparisons of TS1 and

TS2 reveal a consistent orderliness in the behavior of spreads in
response to changes in price levels.

Percentage spreads tend to get

larger as prices get smaller and vice-versa.
figures 5.1.A and 5.1.B

This behavior is shown in
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Table 5.1.B: Average Daily Closing Prices & Spreads
Test Sample Two Summary Data by Decile

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(1)
Close
5.685
10.640
15.029
17.960
20.885
24.716
28.616
33.832
42.070
62.917

(1)
Dec Close
6.364
1
11.501
2
3 15.927
4
19.051
5
21.970
6
25.378
7
29.676
8
34.830
9 42.589
10
62.831

DEC15MBER
(2)
(3)
Bid
Ask
5.608
5.789
10.547
10.763
14.915
15.159
17.845
18.105
20.767
21.034
24.594 24.878
28.500
28.797
33.693
33.998
41.916 42.236
62.738 63.105
JAN U A R Y
(2)
(3)
Bid
Ask
6.271
6.455
11.395
11.609
15.813
16.054
18.923
19.183
21.840
22.109
25.259 25.538
29.550
29.841
35.011
34.703
42.437
42.751
62.649 63.022

19 8 2
(4)
(5)
$Sprd
%Sprd
0.181
3.729
0.216
2.058
0.243
1.639
0.260
1.455
0.267
1.288
0.283
1.151
0.297
1.042
0.306
0.909
0.320
0.768
0.368
0.598

(6)
N
109

no
145
100
130
132
118

118
124
119

19 8 3

(4)
$Sprd
0.184
0.214
0.242
0.261
0.269
0.280
0.291
0.309
0.314
0.374

(5)
%Sprd
3.475
1.909
1.539
1.385
1.242
1.114
0.991
0.904
0.750
0.610

(6)
N
109
110
145
100
130
132
118
118
124
119

Note: %Sprd = (Ask-Bid)/((ask+bid)/2) * 100

In general, prices (average decile) in TS2 are uniformly greater than
prices in TS1.

The equally weighted average prices in TS1 and TS2 are

$23,226 and $26,786, respectively.

Also, TS1 dollar spreads are

greater and percentage spreads smaller compared to TS1.

5.2

Bid-Ask Spread Behavior
Earlier we have suggested that increases in absolute spreads and

decreases in relative spreads are log-linear functions of price.

We

observe in figure 2.1 (chapter 2), however, that the relative spread in
the lowest price decile does not appear to be a strictly linear
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function of price (Figure 2.1 is plotted using sample averages from
table 5.1.A).

This observation is tested using linear regression and a

logarithmic transformation of the data in table 5.1.A.

We note that

regressions on decile data are very low power compared with regression
analysis on the actual spreads for all stocks in the data samples.

The

following analysis is performed to estimate the degree to which actual
bid-ask spreads deviate from those predicted by a linear regression
model.
Two regressions are estimated and the error processes examined.
The first regression included price and relative spread data for
deciles 2 through 10.

The regression parameter estimates were used to

estimate the relative spread for the first decile given the average
price for stocks in that decile.

The relative spread estimate for

decile 1 is 2.896 standard errors from the regression line; the fitted
regression line under-estimates the actual spread.

The second

regression included price and relative spread for all ten deciles.

The

result is a decrease in the forecast error for the first decile (1.152
standard errors from the regression line) and an increase in forecast
error for the second decile (-2.080 standard errors); spreads are
under-estimated for the lowest price decile and substantially over¬
estimated for the second price decile.

We concluded that relative

spreads for the lowest price decile tend to exceed the proportionality
implied by Demsetz (1968) by a significant amount.

Moreover, including

the lowest price decile in the regression increases the standard error
of the forecast.

This result may be due in part to the 1/8 point

minimum spread used on the NYSE for all stocks trading in excess of one
dollar per share.

Smaller spreads might permit more nearly
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proportional bid-ask spreads when very low price levels are considered.
The larger than expected relative spread for the lowest price stocks
may be a significant factor in size effect or in low price effect
studies.
Stocks in the tenth decile are characterized by the largest
absolute ($) spreads (3/8 of a point on average).

Stocks in the lowest

price decile typically have low absolute spreads; slightly greater than
1/8 point on average.

A related observation is that low prices

increase the probability of specialist participation in market-order
trading activity due to the size of the spread.
Trading volumes are not reported in detail for either of the two
sub-samples in this study.

They are available for TS1 but not for TS2.

NYSE volumes were, however, substantially higher during the time period
covered by TS2.

Accordingly, we make the assumption that trading

volumes were higher in all price deciles.

The general support for this

assumption is the difference in average bid-ask spreads between the two
samples.

TS2 spreads were typically lower than TS1 spreads.

This

difference is due in part to slightly higher prices and higher trading
volumes.

5.3

Computing Returns Under Alternative Assumptions
Average daily returns are computed using three alternative

methods:

askt_^-to-bidt, bidt_j-to-askt, and closet_i-to-closet.

Returns measured ask-to-bid assume the use of market orders for one
round lot; buy at the ask and sell at the bid.

Since market orders

require immediate execution, they are almost certain to be executed
without difficulty.

Returns measured bid-to-ask assume the use of
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limit orders; buy at the bid and sell at the ask.

This bid-ask return

represents a "best case" assumption for a trader.

The execution of a

limit order placed to buy at the bid or sell at the ask is relatively
uncertain.

Not only must a trader emerge to take the other side, but

such trading interest must be sufficiently large to absorb any orders
that had been previously placed at the limit price.

Clearly, a trading

strategy which assumes the use of market orders (the worst case
assumption) is much more realistic than one which assumes trades at
either the close or at favorably placed limit orders, particularly for
infrequently traded stocks.

For stocks with high trading volumes,

measuring returns bid (buy) to ask (sell) is more likely but still
unrealistic.

For comparative purposes returns are also measured using

closing prices.

The three sets of calculated returns exhibit

considerable differences.

Table 5.2.A (TS1) and Table 5.2.B (TS2) show

the (unweighted) average daily cross-sectional returns and the average
difference between alternative return measures for all stocks in each
sample.

Columns (1),

(2), and (3) in both tables indicate the mean

daily return for all stocks in each sample. Returns are measured
closet_i-to-closet

(CC), askt-_j-to-bidt: (AB), and

bidt_j-to-askt

(BA), and are computed using equation (5.1)

rt = KPt + dt^ / Pt-ll ~ 1
where: rt =
Pt =
pt_l
dt =

(5.1)

holding period return
closing price quote (ask, bid, or close)
= closing price quote (ask, bid, or close)
dividend paid to owners of record day t
where t = last cum dividend trade date

The unweighted average daily (CC) return for all stocks in TS1 for the
42-day period was -.0896% , a value insignificantly different from
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zero.

The average (AB) and (BA) returns were -1.633% and 1.484%,

respectively.

(AB) and (BA) returns are significantly different from

zero at the .01 level.

The corresponding values for TS2 (43 days) are

.160% (CC), -1.228% (AB), and 1.585% (BA);
ficantly different from zero,
.01 level.

(CC) returns are insigni¬

(AB) and (BA) are both significant at the

Also, returns measured (AB) and (BA) are significantly

different from returns measured (CC) at the .01 level.
We test the significance of the differences between the two sets
of sample summary data averages contained in tables 5.2.A (p.76) and
5.2.B (p. 77) to determine if the two samples from the same population.
Testing the differences between corresponding TS1 and TS2 mean daily
returns yielded the following;

(CC) and (BA) returns are

insignificantly different at the .05 level (t = 1.363 and 0.555
respectively).

(AB) returns are significantly different at the .01

level (t = 2.276).
Column (4) demonstrates the daily average magnitude of the return
measurement bias between returns measured close-to-close and returns
based on market order executions for buying and selling (CC-AB).

The

average magnitude of the difference is 1.544% for TS1 (Table 5.2.A) and
1.388% for TS2 (Table 5.2.B).

These results indicate that a bias is

induced in returns when closing prices are utilized instead of bid and
ask prices.

As previously noted, the latter represent prices more

likely to be obtained by public traders using market orders.
Column (5) demonstrates the average of the return measurement bias
when limit order executions are assumed.

The average magnitudes of the

bias are -1.574% for TS1 and -1.425% for TS2.

Column (6) shows the

magnitude of the difference (BA-AB) between market order returns and
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Table 5.2.A: Average Daily Returns and Differentials
Test Sample One: 1134 NYSE Issues

Day
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Mean

1.
2.
3.
4.

(1)
CC
-0.662
0.207
0.624
-0.746
-0.618
0.159
0.197
-0.297
-1.384
0.293
-0.247
0.185
0.677
-0.412
-0.263
-0.201
0.378
-0.396
-0.386
0.351
0.739
0.598
-1.328
-0.685
-0.065
0.457
-2.083
-0.706
-0.989
0.165
0.597
0.289
-0.530
-0.281
0.107
-0.288
-0.869
-0.071
0.310
2.300
1.206
-0.896

(2)
AB
-2.117
-1.358
-0.860
-2.206
-2.156
-1.315
-1.293
-1.784
-2.851
-1.281
-1.722
-1.336
-0.829
-1.847
-1.781
-1.718
-1.195
-1.816
-1.890
-1.183
-0.859
-1.022
-2.837
-2.259
-1.605
-1.097
-3.555
-2.266
-2.566
-1.471
-1.005
-1.378
-2.080
-1.871
-1.483
-1.874
-2.435
-1.706
-1.262
0.561
-0.366
-1.633

(3)
BA
0.931
1.681
2.163
0.828
0.876
1.708
1.698
1.236
0.214
1.837
1.335
1.696
2.208
1.164
1.246
1.325
1.879
1.205
1.118
1.879
2.293
2.104
0.229
0.875
1.521
2.053
-0.440
0.891
0.606
1.744
2.259
1.907
1.176
1.327
1.724
1.369
0.800
1.514
1.962
3.858
2.860
1.484

(4)
CC-AB
1.455
1.565
1.483
1.459
1.538
1.474
1.490
1.487
1.467
1.574
1.474
1.521
1.506
1.434
1.518
1.517
1.573
1.420
1.503
1.533
1.598
1.620
1.508
1.574
1.540
1.555
1.473
1.560
1.577
1.636
1.602
1.668
1.551
1.590
1.590
1.585
1.567
1.635
1.572
1.739
1.571
1.544

(5)
CC-BA
-1.594
-1.474
-1.539
-1.574
-1.495
-1.549
-1.501
-1.533
-1.598
-1.544
-1.582
-1.512
-1.531
-1.576
-1.509
-1.526
-1.501
-1.601
-1.504
-1.528
-1.554
-1.506
-1.557
-1.561
-1.586
-1.596
-1.643
-1.597
-1.596
-1.579
-1.662
-1.618
-1.705
-1.608
-1.617
-1.657
-1.669
-1.585
-1.652
-1.559
-1.654
-1.574

(6)
BA-AB
3.049
3.039
3.022
3.033
3.033
3.023
2.991
3.020
3.065
3.118
3.057
3.032
3.037
3.010
3.027
3.043
3.075
3.021
3.008
3.061
3.152
3.126
3.065
3.134
3.126
3.151
3.115
3.157
3.173
3.215
3.264
3.285
3.256
3.198
3.207
3.242
3.235
3.220
3.224
3.298
3.226
3.188

Notes for Tables 5.2A and 5.2B
CC = Returns measured close-to-close
AB = Returns measured Ask-to-Bid (market order)
BA = Returns measured Bid-to-Ask (limit order)
CC-AB , CC-BA, BA-AB = Return Differentials
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Table 5.2.B: Average Daily Returns and Differentials
Test Sample Two: 1204 NYSE Issues
(1)
Day
CC
2 -0.091
3 -0.055
4
1.091
5
0.691
0.090
6
7 -0.854
8 -0.637
9 -0.030
10 -1.038
-1.634
11
12 -0.271
13
1.177
14 -0.477
0.781
15
0.559
16
17
0.632
18
0.966
19 -0.406
20
0.202
-0.190
21
22
0.649
-0.824
23
1.240
24
25
0.829
26
2.546
27
0.328
28
1.284
29 -0.237
0.765
30
-0.423
31
32
0.709
0.454
33
34 -0.221
-0.696
35
0.229
36
37
-1.208
38 -2.903
1.097
39
0.320
40
1.383
41
0.313
42
0.571
43
Mean 0.160

(2)
AB
-1.519
-1.420
-0.328
-0.674
-1.336
-2.255
-1.944
-1.512
-2.403
-3.032
-1.723
-0.292
-1.932
-0.693
-0.797
-0.867
-0.471
-1.712
-1.303
-1.585
-0.757
-2.352
-0.216
-0.517
1.101
-0.967
-0.049
-1.552
-0.565
-1.752
-0.654
-0.794
-1.567
-2.016
-1.077
-2.527
-4.174
-0.408
-1.059
-0.033
-0.957
-0.886
-1.228

(3)
BA
1.314
1.358
2.468
2.170
1.520
0.577
0.909
1.335
0.461
-0.139
1.170
2.661
0.990
2.264
2.149
2.079
2.454
1.175
1.579
1.234
2.125
0.539
2.664
2.293
3.947
1.783
2.680
1.128
2.147
0.922
2.040
1.865
1.096
0.671
1.602
0.131
-1.437
2.466
1.739
2.762
1.800
1.876
1.585

(4)
CC-AB
1.428
1.365
1.419
1.365
1.426
1.401
1.307
1.482
1.365
1.398
1.452
1.469
1.455
1.474
1.357
1.499
1.437
1.306
1.505
1.396
1.405
1.528
1.456
1.347
1.445
1.295
1.333
1.315
1.330
1.329
1.363
1.248
1.345
1.320
1.306
1.319
1.271
1.505
1.378
1.416
1.269
1.457
1.388

(5)
CC-BA
-1.405
-1.413
-1.377
-1.480
-1.430
-1.431
-1.546
-1.365
-1.499
-1.494
-1.441
-1.484
-1.467
-1.482
-1.589
-1.447
-1.487
-1.582
-1.377
-1.424
-1.476
-1.363
-1.424
-1.464
-1.401
-1.455
-1.396
-1.365
-1.382
-1.345
-1.331
-1.411
-1.318
-1.367
-1.373
-1.338
-1.466
-1.370
-1.420
-1.379
-1.487
-1.305
-1.425

(6)
BA-AB
2.833
2.777
2.796
2.844
2.856
2.832
2.853
2.847
2.863
2.893
2.893
2.952
2.922
2.957
2.946
2.946
2.924
2.888
2.881
2.820
2.881
2.891
2.880
2.811
2.846
2.750
2.729
2.680
2.712
2.674
2.694
2.659
2.663
2.687
2.679
2.657
2.737
2.875
2.798
2.795
2.756
2.762
2.813
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(optimally placed) limit order returns.

This return differential

corresponds to the difference between executing limit orders under
favorable conditions ( buy at bidt_j

, sell at askt ) and executing

market orders under normal conditions (buy at askt_j

, sell at bidt ).

The average magnitude of the difference between the two trade-oriented
returns is 3.118% for TS1 and 2.813% for TS2.
The magnitude of the bias stemming from the utilization of closeto-close returns is non-trivial.

Indeed many reported anomalies are in

the same 1% to 2% range of the return measurement bias.

The overstate¬

ment of close-to-close returns relative to those that are realizable,
coupled with nonlinearities in the relationships, may well have
resulted in the many findings of abnormal returns.

In section 5.3 we

examine in greater detail the nature of the bias operating on different
price stratifications.

Of particular interest is the behavior of the

percentage spread around the turn-of-the-year and the distribution of
closing prices relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes.

5.4

Average Daily Returns for Price-Stratified Deciles
Average daily returns for each of the price-stratified deciles are

measured utilizing the three trading price assumptions discussed in
section 5.3.

Table 5.3 (p. 80) displays information for each assumed

type of trade's returns by decile by month; Panel A contains the
results for TS1, Panel B for TS2.

For decile 1, returns measured ask-

to-bid (AB) are substantially lower than those measured close-to-close
(CC).

This result is due to measuring returns across the bid-ask

spread assuming market order executions.
when returns are

The situation is reversed

Table 5.3: Stratified Mean Daily Returns
For Strategies: Ask-Bid, Bid-Ask, Close-Close
Panel A : Test Sample One
December 1981
January
1982
Dec
CC
AB
BA
C-C
A-B
B-A
1
-0.225 -4.119 3.858
-0.040 -4.107
4.229
2.028
2 -0.074 -2.129
-0.039 -2.218 2.184
-0.084 -1.838
1.714
3
-0.060 -1.938
1.835
1.474
-0.023 -1.619
4 -0.087 -1.609
1.575
-0.101 -1.462
1.281
-0.094 -1.525
5
1.349
1.182
6 -0.063 -1.284
-0.188 -1.496
1.129
7 -0.078 -1.182
1.037
-0.235 -1.402 0.945
-0.154 -1.150 0.854
8 -0.091 -1.068 0.895
9 -0.162 -0.984 0.673
-0.232 -1.114 0.648
-0.155 -0.792 0.484
10
-0.109 -0.722 0.507

Panel B : Test Sample Two
January
1983
December
1982
B-A
C-C
A-B
CC
AB
BA
Dec
0.589 -2.871
4.136
3.849
0.019 -3.617
1
2.300
0.373 -1.542
2.130
2
0.051 -1.978
1.784
0.226 -1.310
1.745
0.092 -1.532
3
1.664
0.268 -1.113
1.545
4
0.072 -1.373
1.461
0.215 -1.025
1.368
5
0.065 -1.211
1.284
0.160 -0.953
1.144
6 -0.014 -1.155
1.178
0.175 -0.812
1.067
7
0.020 -1.019
1.072
0.160 -0.746
8 -0.009 -0.909 0.908
0.087 -0.660 0.840
9 -0.006 -0.772 0.766
0.108 -0.500 0.718
10
-0.057 -0.656 0.541

measured bid-to-ask (BA) assuming limit order executions.

This last

method of computation yields positive returns for all deciles in both
months, with returns in January being higher for the first five
deciles.

Returns measured CC were typically negative in TS1; typically

positive in TS2♦

In neither sample were CC returns significantly

different from zero.

Returns measured ask-to-bid (AB) were

typically negative in both samples for all deciles; returns measured
(BA) were typically positive.

The smaller magnitudes of TS2 (AB) and

(BA) returns are due to smaller bid-ask spreads resulting from
generally higher prices
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Returns measured bid-to-ask (BA) and ask-to-bid (AB) were each
subtracted from returns measured close-to-close (CC) and the results
presented in table 5.4.

Results for bid-to-ask returns minus ask-to-

bid returns (BA-AB) are also displayed.

The data indicate a

substantial difference in return streams when measured either ask-tobid or bid-to-ask relative to close-to-close; differences are
approximately 4% per day for the lowest price decile.

The values

reported in table 5.4 indicate the average magnitude of the bias
induced in measured returns computed using bid-ask quotes rather than
closing price quotes.

The mean differences between alternative

Table 5.4: Mean Daily Return Differentials
Close-AskBid, Close-BidAsk, BidAsk-AskBid

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel A : Test Sample One
January
1982
December
1981
CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB
CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB
4.067 -4.269 8.336
3.894 -4.083
7.977
2.179 -2.223
4.402
2.055 -2.102 4.157
3.774
1.878 -1.895
1.754 -1.799 3.552
3.193
3.083
1.596 -1.598
1.522 -1.561
2.874
2.744
1.431 -1.443
1.362 -1.382
2.625
2.465
1.307 -1.318
1.221 -1.244
2.346
1.167 -1.180
2.219
1.104 -1.115
0.996 -1.008 2.004
1.963
0.976 -0.986
1.762
0.882 -0.879
1.657
0.822 -0.835
1.276
0.637 -0.639
1.228
0.613 -0.616

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel B : Test Sample Two
January
1983
December 1982
CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB
CC-AB CC-BA BA-AB
7.008
7.467
3.461 -3.547
3.636 -3.830
1.915 -1.926 3.841
2.029 -2.079 4.108
3.094
1.536 -1.558
3.276
1.624 -1.653
2.776
1.381 -1.395
2.918
1.445 -1.473
2.486
1.241 -1.245
2.579
1.276 -1.303
1.113 -1.124 2.238
2.299
1.141 -1.158
1.991
0.987 -1.003
2.086
1.039 -1.047
1.818
0.906 -0.912
1.817
0.900 -0.917
1.500
0.747 -0.753
1.538
0.766 -0.772
1.218
0.607 -0.611
1.197
0.598 -0.598
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measurement schemes were statistically significant at any usual level.
Differences between alternative measures of return are largest for the
lowest price decile and decline monotonically as stock price increases.
These results are consistent with those reported earlier in this
chapter.

The difference between returns measured bid-to-ask and ask-

to-bid averages approximately 8 % for the lowest price decile and 1.25%
for the highest price decile.

The differences are larger in January

1982 than in December 1981 for TS1 and are statistically significant at
the .01 level for all deciles.

January 1983 (BA-AB) values are smaller

than December 1982 values for TS2; a result of smaller bid-ask spreads.
The results presented here indicate that close-to-close returns are
significantly overstated relative to what might actually be realized by
an investor using market orders to execute trades.

The degree of bias

is strongly correlated with price level and bid-ask spread magnitudes.
Also, the magnitude of the bias declines as per share prices get
higher:

The bias is greatest in the lowest price decile.

Finally, we

observe that many of the reported anomalies rely disproportionately on
the performance of low price stocks.

5.5.

Weekly and Monthly Holding Period Characteristics
The same portfolios described in the previous sections are used to

compute mean weekly and monthly holding period return differentials for
the three alternative computation methods.

Weekly returns are measured

from the last trading day of the preceding week, period (t—1), and the
last trading day of the current week, period (t).

Table 5.5 (p. 82)

displays the results for this series of return differentials.
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Table 5.5: Mean Weekly Return Differentials
Close-AskBid, Close-BidAsk, BidAsk-AskBid

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel A:
December
CC-AB
CC-BA
3.834 -4.032
2.077 -2.113
1.709 -1.764
1.517 -1.617
1.378 -1.422
1.200 -1.242
1.117 -1.126
0.986 -0.976
0.809 -0.849
0.618 -0.634

Test Sample One
1981
January 1982
BA-AB
CC-AB
CC-BA BA-AB
7.866
4.157 -4.341 8.498
4.190
2.137 -2.146 4.284
3.473
1.943 -1.881 3.824
3.134
1.662 -1.566 3.228
2.801
1.474 -1.449 2.923
2.441
1.305 -1.283 2.588
2.243
1.173 -1.180 2.353
1.961
0.989 -1.005 1.994
1.659
0.890 -0.843 1.733
1.252
0.634 -0.629 1.263

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel B:
December
CC-AB
CC-BA
3.636 -3.897
1.997 -2.095
1.633 -1.745
1.465 -1.453
1.262 -1.325
1.141 -1.160
1.046 -1.043
0.922 -0.957
0.760 -0.766
0.597 -0.579

Test Sample Two
1982
January 1983
BA-AB
CC-AB
CC-BA BA-AB
7.534
3.671 -3.614 7.285
4.092
2.006 -1.930 3.935
3.378
1.564 -1.566 3.130
2.917
1.361 -1.373 2.734
2.587
1.241 -1.227 2.468
2.301
1.132 -1.127 2.259
2.089
0.981 -0.985 1.966
1.878
0.856 -0.859 1.715
1.527
0.729 -0.753 1.482
1.176
0.596 -0.615 1.211

Similar to the results reported in section 5.3, weekly holding
period returns measured ask-to-bid are lower than returns measured
close-to-close.

Returns measured bid-to-ask are substantially higher.

All differences are statistically significant at the .01 level.

The

smaller magnitudes of all values reported in TS1 compared to those in
TS2 reflect the smaller bid-ask percentage spreads in TS2.

The smaller

magnitude of the percentage spread is the result of higher prices in
TS2.
Similar results are obtained for monthly holding period return
differentials.

Table 5.6 displays the pattern of monthly holding
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period return differentials as measured using the three different
assumed trading patterns.

Table 5.6: Mean Monthly Return Differentials
Close-AskBid, Close-BidAsk, BidAsk-AskBid

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel A: Test Sample One
December 1981
January 1982
CC-AB
CC-BA BA-AB
CC-AB
CC-BA BA-AB
3.899 -3.952 7.851
4.063 -4.158 8.221
2.034 -2.067 4.101
2.169 -2.043 4.211
1.687 -1.939 3.626
2.051 -1.682 3.733
1.441 -1.736 3.177
1.825 -1.356 3.181
1.306 -1.344 2.650
1.459 -1.298 2.757
1.159 -1.316 2.475
1.314 -1.164 2.478
1.119 -1.082 2.201
1.117 -1.101 2.218
0.955 -0.953 1.908
0.967 -0.996 1.963
0.777 -0.881
1.658
0.940 -0.732 1.672
0.603 -0.589 1.192
0.620 -0.583 1.204

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel B : Test Sample Two
December 1982
January ‘1983
CC-AB
CC-BA BA-AB
CC-AB
CC-BA BA-AB
3.695 -4.266 7.961
4.848 -3.239 8.087
2.498 -2.668 5.166
2.611 -1.933 4.544
1.991 -2.100 4.091
1.841 -1.772 3.613
1.459 -1.661 3.120
1.680 -1.516 3.196
3.030
1.395 -1.635
1.511 -1.250 2.762
1.265 -1.430 2.694
1.200 -1.148 2.348
1.228 -1.158 2.386
1.000 -1.130 2.130
0.980 -0.910 1.889
0.882 -1.073 1.955
0.771 -0.765 1.537
0.816 -0.830 1.646
0.650 -0.573 1.222
0.621 -0.613 1.235

Comparisons of tables 5.4 * J5 5J > and 5.6 reveal similar monotone
declines in return differentials as prices increase.

Also, weekly and

monthly holding period return differentials are typically smaller in
December than January for most deciles.

Returns measured bid-to-ask

are substantially higher in January for the first four deciles.

These

findings are similar to the daily holding period results shown in table
5.4.

Caution is warranted in intrepeting these results.

may yield slightly different magnitudes.

Other samples
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The results reported in sections 5.3 and 5.4 indicate that returns
measured ask-to-bid (AB), reflecting market order executions, and bidto-ask (AB), reflecting limit order executions, are more sensitive to
price levels than returns measured close-to-close (CC) when compared on
a year to year basis.

The source of this sensitivity is the behavior

of the price-sensitive bid-ask spread.

We tentatively conclude that

measuring returns close-to-close introduces a bias in computed returns.
Moreover, the bias is substantial for lower priced securities.

The

implication of these results is that the return generating process is
misspecified if it does not consider the combined effects of bid-ask
spreads and price levels.

Also, returns measured utilizing closing

prices do not adequately reflect the return most likely to be achieved
by a trader after market microstructure behavior is appropriately
factored into the process.

5.6.

Turn-of-the-Year Closing Price Characteristics
The daily activity of closing prices relative to the closing bid

and ask prices for TS1 are shown in figure 5.2.A (p. 85).

The very

small number of stocks with closes outside the bid-ask range are not
shown.

The chart reveals a fairly stable number of stocks closing at

prices between the closing bid and ask quotes (the top line).

The

number of stocks closing at the bid or the ask is not as stable and
also demonstrates evidence of a ’’weekend" effect in stock prices; a
disproportionate number of Monday closes on the bid side is evidenced.
Two exceptions to the "weekend" effect appear in figure 5.2.A.

The

first occurs January 4, the first trading day of the new year, which
occurred on a Monday (the "M" following the second "T" from the left).
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Figure 5.2.A. Daily last trade price distributions relative to closing
bid and ask price quotations for TS1. TS1 year ended on Thursday
(second "T" from left). M = Monday, F = Friday.

The frequency of ask side closes on January 4 are slightly greater than
closes on the bid side.

This finding supports Roll’s (1983a)

conjecture that part of the turn-of-the-year effect is caused by a
shift in closing prices from the bid to the ask side.

The second

exception occurs on the third Monday in January (January 18).

The

traces of closes on the bid or ask quotes cross on both of these
Mondays and re-cross the following Tuesday.

The traces cross again on

January 28 reflecting a "bullish” move by the market the last two
trading days in January.
A possible explanation for the January effect is also evident in
figure 5.2.A.

The traces of closes on the bid and ask sides are on

average much closer in January than December; the number of closes on

86

the ask side increase as the number of bid-side closes decrease.

The

strong downward trend of the market in early January shown earlier in
figure 5.1.A is not reflected in the distribution of closing price
quotes shown in figure 5.2.A.

We would expect that a downward movement

of the market would be accompanied by an increase in the number of bidside closes.
closes.

Instead, we observe a decrease in the number of bid-side

Thus, a portion of the January effect may be partly explained

by a change in the relative distributions of closing price quotes at
the bid and ask.
Similar results for TS2 are displayed in figure 5.2.B.

The most

significant difference is the narrowing of the distribution of closes

Figure 5.2.B. Daily last trade price distributions relative to closing
bid and ask price quotations for TS2. TS2 year ended on Friday (first
"F" following the "T"). M = Monday, T = Thursday.

87

on the bid-side and closes on the ask-side, especially after the first
trading day in January.

This reflects the bullish tendency of the

market in TS2.
Figure 5.3.A is formed by displaying the daily values in figure
5.2.A as the average of the daily values for each week.

The TS1

general trend is for bid-side closes to increase steadily throughout
the month of December followed by a significant decline in the average
number of bid-side closes during the first week in January.

The

December trend is also accompanied by declines in the number of closes
on the ask-side as well as a small decline in the number of closes

Figure 5.3.A. Weekly average last transaction price distributions for
TS1. Dl, D2,,,J4 denote the various weeks in December and January.

between the closing bid and ask quotes.

The turn-of-the-year effect is

(at least for 1981-82) fairly generalized cross-sectionally for the
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companies in the sample.

More significant effects will be demonstrated

when discrete price decile data are shown.

The results for TS2 shown

in figure 5.3.B are similar to those of TS1 in figure 5.3.A.

TS2 shows

a more significant change in the number of ask-side close during the
first week in January.

The general bullish tendency of the market in

TS2 is accompanied by a narrow spread between bid and ask side closes.

Figure 5.3.B. Weekly average last transaction price distributions for
TS2. Dl, D2,,,J4 denote the various weeks in December and January.

Lakonishok and Smidt (1983) constructed a "critical ratio" to
illustrate the relationship of closing prices to the quoted high and
low prices for the day.
Index (MI).

In a similar fashion we construct a Momentum

The MI captures the average position of the last trade of

the day relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes for all stocks
in each sample.

The variable is constructed to range from 0 to 1.

A
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value of 0 indicates a close at the bid; a value of 1, a close at the
ask.

The MI is computed using equation (5.2):

MI = ( C - B ) / (A-B)

where: MI
C
A
B

=
=
=
=

(5.2)

Momentum Index
Closing price (last trade of day)
Closing ask quote
Closing bid quote

Figures 5.4.A and 5.4.B (p. 90) show the mean value of this variable
for each trading day for all stocks in TS1 and TS2, respectively.

The

MI exhibits a substantial amount of volatility for both samples.
General trends emerge when averages are taken.

Figures 5.5.A and 5.5.B

(p. 91) display the daily values in figures 5.4.A and 5.4.B as weekly
averages for TS1 and TS2, respectively.

Throughout December the

general trend of closing price-relatives is down indicating the effects
of selling pressures on stock prices; potentially caused by year-end
tax-selling or portfolio realignments.

The downward trend stops at the

second to last day in December and rises the first week in January.
The trend lines in figures 5.5.A and 5.5.B clearly reflect closing
prices momentum to the bid side during December and to the ask side in
January.

The trend reversal in the last trading week in December

reflects the influence of the last trading day; the number of issues
closing at the bid declines as the number of closes below and equal to
the ask increases.

Figures 5.5.A and 5.5.B also display the Mi's for

the first and tenth deciles.

TSl's MI for decile 1 exhibits a clear

swing toward ask-side closes the first week in January and declining
thereafter.

TS2 decile 1 MI exhibits a more pronounced swing to ask-

side closes and captures the general bullish trend in the market.
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Uofner

Figure 5.4.A. Average cross-sectional daily momentum index values for
TS1. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday.

Figure 5.4.B. Average cross-sectional daily momentum index values for
TS2. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday.
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Figure 5.5.A. Weekly average cross-sectional momentum index values for
TS1. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday.

Figure 5.5.B. Weekly average cross-sectional momentum index values for
TS2. F = Friday, M = Monday, T = Thursday.
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5.7

Turn-of-the-Year Characteristics by Decile
Changes in relative bid-ask spreads may suggest a potential

explanation for size effects or turn-of-the-year effects.

Table 5.7,

Panel A (p. 94), shows the average cross-sectional percentage spread
per decile for each of the last three trading days in December and the
first three days in January for TS1.

Decile 1 (lowest price stocks)

exhibits a steady rise in the percentage spread as the year draws to a
close.

Day 1 of the new year finds a substantial (and statistically

significant at the .05 level) drop (12.8%) in the size of the spread,
but rebounding quickly the second day and more or less stable as the
week progresses.

While several other deciles exhibit similar behavior

between day -1 and day +1, none exhibit the magnitude of the first
decile.

None of the other nine deciles revealed any statistically

significant changes in spread values during this time frame.

Also,

none of the other price deciles exhibit the monotone increase in
percentage spread the last full week of trading for the ’’old” year.
Results for TS2 (Table 5.7, Panel B) reveal a slightly different
trend in the lowest price decile.

A 9.336% decline in the magnitude of

the spread occurs on the second day in January.

An examination of TS1

reveals an "up” day on the first trading day in January, 1982.

This

would indicate a decrease in the size of the average spread but by a
substantially smaller percentage than actually occurred.

TS2

experienced a "down" day on the first trading day in January 1983 and
was "up" the next day.

The 9.336%

verification sample change in the

(+2) spread for the lowest price decile is significant at the .10
level
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Table 5.7: Mean Daily Percentage Spread by Decile
Trading Date Relative to Year End
Panel
Dec
-3
1 3.921
2 2.147
3 1.726
4 1.448
5 1.401
6 1.226
7 1.125
8 0.976
9 0.838
10 0.622

A: Test Sample One (81-82)
-2
-1
1
2
4.122 4.278 3.753 4.369
2.098 2.120 2.160 2.178
1.776 1.838 1.823 1.895
1.510 1.651 1.484 1.582
1.281
1.380 1.415 1.401
1.295 1.258 1.247 1.283
1.087 1.134 1.087 1.200
1.048 1.010 0.936 0.936
0.843 0.908 0.847 0.809
0.603 0.629 0.617 0.589

3
4.190
2.174
1.924
1.526
1.358
1.281
1.102
0.936
0.860
0.625

Panel
Dec
-3
1 3.760
2 2.004
3 1.649
4 1.381
5 1.211
6 1.173
7 1.058
8 0.847
9 0.742
10 0.601

B: Test Sample Two (82-83)
-2
-1
1
2
3.620 3.701 3.738 3.389
1.929 2.089 2.112 2.019
1.605 1.781 1.639 1.569
1.397 1.385 1.586 1.379
1.300 1.253 1.337 1.262
1.159 1.178 1.203 1.122
1.047 1.084 0.942 1.024
0.894 0.946 0.932 0.915
0.740 0.733 0.757 0.790
0.574 0.582 0.605 0.599

3
3.506
1.885
1.609
1.398
1.281
1.152
1.054
0.960
0.767
0.588

Note: -1 = last trade date in December
1 = first trade date in January

Roll (1983) suggested that a portion of the size effect results
from the tendency of stocks to close at the ask side of the spread
after the first of the year.
to utilize the Momentum Index.

One method for testing this suggestion is
The Momentum Index is used to capture

the combined effects of closing prices relative to the closing bid and
ask price quotes.

Table 5.8 (p. 94) displays momentum index (MI)

values for the last three days in December and the first three days in
January.

The data indicates that, at least for this time period, low

priced stocks were more likely to close at the ask after the first of
the year.

Test sample (Panel A) mean values for the momentum index are
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.401 and .500 for December and January, respectively, for the first
four price deciles.

The difference between these two means is statis¬

tically significant at the .01 level.

The values for TS2 (Panel B)

Table 5.8: Mean Daily Momentum Index by Decile
Trading Date Relative to Year End

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel
-3
0.283
0.409
0.421
0.370
0.406
0.469
0.460
0.430
0.470
0.460

A: Test Sample One (81-82)
-2
-1
1
2
0.360 0.444 0.491 0.508
0.397 0.440 0.494 0.499
0.467 0.437 0.506 0.526
0.420 0.365 0.520 0.472
0.427 0.463 0.485 0.418
0.425 0.439 0.468 0.457
0.384 0.488 0.451 0.480
0.426 0.507 0.503 0.434
0.431 0.464 0.533 0.527
0.473 0.537 0.546 0.453

3
0.508
0.471
0.524
0.486
0.471
0.488
0.451
0.405
0.477
0.503

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Panel
-3
0.432
0.458
0.453
0.465
0.459
0.465
0.499
0.557
0.513
0.546

B: Test Sample Two '(82-83)
2
1
-1
-2
0.411 0.428 0.509 0.552
0.418 0.415 0.438 0.603
0.451 0.449 0.515 0.568
0.462 0.513 0.500 0.552
0.521 0.387 0.425 0.537
0.439 0.429 0.487 0.612
0.438 0.516 0.455 0.612
0.480 0.426 0.494 0.614
0.452 0.512 0.441 0.556
0.408 0.583 0.480 0.551

3
0.584
0.570
0.493
0.492
0.512
0.510
0.579
0.517
0.467
0.457

Note: -1 = last trade date in December
1 = first trade date in January

are .446 and .531 for December and January, respectively.

The

difference between these last two means is also significant at the .01
level.
Results reported in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 reveal a consistent
pattern of behavior for stock prices in the lower price deciles at the
turn of the year, at least for the samples under observation.

The

higher price deciles exhibit little or no significant difference
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between the two time frames for either of the two sub-samples.

The

shift in closing prices from the bid to ask side for the lower price
deciles would suggest that the higher returns reported in January,
particularly for the lowest priced stocks, may not be the result of a
fundamental change in intrinsic values.

The higher returns result at

least in part from a demand-induced shift from selling (at the bid) to
buying (at the ask) before and after the turn of the year,
respectively.

5.8.

Preliminary Conclusions
This chapter examined the nature of the bias induced in returns

measured using closing (last trade) prices compared to the use of
closing bid and ask price quotes.

We find a consistent over-estimation

of returns (compared to those realized in actual trades) when closing
prices are used.

The bias is approximately the same for different

length holding periods.

The order of magnitude of the bias for each

price decile examined tended to be approximately equal to the
percentage spread for that decile.

Low priced stocks tend to have the

largest relative spreads and the greatest bias in close-to-close
returns.

Thus, the evidence suggesting the existence of a low price

effect may be partially explained by nonlinear relative spread effects.
The nonlinearity is the result of the 1/8 minimum spread imposed by the
NYSE.

The adoption of decimal spreads might result in a significant

attenuation of the spreads on low price stocks.

Quite possibly the

size effect and the low price effect would also appear to be less
strong.

Finally, the magnitudes of the biases in computed returns

examined in this chapter are also sensitive to the magnitude of the
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price level.

The biases may also be sensitive to the use of daily

returns in place of weekly, monthly, or even yearly holding periods
when larger data samples are examined.
The magnitude of the bid-ask spread has been of interest in
research by Roll (1984) and Glosten and Harris (1985).

Both

researchers have attempted to estimate the "effective" bid-ask spread
by utilizing closing or intra-day transaction prices.

Their estimates

of the effective spread, defined as the spread paid by uninformed
traders, have been substantially less that the actual bid-ask spreads
measured in the current research.

Moreover, the magnitude of the

spread is fairly constant over a daily, weekly, or monthly assumed
holding periods.

Also, the bid-ask spread is positive for all deciles

in the the sub-samples tested.

We conclude tentatively that the

attempt to measure "effective" bid-ask spreads using closing or
transaction prices will result in substantially mis-estimated bid-ask
spread effects and potential errors in the implications drawn from
those estimates

CHAPTER

6

RESULTS II
6.1

Observed Prices as True Prices
The first question to be addressed in this chapter concerns the

identity of observed closing prices and ’’true" prices.

On average,

these prices should be identical or (at least) statistically equal.
Blume and Stambaugh (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and others
define "true" prices as the mean of the closing bid and ask price
quotes.

The true price is also termed the "expected closing price."

We shall use the latter term for the balance of this analysis.

In an

efficient market, the average observed closing price should be equal to
the expected closing price.

Earlier we noted the Blume and Stambaugh

(1983) suggestion that a "bid-ask effect" results in an upward bias in
returns computed from closing prices.

Although unspecified by Blume

and Stambaugh, we suspect that the observed closing price should be
slightly smaller than the expected closing price.
following:

Consider the

Suppose the expected closing price on day (t—1) is $2.00

and the (average) observed closing price is $1.99 and the change in
price on day (t) is (+) $0,125.
"observed return" is 6.28%.

The "expected return" is 6.25% and the

The difference is a 0.03% upward bias in

the computed return when observed closing prices are used to compute
returns.

Thus, a smaller denominator in the return computation

algorithm results in larger return magnitudes for a given change in
price.

This section investigates the average ($) magnitude of the

difference between observed closing prices and expected closing prices;
E{e-L> = E{pi - Pi),

where p-j^ is the observed price.
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Test sample one (TS1) and test sample two (TS2) are stratified by
price into deciles and means computed for the difference between
observed and expected closing prices for each decile.
tabulated in Table 6.1.

The results are

The average difference between observed

closing prices (Ob) and expected closing prices (Ex) for each decile
are displayed in the columns labeled "Ob-Ex."

Column (1), Panel A,

presents TS1 results; Column (4), Panel B, TS2 results.

We test

whether differences between observed closing prices and expected
closing prices are significantly different from zero:

The null

hypothesis is (Ob-Ex) = 0.

Table 6.1:

Observed versus Expected Closing Prices

Panel A:
(2)
(1)
Dec
Ob-Ex
t-test
1 -0.01184 -11.486
2 -0.01268 -11.917
3 -0.01014
-8.991
4 -0.01316 -10.519
5 -0.01020
-8.383
6 -0.01066
-8.514
7 -0.01005
-7.618
8 -0.00896
-7.256
9 -0.00559
-4.443
10 -0.00369
-2.731

TS1
(3)
MI
0.425
0.435
0.458
0.448
0.463
0.461
0.459
0.468
0.480
0.494

N
105
113
112
106
121
114
100
121
114
128

Panel B:
(4)
(5)
Ob-Ex
t-test
-0.00472 -4.577
-0.00634 -5.568
-0.00491 -4.421
-0.00582 -4.436
-0.00777 -6.542
-0.00584 -4.684
-0.00595 -4.300
-0.00475 -2.910
-0.00220 -1.645
-0.00119 -0.632

TS2
(6)
MI
0.475
0.474
0.479
0.483
0.473
0.480
0.481
0.485
0.495
0.503

N
109
110
145
100
130
132
118
118
124
119

The results in column (1), Panel A. indicate that observed closing
prices are slightly smaller than expected closing prices and the
differences are significant;

Column (2) contains the t-values.

Also,

the average difference is approximately one cent and exhibits a
monotone decline in magnitude as prices get larger.
(5) display the results for TS2.

Columns (4) and

The mean differences reported in

column (4) are smaller than those in column (1) and are significant for
all but the ninth and tenth deciles.
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The results reported in Table 6.1 are consistent and readily
explainable by examining the momentum index (MI) for decile 1 in each
sample (columns (3) and (6)).

The TS1 MI value for decile 1 is .425

and the magnitude of the difference is -.0118.

This value indicates

that low price stocks in TS1 tended to close nearer the bid side.
corresponding values for TS2 are .475 and -.0047, respectively.

The
TS2

low price stocks also tended to close nearer the bid side but to a
lesser degree.
approaches .500.

The magnitude of the bias decreases as the MI value
Although these results may very well be period

specific, the consistency of the relationship in both panels between
the MI and the magnitude of (Ob-Ex) suggests that the magnitude of any
bias induced in average observed prices is a function of investor
expectations (i.e., bullish or bearish) and institutional (NYSE)
constraints on spreads.

Accordingly, if stocks are in equilibrium and

spreads are not restricted to a minimum increment of 1/8 point, no bias
should be observed in closing prices.

This does not seem to be the

situation when we examine market microstructure behavior.

6.2

Observed

Returns vs True Returns

The next question in this investigation addresses return
measurement errors induced by the use of closing prices as equivalents
for expected closing prices (true prices).

Blume and Stambaugh (1983)

suggest that the Mbid-ask effect” results in significant estimation
errors in returns computed from observed closing prices in contrast to
returns computed from expected closing (true) prices.

In their study

they estimate the value of the average daily estimation bias as .051%.
In section 6.1 we reported that a statistically significant difference
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exists between observed closing prices and expected closing prices.
This section will test if the average magnitude of those differences is
sufficient to produce a significant difference between observed returns
and expected returns.

Returns are computed for all stocks in each

decile utilizing the three methods outlined by Roll (1983) and
specified in equations (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11).

Results are reported

in Table 6.2 for TS1 (Panel A) and TS2 (Panel B).

Table 6.2: Observed minus Expected Returns (%)

Arithmetic
Dec Ob-Ex
t
1 0.0209 0.5729
2 0.0051 0.3328
3 0.0050 0.4213
4 0.0047 0.4284
5 0.0037 0.3997
6 0.0009 0.1187
7 0.0022 0.2993
8 0.0005 0.0885
9 0.0021 0.4307
10 0.0011 0.3066
All 0.0044 1.0217

Panel A: TS1
Buy/Hold
Ob-Ex
t
-0.0077 -1.1452
-0.0003 -0.1188
0.0018 0.9573
0.0021 0.9913
0.0016 1.2525
-0.0005 -0.4204
0.0011
1.0395
-0.0003 -0.3650
0.0016 2.2475
0.0008 1.4300
0.0000 0.0633

Rebalanced
Ob-Ex
t
0.0206 0.5833
0.0050 0.2825
0.0049 0.5008
0.0047 0.3421
0.0036 0.4212
0.0009 0.1236
0.0022 0.2562
0.0005 0.0704
0.0021 0.4866
0.0011 0.2071
0.0044 0.7069

N
105
113
112
106
121
114
100
121
114
128
1134

Arithmetic
Dec Ob-Ex
t
1 0.0284 0.8564
2 0.0090 0.6349
3 0.0031 0.3168
4 0.0023 0.2347
5 0.0021 0.2785
6 0.0006 0.0914
7 0.0001 0.0129
8 ■-0.0007 ■-0.1026
9 0.0009 0.1916
10 0.0017 0.4168
All 0.0045 1.1387

Panel B: TS2
Buy/Hold
Ob-Ex
t
0.0033 0.6048
0.0044 1.8451
0.0002 0.0985
0.0003 0.1907
0.0005 0.5053
-0.0007 -0.6414
-0.0010 -0.8599
-0.0020 -1.9234
0.0003 0.4483
0.0013 2.3035
0.0006 0.9298

Rebalanced
Ob-Ex
t
0.0338 0.8254
0.0097 0.5701
0.0038 0.3556
0.0027 0.2055
0.0030 0.3540
0.0004 0.0361
-0.0003 -0.0449
-0.0012 -0.1417
0.0003 0.0567
0.0016 0.2858
0.0051 0.8046

N
109
110
145
100
130
132
118
118
124
119
1205

Two important results are presented in Table 6. 2.

First , the

magnitude of the differences in returns computed from observed closing
prices are generally positive and less than the bias estimated by Blume
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and Stambaugh (1983).

When arithmetic mean portfolio return

differentials for decile 1 are computed, the magnitudes of the biases
are .0209% and .0284% for TS1 and TS2, respectively.

Second, the error

magnitudes, while positive, are insignificantly different from zero.
The results are quite similar when rebalanced portfolio return
differentials are computed.

The utilization of the buy/hold portfolio

return algorithm results in an substantial attenuation of the bias, but
the results are still insignificantly different from zero; -0.0077% and
0.0033% for TS1 and TS2, respectively.
The important implication of these results is that the "bid-ask
effect" does not materially affect the reliability of daily returns
generated utilizing observed closing prices instead of the mean of the
closing bid and ask prices.

The magnitudes of the biases will,

however, impart larger errors when arithmetic and rebalancing return
computation methods are used to examine size effects or low price
effects.

These errors could be substantial when longer holding period

returns are computed utilizing daily closing price data.
The results reported in this section indicate that the error
magnitude induced in computed returns by the bid-ask effect is
substantially smaller than that reported by Blume and Stambaugh.

Two

reasons are offered for the difference in results achieved in this
study.

First, the Blume and Stambaugh study used a single day’s

closing bid and ask price data for 332 stocks.

This single day's

sample did not permit a sequence of expected closing prices to be
estimated using the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes.

This

series of expected prices would be important in computing true returns
and for comparing those returns to returns computed using the observed
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closing price series.

Second, the algorithm used by Blume and

Stambaugh may be incorrectly specified in so far as estimating the
average value of the bias is concerned.

Their specification assumes

that stocks will close at the bid or the ask with equal probabilities.
Results reported earlier in Chapter 5 indicate that this is not
necessarily the case.

Moreover, the magnitude of the bias will depend

upon the market's direction.

A more precise method for measuring the

magnitude of the bias would be to take the differences in holding
period returns using expected closing prices and observed closing
prices.

That is the procedure followed in this section.

The limited

size of their sample may have produced the abbreviated procedure for
estimating the average bias induced in the lowest price decile and the
resulting misestimation of the bias.

The results of the Blume and

Stambaugh study are even less effective due to their very small sample.
The larger samples used in the current investigation permitted better
estimates of expected closing prices and expected (true) returns, and
their comparison to observed closing prices and returns computed from
those observed closing prices.

6.3

Size Effects
Size effect anomalies have received a substantial amount of

attention in the recent literature.

The methodologies most often

employed require the estimation of historical betas (utilizing 60
months of returns), with and without the several beta correction
procedures, (ie., Dimson betas) as measures of relative risk.

These

beta estimates are then utilized in one of the many forms of the
pricing equation of the CAPM; typically the risk-adjusted return format
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incorporating a proxy for the risk free rate.

Some researchers compute

actual and forecast returns which are then differenced and the
residuals examined within the framework of a statistical test.

The

test determines whether the residuals are significantly positive.
Other researchers examine the intercept term using the risk-adjusted
form of the CAPM pricing equation.

If the average intercept is

significantly positive for firms with small market values of equity or
low prices, then size effects are said to exist.
All of the methodologies described above rely on beta as a
relative measure of risk.

As reviewed earlier, academic researchers

disagree as to the validity of the small firm effect.

The most

frequently cited problems are the weak links between beta risk and
return, and the problems related to nonsynchronous trading which result
in under-estimation of risk when the CAPM is used to test market
efficiency.

Others note that the theory does not specify what

determines the risk-free rate.
study.

Similar tests were performed in this

[Market model] Betas, average returns and variances were

estimated for all stocks in test sample one (41 days of returns).

A

correlation matrix was constructed and the following results noted:
The correlations between betas and returns are weak; r2's are typically
less than .13.

The correlations between average return and variances

(r2 > .95) are strong as are those between return variance and beta.
Some researchers have suggested that the inclusion of the variance term
in the market model improves the explanatory power of the model.

This

study does not suggest that the betas estimated using the relatively
short time period are valid estimators of beta.

The procedure is

conducted to establish the generality of the relationships which exist
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between beta, return, and return variance when different price
constructs are used.

An alternative method is utilized in this study

to test for the size effect which is not hampered by the beta
estimation problems but relies instead on the strong relationship
between return and variance (risk).
price effect.

In this section we examine the low

Stoll and Whaley (1983), and others, have suggested that

this method of analysis yields substantially the same results as the
market value of equity (MVE) used in size effect studies.

Moreover,

the method employed in this section captures the same ordering of
results typically reported in size effect studies which utilize MVE.
Size effect tests typically rely on returns computed from closing
prices.

Results reported earlier in this study have examined the

extent to which these returns might be biased due to expected closing
price measurement errors.

The results reported in sections 6.1 and 6.2

indicate that while the differences between observed closing prices and
expected closing prices are statistically significant, returns computed
from the two price series are statistically identical.
The low price effect is tested by computing mean daily holding
period returns and testing the difference between December and January
portfolio returns.

Mean daily holding period returns are estimated for

each decile [portfolio] using equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15)
corresponding to the three methods outlined in Roll (1983) for
computing portfolio returns; arithmetic (AR), buy-hold (BH), and
rebalanced (RB), respectively.
ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask.

Returns are measured close-to-close,

The last two simulate the use of market-

and limit-orders to execute stock trades.

Mean daily holding period

returns for December (R^) and January (Rj) are differenced and the
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residuals (Rj-Rd) tested for significance.
E(Rj-Rd) =0.

The null hypothesis is

If low price effects are part of the explanation for the

January effect, then the difference between January and December
returns should be significantly different from zero and positive for
low price stocks.

Accordingly, the critical value for the t-test is

1.658 for a single-tail test and the .05 level of significance.

TS1

results are reported in Table 6.3.A; TS2 results in Table 6.3.B.
Discussion of the results is oriented by the method used to define
trade execution prices and the methodology used to compute mean daily
portfolio returns.

Returns are measured using each of the Roll

methodologies for each set of assumed transaction prices.
section (6.3.1) focuses on TS1 results.

The first

Mean daily holding period

returns based on the AR algorithm are analyzed first.

AR returns are

estimated using closing prices (CC), ask-to-bid prices (AB), and bidto-ask prices (BA).

This is followed by a discussion on mean portfolio

returns utilizing the BH algorithm.
results completes the analysis.

A discussion of the RB algorithm

A second section (6.3.2) analyzes TS2

results in the same manner.
6.3.1

Test Sample One (TS1) Results
A generalized review of the results presented in Table 6.3.A (p.

106) indicates that lower price stocks experienced generally positive
or less negative returns in January.

The most typical case was less

negative returns in January compared to December.

Higher price stocks

experienced greater losses in January compared to December.

With

certain exceptions, most residuals (January returns minus December
returns) were statistically equal to zero.
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When portfolio returns are measured AR, the lowest price decile
yields significantly positive residuals for close-to-close returns (t =
1.773).

Returns measured ask-to-bid have a much smaller and

insignificant (t= 0.179) January residual.

Bid-to-ask returns have the

largest and most significant January residual (t = 3.095).

Stocks in

the highest price decile experienced insignificantly negative January
residuals for all three of the assumed price structures.

Summary

statistics for all stocks in TS1 show a slightly negative but
insignificant January residual for close-to-close returns, signifi¬
cantly negative ask-to-bid returns, and significantly positive bid-toask returns.
price effect.

These results indicate a statistically significant low
The price effect is smallest for returns measured ask-

to-bid, reflecting the use of market orders.
The BH methodology results reveal substantially the same outcomes
as the AR method:

Significant but smaller positive January residuals

for the lowest price decile.

Residuals for the highest price decile

are substantially lower than decile 1.

The smaller magnitudes of the

mean daily residuals in all deciles supports the Roll (1983) and Blume
and Stambaugh (1983) suggestions that BH-based return measurements
yield the smallest size-related effects.

Similar to AR returns,

returns measured ask-to-bid experience the smallest low price effects
while those measured bid-to-ask experienced positive returns in both
months.

January bid-to-ask returns, however, were lower for higher

priced deciles compared to December returns.

The magnitudes of the

lower January bid-to-ask returns were not significantly different.
Bid-ask spreads were larger in January reflecting lower prices, and
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Table 6.3.A: Low Price Effects Jan-Dec Return Differentials

Retns
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA

All CC
All AB
All BA

Test Sample
ROLL AR
ROLL,
Ri-Rd
t
Ri-Rd
0.204 1.773
0.185
0.020 0.179
0.012
0.385 3.095
0.371

Dec
1
/

One
BH
t
2.353
0.046
1.354

ROLL,
Ri-Rd
0.202
0.018
0.383

RB
t
1.562
0.152
3.118

N
105
105
105

2

0.038 0.523
-0.085 -1.192
0.162 2.166

0.035 0.662
-0.089 -0.917
0.156 1.972

0.037 0.395
-0.086 -0.982
0.160 1.732

113
113
113

3

0.028 0.397
-0.098 -1.452
0.125 1.793

0.024 0.437
-0.100 -1.177
0.121
1.677

0.026 0.263
-0.099 -1.064
0.123 1.253

112
112
112

4

0.073 1.149
-0.002 -0.030
0.110 1.746

0.064 1.250
-0.010 -0.131
0.101
1.535

0.070 0.741
-0.004 -0.044
0.107 1.176

106
106
106

5

0.015 0.254
-0.054 -0.957
0.076 1.301

0.007 0.129
-0.063 -0.952
0.067 1.089

0.012 0.134
-0.057 -0.640
0.074 0.813

121
121
121

6

-0.118 -1.940
-0.205 -3.415
-0.044 -0.718

-0.126 -2.654
-0.212 -3.102
-0.053 -0.906

-0.122 -1.104
-0.209 -1.954
-0.049 -0.438

114
114
114

7

-0.147 -2.327
-0.210 -3.397
-0.083 -1.311

-0.157 -3.245
-0.219 -3.390
-0.092 -1.568

-0.151 -1.422
-0.214 -2.060
-0.086 -0.816

100
100
100

8

-0.055 -1.030
-0.075 -1.411
-0.034 -0.630

-0.063 -1.326
-0.082 -1.359
-0.041 -0.812

-0.058 -0.599
-0.078 -0.818
-0.037 -0.374

121
121
121

9

-0.061 -1.060
-0.121 -2.140
-0.016 -0.279

-0.070 -1.510
-0.130 -2.222
-0.025 -0.490

-0.066 -0.542
-0.126 -1.065
-0.021 -0.174

114
114
114

10

-0.038 -0.827
-0.062 -1.350
-0.015 -0.324

-0.046 -1.121
-0.070 -1.285
-0.023 -0.476

-0.042 -0.410
-0.066 -0.656
-0.019 -0.185

128
128
128

S

Summary Statistics
-0.007 -0.345 -0.016 -0.948
-0.089 -3.983 -0.096 -1.952
0.056 1.093
0.064 2.709

-0.010 -0.323 1134
-0.091 -3.040 1134
1.958 1134
0.061

108

lower volumes.

These observations indicate that the specialist is

still able to earn positive returns even in a down market.
The RB method reveals residuals quite similar in magnitude and
significance to AR method results.
Roll's (1983) suggestions;

These results are consistent with

AR > BH and RB > BH.

Also. RB ask-to-bid

residuals are uniformly smaller and less significant than close or bidto-ask returns.

The TS1 results demonstrate that the magnitude of low

price effects (and most likely size effects) are sensitive to the
return measurement algorithms.

Moreover, the magnitudes of the

residuals as well as returns are particularly sensitive to the assumed
transaction price structures.
6.3.2

Test Sample Two (TS2) Results
The results reported for TS1 are influenced by a bearish move by

the market in general.

The results reported in Table 6.3.B for TS2 are

influenced by a bull market move.

Accordingly, the test results

reported herein reflect the significant effects of that market trend.
In general. January returns were more positive than December returns
for all deciles and is reflected by the positive values for all
residuals.

January residuals were largest for the lowest price decile.

Moreover, the largest magnitude of the residual occurs for returns
measured ask-to-bid.

Two reasons account for this result.

higher prices typically result in smaller bid-ask spreads.

First,
Second, the

substantial positive move by lower price stocks attenuated the effect
of the spread on measured returns.

This was uniformly the case for all

price deciles except the tenth (largest price) decile.
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Table 6.3.B: Low Price Effects Jan-Dec Return Differentials

Retns
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA
CC
AB
BA

All CC
All AB
All BA

Dec
1

Test Sample Two
ROLL AR
ROLL BH
Rj-Rd
t
Rj-Rd
t
0.590 4.777
0.574 6.726
0.739 2.968
0.746 6.038
0.281
0.289 2.159
1.046

ROLL
Rj-Rd
0.581
0.738
0.282

RB
t
3.475
4.757
1.721

N
109
109
109

0.324
0.424
0.158

3.562
4.386
1.592

0.324
0.438
0.171

4.538
4.254
2.006

0.318
0.419
0.152

2.245
3.124
1.085

no

3

0.145
0.233
0.049

2.276
3.505
0.722

0.143
0.232
0.048

2.824
3.215
0.717

0.142
0.230
0.046

1.392
2.331
0.455

145
145
145

4

0.219
0.277
0.135

2.913
3.578
1.710

0.214
0.278
0.137

3.479
3.236
1.955

0.215
0.274
0.131

1.719
2.276
1.065

100
100
100

5

0.140
0.187
0.093

2.119
2.843
1.389

0.138
0.186
0.092

2.601
2.676
1.458

0.137
0.184
0.089

1.239
1.714
0.802

130
130
130

6

0.136
0.168
0.103

2.036
2.162
1.305

0.130
0.160
0.095

2.302
2.319
1.591

0.133
0.165
0.101

1.187
1.467
0.884

132
132
132

7

0.141
0.182
0.089

2.105
1.781
0.859

0.131
0.185
0.092

2.357
2.725
1.549

0.137
0.178
0.084

1.146
1.432
0.660

118
118
118

8

0.180
0.194
0.198

2.626
2.271
2.204

0.177
0.172
0.171

3.300
2.210
2.925

0.178
0.191
0.195

1.385
1.442
1.473

118
118
118

9

0.035
0.054
0.015

0.539
0.833
0.227

0.023
0.043
0.003

0.438
0.683
0.062

0.034
0.053
0.013

0.267
0.426
0.107

124
124
124

10

0.097
0.087
0.108

1.262
1.138
1.392

0.068
0.060
0.080

0.847
0.641
0.953

0.096
0.087
0.107

0.675
0.615
0.750

119
119
119

0.193
0.247
0.119

Summary
7.970
9.073
4.174

Statistics
0.185 9.153
0.241 5.584
0.112 2.316

0.190
0.243
0.116

4.979 1205
6.550 1205
3.041 1205

2

110

no

110

Returns measured BH were typically negative and less so in January
compared to December.

This reflects the narrowing of bid-ask spreads

as stock prices get larger.

The difference in magnitudes of the BH

residuals compared to AR and RB residuals are quite small; typically
less than three basis points.

This should not be interpreted to mean

that the same level of return was experienced by all three return
measurement methods.

It reflects the uniformity of effects as bid-ask

spreads begin to narrow.

The important implication of this finding is

the effect that the bid-ask spread has on realized returns.
The results discussed in the last two sections suggest that the
low price effect may be sensitive to the methodology and time sample
used to measure returns.

In bear markets, the low price effect may be

the result of the specification of the return generating process.
Specifically, when returns are generated using close-to-close prices,
significant low price effects are present in the lowest price decile.
When returns are generated in a manner consistent with market order
executions, size effects are reduced to insignificance.
markets, the opposite appears to be true.

In bull

When returns are generated

using ask-to-bid prices (market-order executions), low price effects
are significant.
significant.

Returns measured bid-to-ask, however, are less

This would suggest that the specialist/market maker earns

less at the margin during up markets due to a narrowing of the bid-ask
spread.

The issue is more complicated.

limit order activity on the bid side.

The spread may reflect more
Also, we cannot overlook the

possibility of specialist inventory profits in up markets offsetting
any losses in income due to a narrowing of the bid-ask spread.

Ill

The general implications of the preceding analysis suggests that
the low price effect is sensitive to time, market characteristics, and
the method used to examine return differentials.

The strength of the

effect is largely a function of the methodology used to measure returns
and the nature of the samples used to test the effect.

This

observation has been made by other research results indicating an
instability of the effect.

We cannot dismiss the notion that some

degree of market inefficiency is at work in the low price effect
anomaly and most probably in the size effect.

The origin of the

inefficiency, however, is not the market per se.

The low price effect

is most likely related to the behavior of the spread and in particular
the minimum spread imposed by the NYSE for stocks trading in excess of
one dollar.

When stocks rise sufficiently in price, particularly low

price stocks, the mean bid-ask spread predicted by the model implied in
section 6.1 may result in an attenuation of the low price effect.

A

simple elimination of the 1/8 point spread increments might achieve the
same result; ie., use of decimal spreads.

6.4

Weekend Effects
Weekend effects are tested in a manner similar to the testing of

low price effects.

Monday-to-Tuesday (MT) returns are subtracted from

Friday-to-Monday (FM) returns and the residuals tested for
significance.

The null hypothesis is E{MT-FM} = 0.

Due to the

relatively small sample, the two holiday weekend returns (Christmas and
New Years) are included.

This procedure may bias the results.

The

bias, if present, should act equally on all return computation methods.
Accordingly, the results should be useful in understanding the nature
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of the weekend effect.

Also, one might expect weekend returns to be

substantially larger than weekday returns.

This expectation would be

conditioned on the belief that returns occur in calender time.
Accordingly, weekend returns (3 days) should be three times as large as
weekday returns.

The objective of the French (1980) study was to

determine the answer to that question.

French's results suggested that

returns occur in trading time rather than calender time.
A potentially important influence on weekend effects is the
incidence of ex-dividend dates.
ex-dividend dates for TS1.
sample period;

Table 6.4 presents the distribution of

495 stocks went ex-dividend during the

188 stocks (38%) went ex-dividend on Monday as opposed

to 37 stocks (7%) going ex-dividend on Friday.

We would expect, in the

absence of any other effects, that average closing prices on Fridays
would be higher than average closing prices on Mondays.

This

expectation is based on the generally observed tendency of ex-dividend
day share prices to recover less that the total amount of the dividend
lose of trading on the ex-date.

Table 6.4: Frequency Summary for Ex--Dividend Days
By Days of the Week for Test Sample One
Week
Decl
Dec 2
Dec3
Dec4
Dec5
Janl
Jan2
Jan3
Jan4
Total
%

Mon
JL
✓N

30
28
9
27
28
33
16
17
188
38

Tues
16
24
15
6
8
8
7
8
33
125
25

Wed
6
40
8
3
2
3
1
3
11
77
16

Thurs
5
7
7
37
2
1
3
1
5
68
14

Fri
15
9
6
H
H
1
1
3
2
37
7

Note: Decl = first week in December, etc.
H = Holiday, NYSE closed

Total
42
110
64
55
39
41
45
31
68
495
100
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The data for TS2 indicate 579 stocks going ex-dividend during the
sample time period.

The distribution of ex-dates for TS2 are: 245

(42%), 133 (23%), 67 (12%), 86 (15%), and 48 (8%) for Monday through
Friday, respectively.

Thus the two samples have approximately the same

distribution of ex-dates.

The distributions shown in Table 6.4 would

support a marked potential for negative Friday-to-Monday returns for
stocks that go ex-dividend on Monday.
The possibility of substantial ex-dividend date effects suggests
that the data sample be dichotomized on that basis.

Accordingly,

results are reported for non-dividend paying stocks, stocks going exdividend and combined results for each decile in the sample.

Also,

returns are measured close-to-close, ask-to-bid, and bid-to-ask.

Table

6.5.A (p. 113) presents the results for TS1, Table 6.5.B (p. 114) for
TS2.

D = (%) difference in returns, t = test statistic, and N = the

number of issues.
The last three rows in Table 6.5.A contain the summary statistics
for all stocks in TS1.
nine categories.

The weekend effect is present in eight of the

When returns are measured close-to-close, TS1 results

indicate significantly negative residuals in six of the ten deciles.
When returns are measured ask-to-bid, five deciles have significantly
negative residuals and only three deciles have significantly negative
residuals when returns are measured bid-to-ask.

Effects are most

significant in the third, sixth, and eighth deciles.

In all deciles,

the evidence of a weekend effect is weakest in non-dividend paying
stocks; 7 out of 30 possibilities.
going ex-dividend; 15 out of 30.

The evidence is strongest in stocks
Also, the weekend effects are weakest

in the lowest and highest price deciles.
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Table 6.5.A: Weekend Effect under Alternative Assumptions
Return Differentials and Dividend Effects
Test Sample One
Ask-to -Bid
Close--to- Close
No
Div Comb
Dec
No
1Div Comb
-0 .39 0 .06 -0.33 -0, ,28 -0 .08 -0.25
— 1.8 0 .18 1.71 -0.,87 -0 .15 0.87
1
14
105
91
14
105
91

D
t
N

No
-0 .25
-0 .68
91

Bid-to -Ask
Div Comb
0.02 -0.21
0.05 0.65
14
105

f-H

.
o
1

D
t

2

-0 .17 -l3.3 -0.22 -0.,16 -0 .19
-1 .18 -1 .89 2.02 -0,,89 -1 .03
43
113
70
43
70

3

-0 .46 -0 .34
— 2.7 -2 .27
56
56

N
D
t
N
D
t
N
D
t
N
D
t
N
D
t
N
D
t
N
D
t
N
D
t
N

D
t
N

-0.4
3.54
112

-0,,44 -0 .36
-2,.37 -2 .02
56
56

-0 . 16 -0.14 -0.15
1.3 -0 .98 -0.75 1.24
113
70i
43
13

-0.4
3.11
112

-0 .45 -0.37 -0.41
-2 .44 -2.63 3.55
112
56
56

4

-0 .09 -I0.4 -0.23
-0 .69 -3 .28 2.52
49
106
57

-0,,22 -0 .36 -0.29
-1,.49 -2 .89 2.91
106
57
49

-0 .03 -0.31 -0.16
-0 .18 -2.23 1.48
57
106
49

5

-0 .05 -0 .02 -0.04
—10.4 -0 .15 0.39
121
60
61

-0,.06 -0 .09 -0.07
-0,.44 -0 .61 0.75
121
61
60

-0 .06
-i0.5
60

6

-0 .23 -0 .34 -0.28
-1 .83 -2 .49 3.04
114
62
52

-0,.23 -i0.4 -0.31
-1,.62 -2 .74 3.02
114
52
62

-0 .25 -0.3 -0.27
-1 .91 -2.16 2.88
114
62
52

7

0 -0 .06 -0.03
0 .03 -0 .38 0.25
100
51
49

-0,.05 -0 .13 -0.09
-0 .35 -0 .94 0.91
100
49
51

0 .09 -0.12 -0.01
0 .58 -0.69 0.12
100
49
51

8

-0 . 16 -0 .28 -0.21
-1 .44 -2 . 16 2.54
121
54
67

-0 .22 -0 .31 -0.26
-1 .94 -2 .44 3.09
121
54
67

9

0 .02 -0 .25
0 .19 -1 .93
53
61

-0.1
1.22
114

-0 .11 -0 .28 -0.19
-0 .95 -2 .16 2.19
114
53
61

0 .02 -0.22 -0.09
0 .17 -1.58 0.98
114
53
61

10

0 .09
0.9
76

0 .04
0 .41
52

0.07
0.94
128

-0 .02 -0 .01 -0.01
-0 .18 -0 .08 0.19
128
52
76

0 .11
1 .04
76

Summary Statistics
-0.15 -0.2-0.17 -0.18-0.23 -0.2
-3.16 -4.55 5.18 -2.14 -3.92 3.67
651
483 1134
651
483 1134

0.06
0.42
61

-0 .15 -0.27
-1 .31 -1.91
54
67

0.07
0.8
52

0
0
121

-0.2
2.29
121

0.09
1.25
128

-0.11-0.17-0.14
-1.27 -2.74 2.36
651
483 1134
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Table 6.5.B: Weekend Effect under Alternative Assumptions
Return Differentials and Dividend Effects

D
t
N

Test Sample Two
Close-to-Close
Ask-to-Bid
Dec
No
Div Comb
No
Div Comb
1 -0.14
-1 -0.21 -0.14 -0.28 -0.2
-0.68 -1.81 1.09 -0.73 -1.97 1.69
109
100
9
100
9
109

Bid-to-Ask
No
Div Comb
-0.55 -0.16 -0.31
-1.54 -0.88 1.75
100
9
109

D
t
N

2

-0.12 -1.04
-0.4 -1.9
40
70

-0.2
0.69
110

-0.17 -0.29 -0.22
-0.97 -2.04 1.97
70
40
110

-0.3 -0.36 -0.33
-2.33 -3.32 3.93
70
40
110

D
t
N

3

-0.19 -0.89 -0.25
-0.58 -1.55
0.8
67
145
78

-0.37 -0.29 -0.33
-2.81 -2.12 3.51
145
78
67

-0.57 -0.26 -0.41
-3.39 -1.53 3.42
67
145
78

D
t
N

4

-0.12 -0.08 -0.11
-0.67 -0.4 0.78
46
100
54

-0.37
-2.63
54

-0.3 -0.34
-2.2 3.44
46
100

-0.54 -0.52 -0.53
-3.01 -3.02 4.28
100
54
46

D
t
N

5

-0.15
-0.78
69

0.12 -0.05
0.51 0.36
61
130

-0.38 -0.25 -0.32
-2.64 -1.82 3.19
130
69
61

-0.2 -0.28 -0.24
-1.8 -2.43 3.02
130
69
61

D
t
N

6

-0.05
-0.26
60

0.05 -0.01
0.1
0.21
132
72

-0.1 -0.33 -0.23
-0.71 -2.91 2.53
132
60
72

-0.2 -0.32 -0.26
-1.81 -2.69 3.22
132
72
60

D
t
N

7

-0.21 -0.34 -0.27
-1.65 -2.46 2.88
118
72
46

-0.3 -0.3
-1.67 -1.99
46
72

-0.3
2.58
118

-0.16 -0.28 -0.23
-1.52 -2.46 2.85
118
46
72

D
t
N

8

-0.27 -0.37 -0.31
-1.84 -2.73 3.14
118
59
59

-0.26 -0.19 -0.22
-1.48 -1.07 1.76
118
59
59

-0.19 -0.09 -0.14
-1.54 -0.83 1.73
118
59
59

D
t
N

9

-0.25 -0.36
-1.71 -2.54
64
60

-0.3
2.94
124

-0.21 -0.18 -0.19
-1.55 -1.69 2.29
124
60
64

-0.25 -0.44 -0.35
-1.72 -1.7 2.36
124
64
60

D
t
N

10

-0.04 -0.27 -0.15
-0.21 -2.13 1.33
119
57
62

-0.58 -0.2 -0.35
-1.65 -1.08 1.96
62
57
119

-0.22 -0.12 -0.17
-1.66 -1.16 2.03
119
57
62

Summary Statistics
-0.18 -0.27 -0.22 -0.18 -0.24 -0.21
-3.63 -6.28 -6.55 -2.23 -4.61 -4.1
658
547 1205
547 1205
658

-0.2 -0.27 -0.23
-2.22 -5.2 -4.21
547 1205
658

D
t
N

116

These results support two possible conclusions.

First, the weekend

effect is very sensitive to the incidence of ex-dividend date price
adjustments.

Second, the weekend effect is not equally distributed

among different price levels.

This might suggest an interaction

between the price level and the magnitude of the dividend.

However,

due to the size of the samples, any findings of weekend effects should
be interpreted with caution.
The last three rows in Table 6.5.B contain the results for all
stocks TS2.

The weekend effect is present in all nine categories.

When returns are measured close-to-close, only three of the ten deciles
have statistically significant negative residuals.

When returns

measured ask-to-bid or bid-to-ask, all ten deciles have statistically
significant negative residuals

In all deciles, the evidence of a

weekend effect is weakest in non-dividend paying stocks; 11 out of 30
possibilities.
20 out of 30.

The evidence is strongest in stocks going ex-dividend;
Similar to the TS1 results, effects are weakest in the

lowest and highest price deciles.

The TS2 results are substantially

similar to the TS1 results and support the same level of conclusions
suggested in the previous paragraph.

6.5

The January Effect
The January effect is the tendency of stocks reaching year end

lows in December to experience significant gains after the first of the
year.

A problem in examining the January effect is that it may be

associated with or indeed part of the size effect, low price effect, or
may be confounded by one or both of these effects.

Some research has

suggested that stocks with absolute gains in December or earlier may
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continue to experience gains after the new year.

Alternatively, not

every stock reaching year-end lows in December will experience any
significant gains in January.

We are interested in examining the

January effect under alternative assumptions about the form of the
return generating process.

Accordingly, we examine turn-of-the-year

behavior with returns measured close-to-close, ask-to-bid, and bid-toask.

The primary focus of our investigation is the behavior of the

first (lowest) and tenth (highest) price deciles.
The data samples are examined for a January effect by testing the
difference between mean daily January and December close-to-close
returns.

The TS1 lowest price decile t-test is 2.54; the highest price

decile is -.799.

The test results indicate a January effect in the

lowest price decile.

January returns for the highest price decile were

more negative than December returns but the difference is insignifi¬
cantly different from zero.

When returns are measured ask-to-bid or

bid-to-ask, test results are quite similar:

January returns are more

positive for the lowest price decile, and more negative for the highest
price decile.

Unlike close-to-close returns, none of the latter

results are statistically significant.

Tests of TS2 indicate

substantially greater January returns compared to December returns for
the three alternative return generating processes.

The results were

expected: the market evidenced a substantial bull move during January
1983.

The t-test values for the TS2 lowest and highest price deciles

were 6.42 and 3.11, respectively.

An additional test of the difference

between January returns for the lowest and highest price deciles
indicates a significantly more positive return for the lowest price
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decile.

The t-test values are 1.97 and 6.63 for TS1 and TS2,

respectively.
We next divide each the lowest and highest price deciles into
quintiles and examine the January effect in greater detail.

In effect,

five portfolios each (total of ten) are formed with the stocks in the
lowest and highest price deciles.

Stocks are assigned to these

portfolios on the basis of December returns;

stocks with the lowest

positive or most negative returns are assigned to portfolio 1, those
with the highest positive or least negative returns are assigned to
portfolio 5.

The five portfolios within each decile contain the same

number of stocks within plus or minus one.

Table 6.6 contains the t-

test results of these comparisons for TS1 and TS2.

Table 6.6:

January-December Return Differentials

Panel A: TS1 t-Test Results
Highest Price Decile
Lowest Price Decile
BA
AB
AB
BA
CC
Pf
CC
3.084
0.254
2.892
2.208
1
6.199
1.558
-0.227
0.280
0.508
0.074
3.268
1.036
2
0.442
0.629
1.234
0.575
3
3.018
0.853
-3.784
-2.017
-3.642
0.273
4
1.036
-0.053
-1.758
-2.365
-1.310
-0.854
-0.959
5 -4.898
-0.908
-0.799
-0.469
0.448
All 2.541
0.922
Panel B: TS2 t-Test Results
Highest Price Decile
Lowest Price Decile
BA
AB
CC
BA
AB
CC
Pf
7.273
6.168
7.731
1.193
2.758
11.01
1
2.697
2.000
4.100
1.716
2.817
7.610
2
1.259
1.403
1.581
0.649
2.002
3
3.475
-0.150
-0.119
-0.197
-0.444
1.995
4
2.356
-3.025
-2.844
-3.504
-0.633
0.302
5 -2.293
4.453
2.521
3.109
0.778
3.733
All 6.424

In general, stocks in the first quintile, those experiencing the
worst returns in December, show the largest positive differentials
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between January and December returns; those experiencing the best
December returns (fifth quintile) experience the largest negative
differentials in January.

The magnitudes of the return differentials

decline in near monotone order from the first to the fifth quintiles.
(Critical value for the t-test = 2.080.)
Results describing return differences for the lowest price decile
were presented in section 6.3.

The results described therein clearly

show more positive returns accruing to low-priced stocks in comparison
to the high-priced stocks.
to the investigation.

Table 6.6 provides an additional dimension

A further categorization based on December

returns for stocks in the lowest and highest price deciles reveals an
additional regularity.

Stocks in the lowest return quintiles

experience strong January effects regardless of price decile.

Stocks

in the highest return quintiles experience statistically significant
lower January returns.

Differentials for the lowest price decile are

significant for returns measured close-to-close and ask-to-bid and
insignificant for returns measured bid-to-ask .

The results are

generally significant for the lowest and highest return quintiles of
the highest price decile regardless of the assumptions made about the
return generating process.
Tax considerations have been suggested as an explanation for part
of the turn-of-the-year or January effect.

Accordingly. December would

seem the best time (from a tax standpoint) to recognize losses and
January to realize gains.

The regularity of the return behavior of the

first and fifth quintiles suggests the possibility of a rotation in the
flow of investment during January from those stocks with the best
December performances to those with the worst; with part or all of the
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rotation occurring in January.

Two additional observations are made.

First, test sample one average daily trading volumes for the lowest
price decile were uniformly lower in January compared to December.

The

average daily trading volume decline in the fifth quintile (37%) was
slightly greater than the first quintile (34%).

Second, average daily

trading volumes for the highest price decile were uniformly larger in
January compared to December; 34% greater in the fifth quintile and 28%
for the first quintile.

Table 6.7:

Pf
1
2
3
4
5
All

The results are contained in Table 6.7,

January versus December Trading Volumes
Test Sample One

Low Price Decile
Jan Vol
Dec Vol
t-test
16757
25543
-0.907
17413
19454
-0.315
10559
12343
-0.449
9866
15856
-1.384
13666
21733
-1.669
13652
18985
-1.881

High Price Decile
Jan Vol
Dec Vol
t-test
61679
48035
1.093
90093
0.697
71005
51086
41496
0.858
80744
49297
1.174
84278
62525
0.596
73391
54383
1.699

Statistical t-tests of the differences in trading volumes reveals
insignificant differences when January volumes and December volumes are
compared.

These observations would suggest that, at least for TS1

(bear market), January gains in low price stocks occur on lower
volumes; losses in the highest priced stocks occur on larger volume.
The differences between January and December trading volumes are
significant at the .10 level; t-test results are -1.881 and 1.699 for
the lowest and highest price deciles, respectively.

The lower January

trading volumes for the lowest price stocks might suggest a partial
explanation for the January effect, at least for the lowest priced
stocks.

Lower volumes suggest a decrease in liquidity.

A decrease in

liquidity is also accompanied by an increase in the bid-ask spread.
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Both are indicative of increased levels of risk.

If the relationship

between risk and return holds, then postive January returns for low
price stocks would be a partial result of the increase in the apparent
riskiness of these low priced securities.

These results are, of

course, very speculative due to the very small sample of stocks.

It

does, however, reveal a potentiallly important relationship between the
interaction of volumes, bid-ask spreads and observed returns.

A more

detailed analysis with larger data samples might be useful in
increasing our understanding of this particular anomaly.
These results suggest that the magnitude of the January effect (or
turn-of-the-year effect) is sensitive to the underlying trend of the
market; the effect is stronger in a bull market.

The results also

indicate that the effect is non-uniform across a price-stratified
sample.

When a price decile is further stratified on the basis of

December performance, stocks in the worst December returns quintile
substantially outperform those in the best December performance
regardless of the underlying trend in the market.

Finally, the results

suggest that the January effect is most significant when returns are
measured close-to-close and least significant when returns are measured
bid-to-ask (limit orders) for the lowest price decile:

The results for

the highest price decile are significant regardless of the assumptions
made about the form of the return generating process.

6.6

Microstructure Price Behavior and Autocorrelation
We now investigate the relation between today's closing price

relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes and the next day's
price change.

We are interested in determining the extent of
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regularities in price changes when stocks close at the bid, ask,
inside, or outside the closing bid-ask spread.

To facilitate our

investigation, we have stratified the sample into deciles using the
daily closing price as the stratification variable.

This procedure

minimizes the effects of different price/spread levels present in the
overall sample.

The very low number of securities closing outside the

closing bid-ask price spread precludes separate estimates for means and
variances of next day price changes.
reported:

closes<=bid;

Accordingly, three categories are

bid< close <ask;

and close >= ask.

In each

category, the scale of the (t+1) change is always relative to the
magnitude of the day(t) bid-ask spread.

Thus, changes in the (t+1)

closing spread, bid, ask are given as percentages using equations
(6.1),(6.2), and (6.3), respectively.

%Dspr = (Askt+| - Bidt+i) - (Askt - Bidt)
(Askt - Bidt)

(6.1)

%Dask = (Askt+i - Askt) / (Askt - Bidt)

(6.2)

%Dbid = (Bidt+i - Bidt) / (Askt - Bidt)

(6.3)

An important result of using time t's spread as a scale is
demonstrated in the subsequent tables.

The percentage change in the

(t+1) spread (%CHG S) is equal to the algebraic difference between
changes in the ask (%CHG A) and bid (%CHG B) quotes; equation (6.2)
minus equation (6.3) equals equation (6.1).

The price-stratified

samples suggest that the magnitudes of the next day changes are
sensitive to price levels and the size of the bid-ask spread.

Two sets

of price-stratified results are reported; (1) test sample one (TS1) and
(2) test sample two (TS2).

Next Day returns (%RET) are also reported
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along with the total number of observations (N).

Analysis of the TS1

results is followed by an analysis of the TS2 results.
When the last trade price is equal to or less than the closing bid
price, next day returns (measured close-to-close) are positive for all
deciles, and statistically significant for the first eight deciles.
The (t+1) closing spreads are larger and exhibit a near monotone
increase in the percentage change from the lowest to the highest price
decile.

All next day spread change magnitudes are statistically

significant and positive.

The change in spread is primarily the result

of a drop in the bid-side quote.
6.8.A.I.

These results are exhibited in Table

(t-statistics in parentheses.)
Table 6.8.A.1: TS1 Next Day Changes
Close =< Bid
Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

%CHG S %CHG A
21.090
1.702
(19.0)
(0.72)
26.142
6.007
(19.5)
(1.73)
33.555 11.526
(2.65)
(20.9)
29.712 11.867
(17.7)
(2.49)
32.229
1.676
(0.34)
(20.5)
37.589
1.862
(0.26)
(19.0)
1.147
37.158
(0.14)
(18.8)
39.496 -6.685
(0.75)
(19.6)
43.557 -24.408
(1.97)
(19.5)
43.503 -8.481
(0.63)
(17.4)

%CHG B
-19.389
(8.08)
-20.135
(5.76)
-22.029
(5.17)
-17.845
(3.79)
-30.552
(6.23)
-35.727
(4.99)
-36.011
(4.50)
-46.181
(5.25)
-67.965
(5.47)
-51.984
(3.91)

%RET
1.111
(14.2)
0.546
(10.0)
0.480
(8.76)
0.472
(9.08)
0.333
(6.89)
0.269
(4.84)
0.270
(4.67)
0.136
(2.68)
0.054
(0.88)
0.089
(1.94)

N
1900
1900
1722
1722
1469
1469
1359
1359
1466
1466
1219
1219
1065
1065
1240
1240
1063
1063
1205
1205

The larger percentage changes in the upper deciles is due to the
larger absolute spread for stocks trading at higher prices; typically
3/8 of a point.

The largest percentage change in the bid-ask spread
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results from a change in the bid.

Changes on the ask-side are

insignificantly different from zero in most deciles.

These results

reflect the expected changes in the bid-ask spread/prices for markets
influenced by specialist activity and/or the limit order book.

If the

last trade of the day results in the execution (from the limit-order
book) of a limit order (to buy), we would expect an increase in the
spread on average.

Recall that the "market" is defined as the highest

unexercised offer to buy (bid) and the lowest unexercised offer to sell
(ask) as reflected in the specialist's limit-order book.

The average

magnitude of the change would depend on the depth of the orders
awaiting execution from the specialist' limit order book.

An earlier

study by Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966) reported clustering of limit
orders at whole numbers followed by halves, quarters, and odd eighths.
The nonuniform clustering produced nonrandom effects in stock price
motion.

The results reported in this study may well reflect the

effects of nonrandom distributions on the nonrandom outcomes of last
trade prices relative to the closing spread/price.
When stocks close inside the bid-ask spread, next day returns are
typically and significantly negative for all deciles.

The (t+1)

closing spreads are smaller and exhibit a near monotone decrease in
percentage change from the lowest to the highest price decile.

These

results are shown in Table 6.8.A.2 (p. 124)
All spread changes are significantly different from zero.

Changes

in the ask quote are typically negative and significant in all ten
deciles.

Changes in the bid quotes are smaller in magnitude and are

positive for the first four deciles and negative for the last six.
bid-quote changes in the first and last two deciles are significant.

The
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Table 6.8.A.2: TS1 Next Day Changes
Bid < Close < Ask
Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

%CHG S
-23.537
(25.6)
-18.258
(23.6)
-15.756
(22.1)
-13.653
(18.2)
-13.356
(19.1)
-11.441
(17.6)
-10.468
(14.2)
-10.565
(15.5)
-10.266
(15.7)
-9.934
(14.4)

%CHG A
-14.808
(7.51)
-10.501
(4.68)
-12.819
(5.60)
-10.743
(4.16)
-13.822
(5.10)
-14.121
(4.85)
-19.652
(6.18)
-16.346
(4.97)
-20.135
(5.27)
-25.333
(5.56)

%CHG B
8.729
(4.50)
7.757
(3.48)
2.937
(1.28)
2.911
(1.12)
-0.466
(0.17)
-2.679
(0.93)
-9.184
(2.87)
-5.781
(1.73)
-9.869
(2.57)
-15.399
(3.38)

%RET C
-0.339
(3.23)
-0.138
(2.18)
-0.156
(2.91)
-0.106
(2.17)
-0.147
(3.31)
-0.134
(3.18)
-0.192
(4.63)
-0.125
(3.41)
-0.150
(4.10)
-0.143
(4.67)

N
1144
1144
1743
1743
2014
2014
1965
1965
2332
2332
2522
2522
2250
2250
2713
2713
2679
2679
2915
2915

The observed decrease in the spread may reflect efforts by the
specialist to limit competition from other traders or from public
traders attempting to use attractively placed limit orders: the use of
limit-orders avails the best strategy available to a public trader who
desires to narrow the spread and obtain a better execution price.
significant change is a decline in the ask-side quote.

The

This may

reflect the general bearish behavior of the market during the period
covered by TS1.
When stocks close at a price equal to or greater than the closing
ask price, next day returns are significantly negative for all deciles.
The (t+1) closing spreads are significantly larger and exhibit a near
monotone in the percentage change from the lowest to the highest price
deciles.

Table 6.8A.3 exhibits these results.

The largest percentage

change occurs on the ask side (the ask quote is higher) for the first
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five deciles and on the bid side (it is lower) for the last five
deciles.

All bid-side changes are negative and significant.

Table 6.8.A.3: TS1 Next Day Changes
Close => Ask
Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

%CHG S %CHG A
22.297 15.133
16.151
4.483
36.044 19.116
16.851
3.821
35.604 22.266
18.556
3.963
38.680 14.171
18.433
2.246
39.288 22.222
19.186
3.504
41.879
9.578
19.800
1.121
42.761
4.366
17.457
0.393
40.617 15.345
19.279
1.435
39.122 -36.430
18.075 -2.697
40.831 11.331
18.999
0.763

%CHG B %RET C
-7.164 -1.591
-2.101 -14.661
-16.928 -0.705
-3.062 -9.902
-13.338 -0.543
-2.382 -7.346
-24.509 -0.574
-3.777 -9.563
-17.066 -0.456
-2.669 -7.799
-32.301 -0.506
-3.761 -7.802
-38.394 -0.522
-3.426 -6.617
-25.271 -0.347
-2.337 -5.785
-75.551 -0.521
-5.536 -7.884
-29.500 -0.276
-1.984 -5.338

N
1261
1261
1168
1168
1109
1109
1022
1022
1163
1163
933
933
785
785
1008
1008
932
932
1128
1128

We would expect that the ask-side quote would increase in the
absence of other effects.

These results may be ascribed to the general

decline of the market during the period under observation.

The average

change in the spread is consistent with the operation of the
specialist's limit order book and may also reflect the effects of
price-clustering reported by Neiderhofer (1965).

Also, the magnitudes

and monotonicity of the changes are quite similar to those resulting
from bid-side closes.
The behavior observed in TS1 suggests that next day regularities
decline in relative strength as prices (and spreads) get larger.

The

magnitudes of all next day returns are insufficient for trading profits
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after transaction costs are considered.

The regularity of this

behavior is, however, anomalous to the random walk hypothesis.
Results for TS2 are similar to those in TS1.
in Tables 6.8.B.1, 6.8.B.2, and 6.8.B.3.

They are exhibited

When stocks close at or below

the closing bid price, next day returns are positive and significant in
all but the last two deciles.

Spreads are significantly larger and the

percentage change in the spread increases in a monotone fashion similar
to the TS1 result.

Table 6.8.B.1: TS2 Next Day Changes
Close <= Bid
Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

%CHG S
24.133
(18.7)
28.468
(18.7)
32.303
(22.0)
37.834
(19.1)
35.944
(20.5)
35.587
(20.1)
35.670
(20.1)
38.961
(19.2)
39.955
(19.8)
45.312
(17.5)

%CHG A
17.627
(4.39)
25.877
(4.42)
20.287
(4.09)
32.375
(4.36)
30.997
(4.46)
4.350
(0.49)
14.525
(1.32)
23.133
(1.96)
46.092
(3.066
59.929
(2.56)

%CHG B
-6.507
(1.63)
-2.591
(0.45)
-12.016
(2.44)
-5.473
(0.73)
-4.947
(0.71)
-31.237
(3.52)
-21.187
(1.93)
-15.832
(1.34)
6.091
(0.41)
14.621
(0.63)

%RET C
1.515
(15.2)
0.838
(10.6)
0.615
(11.5)
0.601
(8.92)
0.556
(9.60)
0.321
(5.13)
0.348
(5.25)
0.368
(5.69)
0.407
(5.90)
0.326
(4.80)

N
1757
1757
1556
1556
1850
1850
1157
1157
1545
1545
1409
1409
1191
1191
1145
1145
1071
1071
1041
1041

128

Table 6.8.B.2: TS2 Next Day Changes
Bid < Close < Ask
Dec %CHG S
1 -23.147
(27.6)
2 -17.047
(21.2)
3 -14.818
(23.3)
4 -13.731
(18.9)
5 -12.840
(20.8)
6 -10.387
(16.9)
7 -10.804
(12.7)
8
-8.250
(4.07)
9
-8.149
(13.9)
10
-7.762
(11.0)

%CHG A
-9.300
(3.91)
-1.113
(3.39)
4.928
(1.79)
4.622
(1.41)
3.175
(0.97)
4.136
(1.22)
9.707
(2.43)
5.515
(1.20)
0.765
(0.16)
5.743
(0.86)

%CHG B
13.847
5.779
15.932
5.536
19.740
7.183
18.354
5.554
16.012
4.863
14.515
4.263
20.497
5.216
13.746
3.059
8.882
1.889
13.375
1.997

%RET C
0.060
(0.59)
0.115
(1.61)
0.201
(3.91)
0.202
(3.66)
0.124
(2.53)
0.119
(2.75)
0.162
(3.67)
0.105
(2.32)
0.049
(1.29)
0.058
(1.50)

N
1332
1332
1764
1764
2572
2572
1990
1990
2618
2618
2931
2931
2713
2713
2738
2738
3093
3093
2871
2871

Table 6,.8.B.3: TS2 Next Day Changes
Close => Ask
Dec

8

10

%CHG S
25.974
(17.8)
33.371
(18.7)
34.148
(20.2)
36.040
(17.9)
38.159
(19.8)
37.312
(19.1)
36.839
(18.4)
40.878
(19.2)
37.059
(18.3)
39.721
1(7.8)

%CHG A
44.534
(9.51)
44.954
(6.98)
36.181
(6.52)
45.473
(5.31)
46.904
(5.52)
49.136
(4.77)
37.078
(3.35)
42.386
(3.27)
22.124
(1.48)
22.108
(1.01)

%CHG B
18.557
(3.99)
11.583
(1.77)
2.023
(0.36)
9.433
(1.11)
8.741
(1.03)
11.575
(1.13)
0.238
(0.02)
1.477
(0.11)
-15.007
(1.01)
-17.782
(0.82)

%RET C
-0.650
(5.90)
-0.245
(2.88)
-0.304
(5.15)
-0.254
(3.57)
-0.205
(3.10)
-0.203
(2.82)
-0.236
(3.58)
-0.194
(2.79)
-0.247
(3.77)
-0.251
(3.94)

N
1489
1489
1300
1300
1668
1668
1053
1053
1297
1297
1204
1204
1052
1052
1073
1073
1044
1044
1086
1086
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When stocks close on the ask side or above, next day returns are
negative and significant for all deciles.

When stocks close inside the

bid-ask spread, next day spreads were significantly smaller.
The principal differences between the TS1 and TS2 are related to
which side of the spread changes the most.

TS2 bid-side closes were

typically accompanied by a significant increase in the next day ask
quote for eight of the ten deciles.
stocks closed on the ask side.

This was also the situation when

When stocks closed inside the bid-ask

spread, next day returns were positive and significant in six of the
ten deciles.

These particular results are exactly opposite to the

behavior observed in TS1.

A plausible explanation for these

differences is most likely related to the underlying trends in the
stock market.

The expected direction and relative magnitudes of next

day changes are significantly influenced by the trend of the market.
The results reported herein complement those reported earlier by
Neiderhofer and Osborne (1966).

Their study reported the regularity of

intra-daily price-reversals for sequential transactions and nonrandom
limit-order price clustering.
important aspects.

The results reported here differ in two

First, earlier studies did not examine the

relationship of serial price dependencies in relation to bid-ask
spreads.
patterns.

Second, those studies focused on intra-daily trading
The results reported in this study indicate a more

significant regularity in the behavior of next day price changes given
today’s closing price relative to the closing bid-ask spread.

Caution

is warranted in interpreting the implications of these results due to
the relatively small time samples used in the study.

However, the

similarity of next day behavior of the variables in both samples
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suggests that this behavior is more than just the artifact of a
particular sample.
The results reported herein, however, cast a shadow on recent
efforts by Roll (1984), Harris (1985), and others, to measure the
effective bid-ask spread.
assumptions.
spread.

Central to their measurement scheme are two

First, that most trading takes place inside the bid-ask

Hence their assertion that the uninformed trader actual pays a

smaller "effective" spread.

Second, they assume that price

fluctuations within the bid-ask spread are random.

The effective

result is that the effective spread may be measured as

2/-cov, the

relationship hypothesized by Roll (1984) as defining the value of the
effective spread.

The results presented in Tables 6.8.A.1 through

6.8.B.3 indicate significant nonrandom regularities in price behavior
from day to day.

Moreover, the results are nonuniform in magnitude

across different price levels and market trends.

Many trades do occur

at the bid or the ask as well as inside the quoted spread.

Also, there

is evidence presented in the current research to indicate that even
when trades occur inside the bid-ask spread, there is no regularity of
expectation that they occur at the exact center of the spread.

It is

possible that the results presented in this research may cause a reevaluation of theories and methods being developed to measure
"effective" spreads paid by uninformed traders.
In general, the results reported herein provide additional
information on the nature of serial price dependencies at the
microstructure level.

The significant regularity of next day returns

with respect to sign and magnitude would seem to suggest a potentially
exploitable strategy.

We will explore such possibilities when we
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examine the effects of different price constructs on the computation of
a popular market index.

Also, these results may provide some insight

into specialist behavior.

6.7

The DJIA under Alternative Price Assumptions
This study seeks to determine the sensitivity of market indexes to

alternative specifications of closing prices.

The Dow Jones Industrial

Average (DJIA) has been selected for this investigation.

The DJIA is

computed using four different price specifications: Close, Bid, Ask,
and the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes (the "true” price
construct).

Tables 6.9.A (TS1) and 6.9.B (TS2) display the values of

the DJIA index using closing prices (DJIA-C) and the mean of the
closing bid and ask prices (DJIA-M).

Equation (6.4) is used to

calculate the daily value of the index:

DJIA =

I Pn / 1.314

for n = 1,2,,,30

(6.4)

Where: Pn = closing price for each DJIA component stock
1.314 = DJIA divisor

The computed values of the index using closing prices and the mean
of the closing bid and ask quotes are statistically identical.

The

same relationship is true for the index computed with closing bid or
ask prices.

As expected, the DJIA index constructed from closing ask

prices is slightly higher, the DJIA index with closing bid prices
slightly lower than the traditionally constructed index (DJIA-C).
Pairwise correlations correlation coefficients are all in the .97 to
.99 range.

We conclude that the DJIA is insensitive to the closing

price specification used in its construction.
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TABLE 6.9.A: DJIA Alternative Price Assumptions
Closing Distributions and Momentum Index

Day
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Mean
SDev

Test Sample One
(2)
(3)
(4)
DJIA-M
C=B
INS
890.22
23%
47%
883.28
50%
27%
883.70
27%
50%
892.79
33%
43%
886.80
40%
17%
881.28
17%
47%
888.22
30%
40%
33%
892.17
40%
886.84
43%
33%
872.15
60%
23%
27%
33%
875.33
37%
869.20
30%
23%
870.62
43%
875.62
37%
37%
53%
30%
873.72
30%
27%
871.77
37%
869.58
30%
37%
873.48
23%
40%
33%
870.53
868.39
37%
23%
873.72
47%
30%
874.90
20%
50%
33%
27%
882.42
866.01
50%
40%
30%
861.44
43%
861.73
30%
40%
17%
37%
865.92
23%
37%
850.74
843.03
33%
40%
37%
27%
838.80
47%
17%
842.47
23%
847.27
33%
40%
20%
854.12
20%
40%
847.41
33%
845.84
30%
30%
50%
848.89
33%
40%
845.51
50%
27%
842.51
23%
30%
841.13
27%
53%
843.32
37%
13%
862.87
47%
3%
870.34

(5)
C=A
30%
23%
23%
23%
43%
37%
30%
27%
23%
17%
40%
30%
33%
17%
17%
43%
33%
37%
27%
40%
23%
30%
40%
10%
27%
30%
43%
37%
27%
37%
37%
43%
40%
40%
37%
20%
27%
23%
47%
20%
47%
47%

(6)
MI
0.533
0.361
0.494
0.461
0.525
0.589
0.500
0.467
0.400
0.278
0.572
0.428
0.450
0.356
0.306
0.572
0.519
0.489
0.428
0.506
0.367
0.544
0.522
0.311
0.417
0.500
0.617
0.461
0.456
0.558
0.450
0.561
0.609
0.494
0.528
0.344
0.433
0.507
0.594
0.333
0.911
0.700

Summary Statistics
33%
35%
866.42 866.34
9%
11%
16.04
15.87

32%
9%

0.487
0.114

(1)
DJIA-C
890.22
882.61
883.85
892.69
886.99
881.75
888.22
892.03
886.51
871.48
875.95
868.72
870.53
875.00
873.10
871.96
869.67
873.48
870.34
868.25
873.10
875.00
882.52
865.30
861.02
861.78
866.53
850.46
847.70
838.95
842.28
847.60
855.12
847.41
845.89
848.27
845.03
842.75
841.51
842.66
864.25
871.10
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Table 6.9.B: DJIA Alternative Price Assumptions
Closing Distributions and Momentum Index

DAY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Mean
SDev

(1)
DJIA-C
1021.77
1024.54
1022.44
1046.70
1047.56
1038.01
1022.54
1015.47
1021.20
1007.54
992.65
987.20
1004.78
999.90
1020.05
1027.79
1038.68
1062.74
1051.47
1053.19
1041.06
1039.53
1022.36
1041.54
1041.16
1070.00
1074.87
1090.15
1081.46
1080.69
1071.05
1077.54
1080.79
1077.06
1069.04
1072.00
1057.30
1033.23
1043.64
1039.63
1063.84
1065.80
1075.44

Test Sample Two
(2)
(3)
(4)
DJIA-M
C=B
INS
1022.35
33%
37%
1024.59
37%
33%
1022.39
40%
30%
1046.27
23%
37%
1047.60
27%
43%
1038.29
30%
50%
1022.11
27%
47%
1015.76
43%
33%
1021.06
33%
40%
47%
27%
1008.02
17%
991.50
33%
987.11
27%
40%
1005.54
43%
33%
13%
53%
999.52
27%
40%
1019.72
50%
23%
1027.69
1038.91
40%
43%
40%
20%
1061.88
40%
30%
1051.95
43%
27%
1053.05
30%
43%
1041.68
37%
33%
1039.87
30%
1021.77
27%
37%
10%
1040.87
27%
27%
1040.63
37%
33%
1070.04
47%
27%
1074.87
27%
33%
1089.62
30%
1080.84
23%
37%
37%
1080.98
30%
47%
1071.29
30%
30%
1077.30
23%
43%
1080.88
37%
47%
1077.68
37%
33%
1068.71
23%
43%
1072.34
47%
23%
1057.44
43%
33%
1033.66
37%
33%
1043.83
40%
30%
1040.11
33%
13%
1062.41
27%
20%
1064.89
30%
27%
1075.34

(5)
C=A
30%
30%
30%
40%
30%
20%
27%
23%
27%
27%
50%
33%
23%
33%
33%
27%
17%
40%
30%
30%
27%
30%
43%
53%
47%
30%
27%
40%
47%
27%
23%
40%
33%
17%
30%
33%
30%
23%
30%
30%
53%
53%
43%

(6)
MI
0.385
0.490
0.510
0.582
0.491
0.452
0.569
0.452
0.527
0.404
0.761
0.521
0.357
0.571
0.557
0.517
0.456
0.667
0.400
0.524
0.377
0.434
0.842
0.635
0.612
0.491
0.500
0.600
0.633
0.437
0.447
0.561
0.478
0.386
0.569
0.429
0.471
0.426
0.463
0.407
0.763
0.686
0.518

1044.54
26.46

Summary Statistics
36%
31%
1044.47
8%
9%
26.43

33%
9%

0.520
0.109
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Columns (3),

(4), and (5) in Tables 6.9.A and 6.9.B capture the

distribution percentages of the DJIA stocks’ closing prices in relation
to the closing bid-ask price spreads.

Not shown in Tables 6.9.A or

6.9.B are the small number of stocks closing outside the closing bidask spread.

The incidence of DJIA stocks closing outside the bid-ask

range occurred less than 10 times per sample.

This result is not

surprising as the DJIA issues are very actively traded.

Average daily

(NYSE) trading volume during the TS1 period was in excess of 140,000
shares.
Earlier we described the regularity of next day price moves when
today's closing prices relative to the closing bid and ask price quotes
are known.

We investigate if a meaningful relationship exists in where

the DJIA stocks close in relation the closing bid and ask price quotes
and next day moves in the DJIA.
To capture the combined effects of the closing price distributions
we utilize the Momentum Index (MI).

Figures 6.1.A and 6.1.B plot the

daily values of the momentum index (MI) as well as the trend of the
DJIA over the TS1 and TS2 periods, respectively.

Column (6) in tables

6.8.A and 6.8.B list the daily values of the MI.

In effect, the MI

summarizes the closing distribution data in columns (3) through (5) in
a more meaningful format.

The mean value for the DJIA component stocks

for TS1 is .487, reflecting the general downward trend of the market
and the very slight dominance of bid-side closes.

The TS1 mean MI

value is insignificantly different from an expected value of .500 (t =
-.625).

The mean value for TS2 is .520 and the t-value = 1.005.

Momentum Index
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Uomenrtim Index

Figure 6.1.A.
TS1 DJIA versus Momentum Index.
Values plotted are for
the period December 1, 1981 through January 29, 1982.

Figure 6.I.B.
TS2 DJIA versus Momentum Index.
Values plotted are for
the period December 1, 1982 through January 31, 1983.
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We next test the correlations of time t's MI and time t+l's DJIA.
If the closing distributions are useful in predicting next day returns,
then we should observe a positive correlation between MIt and DJIACt+i.

The calculated correlation coefficients for MIt and DJIA-Ct+|

for TS1 and TS2 are .0624 and .0965, respectively.
MIt and DJIA-Mt+1 were .0612 (TS1) and .0962 (TS2).

Correlations for
The signs are

positive as expected, but the MI appears to offer limited knowledge in
forecasting the DJIA in either of the two specifications tested.

We

can explain less than 1% of the variation in the day (t+l)'s DJIA from
the information contained in day (t)'s momentum index.

A probable

explanation for the weak correlations may be found in the effects of
portfolio diversification.

As more issues are added to a portfolio,

the strong correlations for individual stocks described in the previous
section are attenuated by the averaging out of bid- and ask-side
closes.

6.8

Security Risk Measures under Alternative Assumptions
We are interested in determining if the use of alternative return

measurement specifications reduce the degree of errors in estimated
betas when using the market model (see equation 3.12).

Herein betas

are estimated using returns measured close-to-close (Beta-C) and
returns measured using the mean of the closing bid and ask spread
(Beta-M).

The results are reported for price-stratified data similar

to that used in prior sections.

All returns are computed using

equation (6.7):

Ri - [ (Pt + Dt> / pt-l 1 - 1

(6.7)
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Tables 6.10.A and 6.10.B present the results of estimating beta
using the market model for each of the return generating model
assumptions.

In each case the ’’market” portfolio consists of all 1134

issues in TS1 and 1205 issues in TS2.

Two sets of cross-sectional

averages of all stocks in each decile are examined: the average beta
estimate for each price specification (Beta-C, Beta-M) and the average
standard error of the estimate (SEE-C, SEE-M).

The differences between

the means for each set of paired estimates are tested statistically and
the results are reported in columns (3) and (6).

Table 6.10.A: Market Model Betas & Alternative Price Definitions
Cross-sectional Means for TS1
(Dec81-Jan82)

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(1)
Beta-C
1.053
0.887
0.950
0.899
0.936
1.089
0.962
0.986
1.183
1.046

(2)
Beta-M
0.991
0.871
0.937
0.879
0.933
1.104
0.984
1.012
1.201
1.070

(3)
t-test
0.518
0.180
0.152
0.198
0.028
-0.158
-0.214
-0.313
-0.212
-0.362

(4)
SEE-C
0.034
0.022
0.020
0.018
0.017
0.018
0.017
0.016
0.016
0.013

(5)
SEE-M
0.029
0.021
0.019
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.013

(6)
t-test
3.148
1.345
1.500
0.161
0.896
0.534
0.695
0.380
0.500
0.339

The results reported in Table 6.10.A, column (3), indicate that
there are no significant differences, on average, in the magnitudes of
the beta estimates using the two closing price specifications for any
of the price stratified deciles.

The general tendency is for lower

price stocks to have slightly lower betas and higher price stocks to
have slightly higher betas when returns are computed from expected
closing prices.

Column (6) indicates that statistically significant

increases in estimation efficiencies are achieved for the lowest price
stock decile.

The efficiency gains decrease as prices get larger.
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Similar results are reported in TS2 (Table 6.10.B).

Mean

estimated betas are slightly lower when returns computed from expected
closing prices are utilized instead of observed closing prices.

The

differences in the two sets of beta estimates are insignificantly
different from zero.

Obvious increases in ex post prediction

efficiency are evident in the lowest price decile and decreasing
rapidly as prices get larger.

Table 6.10.B: Market Model Betas & Alternative Price Definitions
Cross-sectional Means for TS2 (Dec82-Jan83)

Dec
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(1)
Beta-C
1.214
1.077
0.897
0.922
0.929
0.969
0.951
1.029
1.005
1.052

(2)
Beta-M
1.179
1.066
0.899
0.911
0.935
0.978
0.963
1.032
1.009
1.063

(3)
t-test
0.325
0.110
-0.031
0.144
-0.081
-0.116
-0.152
-0.050
-0.075
-0.199

(4)
SEE-C
0.039
0.027
0.022
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.020
0.020
0.018
0.018

(5)
SEE-M
0.035
0.026
0.021
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.019
0.019
0.018
0.018

(6)
t-test
2.638
1.047
1.264
0.138
0.809
0.584
0.486
0.193
0.499
0.298

The increase in estimation efficiency for the lowest priced stocks
when returns are computed using the mean of the closing bid-ask spread
suggest a potential source of low-price or size effects reported in the
anomalies literature.

Additional testing with larger samples of

closing bid-ask data may be necessary to determine fully the extent of
any efficiency increases.

This type of data may also prove useful in

helping to explain low-price effects.

CHAPTER

7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter begins with a review of the objectives underlying the
current research effort and summarizes its findings.

The review is

followed by a discussion of the insights acquired into the structural
relationships between theoretical price constructs and observed prices,
theoretical returns and risk, and observed returns and risk measure¬
ments.

The implications of those observations are also discussed.

A

note on the limitations of the current study completes the discussion
and review.

The chapter closes with a delineation of potential areas

for further research.

7.1

Review of Objectives and Results
The following issues were investigated in this study:

1.

How accurately do observed closing prices approximate the
theoretically expected closing prices?

2.

How accurately do returns computed from closing prices
approximate returns computed from expected closing prices?

3.

To what extent are findings of empirical anomalies the result
of a misspecification of the returns generating process?

4.

How sensitive are measures of relative risk (beta) when
alternative price constructs are used?

In addition to the issues listed above, an investigation was conducted
on the nature of the serial correlational behavior of sequential stock
prices.
To evaluate the first issue, two stock price series were compared.
The first price series was composed of the market closing prices for
all stocks in the test and the verification samples for the time
periods under observation.

These prices were treated as approximations
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for expected closing prices.

The second price series was constructed

from the mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes for all stocks in
the samples.

The second set of prices should be exactly equal to

expected closing prices in an efficient market.

Efficient market

theory suggests that the means of the two price series should be equal.
The empirical results based on the comparison of the two prices series
from two separate samples indicate that:
1.

The means of the two price series are significantly different
and the average magnitude of the difference is approximately
equal to one cent.

2.

The magnitude and sign of the of the difference is sensitive
to the effects of trends in closing prices. Bear trends
produce negative biases, bull trends positive biases.

3.

Estimation errors are sensitive to price levels. The average
magnitude of the error declines as prices get very large.
The second issue was evaluated by computing two sets of returns.

The first set of returns was computed utilizing observed closing prices
and is typical of the method used to compute security returns.

The

second set was computed using the mean of the closing bid and ask
prices.
returns.

Returns computed using the latter series approximate true
A comparison of the two return series indicates that:

1.

Observed returns are typically less negative (more positive)
than true returns and are slightly more volatile.

2.

The magnitude of the return estimation errors are non-linear
in price. The estimation error is positive and random.

3.

No significant differences are observed between the two
return series for the combined samples.
The third issue dealt with the persistence of empirical anomalies

when alternative price and return generating process specifications are
considered.

Returns were computed using three specifications for

prices; close-to-close, ask-to-bid (market order), and bid-to-ask
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(limit-order).

A comparison of the three sets of returns indicates

that:
1.

The persistence of the low price anomaly is dependent upon the
method used to measure returns and the characteristics of the
sample. Small low price effects were found in the test sample;
much larger and more significant effects in the verification
sample.

2.

The evidence indicates that the weekend effect may be sensitive
to the number of stocks going ex-dividend on Mondays compared to
Fridays. With very few exceptions, no weekend effect is observed
in sub-samples of stocks which did not go ex-dividend on Mondays.

3.

The weekend effect is inconsistent across price ranges. Less than
half of all deciles displayed strong weekend effects; three
displayed no weekend effect and these three deciles included the
lowest and highest price deciles.

4.

Samples containing substantial numbers of ex-dividend stocks
result in significant weekend effects.

5.

The January effect appears to be more complex than a simple
end-of-year or tax-induced phenomenon. It also appears to
involve a broader spectrum of stocks.
The last issue investigated required the estimation of relative

risk (beta) measures using closing prices and expected closing prices
(mean of the closing bid and ask price quotes).

The results of this

study indicate that:
1.

Relative risk estimates are not statistically different when
expected closing prices are used to compute returns rather than
using observed closing prices.

2.

The ex-post standard error of the estimate improves marginally when
expected closing price equivalents are utilized to estimate
relative risk.
An investigation related to the fourth issue examined the nature

of serial correlations observed in sequential prices.

The objective of

these tests was to determine if movements in a market index could be
forecasted given knowledge of today's closing prices relative to the
closing bid-ask price quotes.

The principal question is whether a
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relationship exists between today's closing price and tomorrow's
expected return. The results of this investigation reveal that:
1.

Day (t+1) returns are systematically related to where stocks
close day(t). Closes at the ask and inside the closing bidask spread are typically followed by significantly negative
returns the next trading day. Closes at the bid are typically
followed by positive returns the next trading day.

2.

Close-to-close returns are systematically greater in magnitude
(positively or negatively) than close-to-open returns.

3.

The magnitude of the day(t+1) returns are inversely related to
price; the lower the price, the greater the magnitude.

4.

The magnitude of next day returns are insufficient for one to earn
trading profits when brokerage and spread costs are considered.

5.

The closing price location of stocks are significantly related
to changes in the spread. Bid- and ask-side closes are typically
followed by increases in the spread. Stocks which close inside the
bid-ask spread experience significantly smaller next-day spreads.

6.

The magnitude of the change in spread is related to price for bidside closes. The larger the price, the greater the magnitude of
next day spread changes. When stocks close inside the bid-ask
spread, the relationship is inverse; the larger the price, the
smaller the spread change. Ask-side closes generally have smaller
changes.

7.2

Insights and Implications
Are prior tests of market efficiency and the asset pricing models

affected by the specification of price structures and return
measurement models?

The general results of this study suggest that

significant problems exist with the results of all general market
studies which rely on closing prices to measure returns.

When closing

prices are solely utilized to compute holding period returns,
substantial biases are induced.

The biases introduced result from the

exclusion of market trading behavior from efficient market theory.
Efficient market theory may be reasonably described as a normative
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theory.

When return computation methods incorporate market trading

behavior, substantially different results obtain.

The specification of

expected closing prices by some researchers is viewed as an attempt to
minimize price measurement errors.

A more positive view requires that

the prices most likely to be obtained by a public trader are the prices
which ought to be used to compute returns.
The most significant implication of this study pertains to
anomalous findings in tests of market efficiency.

When market trading

patterns are incorporated in return measurement models, substantially
different results are obtained.

The significance of the low price

effect is largely a function of the assumptions used to specify the
price structures utilized in computing returns.

Moreover, the presence

and magnitude of low price effects are related to the methodology used
to measure portfolio returns.

Finally, research results reporting an

unstable low price effect or an unstable size effect may be affected by
the magnitudes of the market trends contained in the research sample.
Blume and Stambaugh (1983), Keim (1983), et al., frequently subdivide
their samples into smaller subsamples and examine the strength of the
anomalies in each subsample.

A frequent observation is that these

effects are unstable over time.

The relatively small sample used in

the current investigation suggests that bear markets appear to produce
the smallest low price effects; bull markets the largest effects.
Additional research is indicated with larger samples of bid-ask data.
In the case of the weekend effect, a substantial explanation for
the anomaly may stem from poor controls for ex-dividend effects in
prior studies.

The tendency for large numbers of stocks to go ex-

dividend on Mondays in contrast to Fridays appears to be the principal
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cause of the evidence for a weekend effect.
uniform across all price levels.

Also, the effect is not

It is statistically absent in the

lowest and highest price deciles.

7.2.1

Closing Prices and Returns
Efficient market theory acknowledges the variation of prices over

time as prices adjust to new information.

In general, the mean of

observed closing prices should be equal to the expected closing prices.
In an efficient market, the expected closing price should be equal to
the mean of the bid and ask prices.

The results of this study indicate

that, from the point of view of a statistical test for equality of
means, the observed and expected means are different.

The magnitude of

the differences are also sensitive to the underlying market trend. The
greater the volatility of the market,

the larger the difference.

The

sign of the difference is dependent upon the bearish or bullish nature
of the market: Bear markets produce negative magnitudes, bull markets
positive magnitudes.

The market trends examined in this study did not

produce a difference with a positive sign.

The results, however,

clearly indicate that the sign and magnitude of the difference is
related to the underlying market trend.

An unresolved question is why

the verification sample momentum indexes tended to indicate averages
below .500 for a market in a major bull move.

Recent research has

suggested that market prices tend to move up toward the end of the
trading session.
research.

This suggests a potential area for additional
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7.2.2

Empirical Anomalies and Price Specifications
How sensitive are findings of empirical anomalies to alternative

price specifications in the return generating process?

The results of

this investigation do not provide a definitive answer.

Low price

effects were found in the test and verification samples for returns
measured using closing prices.

When market order-based returns are

utilized, the effect is insignificant for the bear market sample and
substantially significant in the bull market sample.

Similar results

are found using returns based on limit order executions.

A partial

explanation may be related to the behavior of the bid-ask spread and
the minimum size of the spread for low priced stocks.
Another possible explanation for the different results stems from
the implicit assumptions of the normative character of efficient
markets theory.

The time series average of observed closing prices are

very likely equal to expected closing prices for samples covering
longer periods of time.

But expected closing prices are not likely to

be obtained by a public trader using a market order.

Executions at the

bid or the ask price are more likely, especially for lower priced
stocks with narrow dollar spreads and low trading volumes.
immediate result is an increase in specialist participation;
are bought at the ask and sold at the bid.

The
stocks

Computed returns based on

trading patterns are substantially lower than returns computed from
closing prices.

The general result is an inconsistency between the

behavioral implications of efficient market theory and the actual
behavior of the market.

Most market studies have relied on price data

inconsistent with obtainable prices.
anomalous to market efficiency.

The results have shown up as

The general implication of this study
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is that at least some prior anomalous findings may be artifacts of the
misuse of observed closing prices as obtainable prices rather than
prices obtainable by public traders using market orders.

The implied

inefficiency of the market or inadequacy of the asset pricing models
are critically tied to the fallacy implicit in positive implementations
of a normative theory.

The degree to which efficient market tests

abstract from the real operation of the market may underlie the
anomalous results reported in the literature.
In the case of weekend effects, prior reports of behavior
anomalous to the random walk hypothesis failed to control for the
incidence of ex-dividend day effects.

The results of this study

indicate that the effects are related mainly to stocks going exdividend.

Stocks which do not go ex-dividend on Monday do not exhibit

significant negative weekend returns in contrast to Monday-Tuesday
returns.

Also, the effect is not generalized across all price ranges.

It is strongly present in three of the ten deciles and totally absent
in three others.

The remaining four deciles exhibit varying degrees of

weekend effects.

The implication of these results is that the effect

is sample specific.

Samples with large numbers of dividend paying

stocks have a high probability of ex-dividend dates falling on Monday.
Accordingly, weekend effects are likely to be present. When samples
exclude stocks going ex-dividend on Mondays, the effect is essentially
absent.

7.2.3

Autocorrelation and the Behavior of Stock Prices
A startling discovery in this research is the additional insight

provided by information on the position of the closing price relative
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to the closing bid-ask spread.

Several earlier studies in security

market behavior reported the presence of negative serial correlation in
sequential price series for individual securities.
significantly expands those results.

This study

Specifically, the next-trading

day returns are directly influenced by where stocks close.

Also, the

magnitude of the next-day returns are strongly and inversely related to
price level; lower price stocks tend to have substantially larger
relative (percentage) changes than higher priced stocks.

These results

suggest that a portion of the low price effect may be tied to the
autocorrelational properties of sequential stock prices and to
statistical artifacts arising from the price level and the magnitude of
the change in dollar terms.

Also, the mis-estimation of risk does not

appear to be the reason for excess returns accruing to the low price
stocks.

The oscillation of recorded transaction prices between the bid

and ask price spread appears to induce higher coefficients of variation
(risk) in stock returns.

When stock returns are measured using market

or limit orders, substantially lower coefficients of variation (risk)
are obtained.

It would appear that the mis-estimation of risk due to

nonsynchronous trading is an insufficient explanation for the size
effect.

The low price effect is also affected by the relative scales

of the change magnitude (in cents) and the average dollar value of the
security.

Thus, one cent changes result in substantially larger

effects for low priced stocks in comparison to higher priced stocks.

7.2.4

Price Specifications and Relative (Beta) Risk
Results reported in this study indicate that a small portion of

beta estimation errors arise from the use of observed prices as
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equivalents for expected closing prices.

The magnitudes are small and

generally insignificant for the sample examined.

A larger sample might

yield different results.
Differences in betas estimated from closing prices or expected
closing prices do not differ significantly.

Marginal improvements in

ex-post forecasting efficiency are obtained when expected closing
prices are utilized rather than closing prices.

This observation is

most likely the result of removing the price estimation bias when
observed closing prices are utilized instead of expected closing
prices.

Moreover, the estimation bias is strongest in the lowest price

deciles.

7.3

Limitations
In drawing inferences from the empirical results of this study,

the limited size and time frame of the samples need to be kept in mind.
The underlying trends of the market may have biased the sign and the
magnitude of the results reported.

Also, the restriction of the sample

to NYSE stocks may have attenuated the magnitude of low price effects
for close-to-close returns.

Finally, the attenuation of the low price

effect when returns are measured ask-to-bid may be more pronounced for
larger samples of lower priced stocks (such as might be found on the
AMEX or OTC) and similar absolute spread characteristics.
Notwithstanding these reservations, the results of this study shed
important light on the methods by which normative theories are
operationalized.

Efficient market theory does not consider the

practical aspects of the mechanics of trading in a market dominated in
many instances by the market specialist.

The strong effects of spreads
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and limit-order price clustering may underlie findings of anomalous
behavior.

The regularity of next day price behavior is potentially

troublesome.

Statistical tests of samples require that the populations

from which they are drawn be normally distributed.

The evidence

presented in this study indicates the existence of stronger
regularities than previously thought.

Also, these regularities may

distort efficient market test results.
The alternative methodologies employed in this study for measuring
returns yield substantially less volatile day-to-day returns.

The re¬

specification of the return generating process to reflect the operation
of security markets dominated by specialist activity and liquidity
costs are suggested as important corrections for analyzing efficient
market operation.

Specifically, in the absence of Walrasian market

structures and strictly continuous trading among a large number of
traders, the imposition of liquidity providing agents alters
substantially the operationalization of efficient market theory.

The

effective result is an attenuation of one category of market anomalies;
ie., the size effect.

7.4

Extensions
The results of this study suggest at least three major extensions

for future research.

The first extension would be to examine a larger

data set of closing bid and ask prices.

This expanded data set would

include at least six full years of closing bid and ask prices, closing
prices, and trading volumes. In order to prepare such a large data
sample in computer readable form, a monthly time horizon would be
advisable.

Accordingly, 72 days of data would be utilized. The
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expanded data set would include at least one complete market cycle.
This sample would be used to test more fully the biases induced in
computed returns when closing prices are utilized to compute returns in
preference to expected closing prices.

The results of the current

study indicate a potentially rich topic for investigation.
A second area for extending the current study relates to risk
measures (beta) and market efficiency.

The limited time sample used in

this study did not permit a viable estimate of beta.

The preliminary

results indicated some increases in estimation efficiency.
Accordingly, a data set with sixty months of historical data would
permit estimates of beta utilizing expected closing prices as well as
closing prices.

The two risk estimates could then be tested on the

sixth year of data.

This study design would more closely resemble the

more typical test of market efficiency using the CAPM.
The third extension is a more detailed examination of bid-ask
spread behavior, particularly for low price stocks.

The results

reported in this investigation indicate a spread magnitude larger than
that predicted by regression analysis.

A portion of the size effect

may be related to the behavior of this variable.

The bid-ask spread

may also be a missing factor in the asset pricing model.
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